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Customized Marriage
JAMES HERBIE DIFoNzo*
There is nothing intrusive or overbearing about offering the choice of a stronger
marriage contract accompanied by preparation and reinforcement to a
generation seeking what many of its members did not have as children-the
security of a two-parent family.'
Would we be married, then? I said.
What would be the need of that? he said. Marriage never did any good, as far as
I can see; for if the two are of a mind to keep together, they will; and ifnot, then
one of them will run off, and that's the long and short of it.2
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INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
AT THE DAwN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Americans have always taken their pursuit of happiness to the altar, and the
frequent failures of our marital enterprises have diminished neither our efforts nor our
expectations. In a 1930 essay entitled Romantic Divorce, Katharine Fullerton Gerould
identified "the American habit of acting promptly on our marital dissatisfactions,"3
a predilection stemming from "our seeing marriage as an intensely personal and an
intensely romantic affair."4 Connubial individualism has a lengthy pedigree.5 The
legal theory of marriage insisted that once wife and husband wed, the legal status of
their marriage was placed almost exclusively in the state's hands. But this formulation
was honored only in the breach and in the halcyon rhetoric of appellate opinions.6 For
3. Katharine Fullerton Gerould, Romantic Divorce, 88 SCRMNER'S MAG. 485,485 (1930).
4. Id.
5. In the words ofamodem family law scholar, Americans believe in a"fundamental right
to marry, and marry, and marry." Mary Ann Glendon, The New Marriage and the New
Property, in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES: AREAS OF LEGAL,
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CHANGE 59, 63 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N. Fetz eds., 1980). A
popular anti-divorce tract points to a "nagging paradox: Americans express a high regard for
marriage and a great willingness to end marriages." MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF
MARRIAGE: How WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE 219 (1996). Nor is this sentiment new. See,
e.g., Decency in Divorce, 127 NATION 214 (1928) ("American divorce used to be considered
a scandal; it has become an institution. It used to be considered a menace to the home; it may
come to be looked upon as a bulwark of marriage."); W.D. Howells, Editor's Easy Chair, 140
HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG. 566, 566 (1920) ("In both [divorce and marriage] the main motive
seems to be love, though the course of this popular passion is more circuitous in divorce than
in marriage."); Doris Stevens, Uniformity in Divorce, 76 FORUM 322, 324 (1926) (stating that
"easy divorce is a civilized thing" but the institution of marriage remains vital). See generally
J. HERBiE DIFoNzO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 43-61 (1997) (describing the popular and legal
support for divorce in the 1920s).
6. The Supreme Court limned the three-party social contract of marriage over a century
ago in a case in which it condemned the "loose morals and shameless conduct of the husband"
as "meriting the strongest reprobation," but nonetheless declaimed marriage as a lofty ideal:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always
been subject to the control of the legislature.
... The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various
obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888). These oft-cited formulations of marriage's
moral purity are at odds with the opportunistic conduct at issue in the case. The husband left
his first wife and children in Ohio in 1850 and headed for the Oregon Territory, promising to
continue to support them and either to return within two years or to send for them. But the
husband reneged on his promise of support and instead abandoned them. He then secured the
passage of a legislative act in the Oregon Territory granting him a divorce from his first wife,
and soon afterwards married again. The Supreme Court condemned the husband's behavior
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at least a hundred years, argued Gerould, Americans "have envisaged marriage as a
purely individual, not at all as a social, contract, and have refused to consider any
marriage successful that did not maintain, for both parties, a high romantic
satisfaction."7 We pay a price in this quest for "white-hot emotional perfection,"' of
course. And Gerould judged the matter correctly, for her generation as for its
successors: "As long as personal happiness is made the only desideratum in marriage,
the divorce courts will be full."9
But even the equable Gerould would likely have been astonished had she lived to
see just how full divorce courts became in the wake of the no-fault divorce
revolution.'0 Between 1970 and 1996, the number of divorced Americans more than
quadrupled, from 4.3 million to 18.3 million." Although the divorce rate declined
but held that the territorial legislature had the power to award the legislative divorce. See id.
at 210. This lack of congruence between legal theory and reality in domestic relations
developed in the infancy of American history. See NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN
DIVORCE 38-39 (1999) (describing post-Revolutionary pressure for consensual divorces);
MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMENANDTHE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 58-80 (1986)
(describing colonial practice of "wife sale" and arbitrated extra-legal divorces).
7. Gerould, supra note 3, at 486. Gerould's reference in 1930 to the passage of a hundred
years constituted more than rhetorical flourish. The 1830s marked the beginning of a public
argument between feminism and the "ideology of domesticity," focusing on tensions in the
hierarchical relationship between men and women. NANCY F. CoTr, THE BONDS OF
WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 5-9 (1977); see also
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, A JUDGMENT FOR SOLOMON: THE D'HAUTEVILLE CASE AND LEGAL
EXPERIENCEIN ANTEBELLUMAMERICA (1996) (case study ofAmerican marriage in the 1830s,
documenting the early inroads of romantic individualism into the realm of matrimonial
hierarchy).
8. Gerould, supra note 3, at 486.
9. Id. In this view, divorces are aproduct of our cultural assumptions about marriage. See
David L. Cohn, Are Americans Polygamous?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1947, at 30, 32.
We teach our young that to be married is automatically to be happy. We believe
that everybody is, ought to be, or can be made happy; that all are "entitled" to
happiness as to fresh air. . . . But simultaneously, in our anarchy of
impermanence, we believe that if we are not happy in one marriage we shall
surely be happy in another.
Id. at 32; see also Christopher Lasch, Divorce American Style, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17,
1966, at 3, 4 ("Easy divorce is a form of social insurance that has to be paid by a society which
holds up domesticity as a universally desirable condition .... ).
10. On the history of modern no-fault divorce in the United States, see DIFONZO, supra
note 5. See also HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION
(1991). Roderick Phillips provided a good international overview ofdivorcetrends in the West
in RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTrrING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOcIETY
(1988).
1I. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Numbers of Divorced and Never-
MarriedAdults Increasing, Says Census Bureau Report (visited Apr. 13, 1998) <http://www.
census.gov/Press-Releaselcb98-56.html>. The question whether no-fault divorce resulted in
the booming divorce rates is problematic and beyond the direct scope of this Article. Note,
however, that a causative relationship is central to the no-fault divorce "counterrevolution."
Compare H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private
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slightly after its peak in the mid-1980s, 2 we still fail at marriage almost as often as
we succeed, and critics see a drift into a "divorce culture"' 3 whose goal is "the
abolition of marriage,"' 4 to cite the titles of two recent popular broadsides.
In reaction to the perceived excesses of no-fault divorce, a movement has
crystallized to reduce the incidence of divorce in America."5 Reminiscent of the
Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437,452-53 (1986) (finding that no-fault laws have virtually
no influence on the probability of divorce), with Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault
Laws andAt-Fault People, 18 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 325, 340 (1998) ("Our study of divorce
rates... provides the strongest evidence to date that no-fault laws are associated with higher
divorce levels."). On the no-fault "counterrevolution," see Part II.C.
12. The divorce rate per 1000 people declined from 5.0 in 1985 to 4.7 in 1990 to 4.1 in
1995. See Decline of Traditional American Family Slows in 90's (visited May 28, 1998)
<http:/cnn.com/US/9805/28/family.figures>; see also U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 74 (1997). The recent history of Canadian divorce rates
delineates a similar parabola. Before the Divorce Act of 1968, Divorce Act, ch. 24, 1967-1968
S.C. 187 (Can.), the divorce rate sat at eight percent. By 1987, a year after the institution of no-
fault divorce, the rate had rocketed to 44%; 10 years later it had fallen to 40%. Robert Glossop,
director of the Vanier Institute of the Family in Ottawa, described the Canadian divorce
experience in terms that apply equally to the United States: "'The levels [of divorce] have
come down, and are relatively stable. But they are stable at a historically unprecedented high
rate."' Sharon Doyle Driedger, After Divorce, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 20, 1998, at 39.
13. BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997). Whitehead's book had
its genesis in her influential 1993 article, Barbara Defoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right,
ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 47. In that piece, Whitehead argued that Americans in the 1970s
largely destigmatized divorce because the mores had shifted from protecting children's well-
being to pursuing adult happiness. See id. at 52. Divorce became merely an escape hatch from
a tumultuous relationship. But her review of social science studies reflecting the serious
damage to children of divorce concluded that "growing up in an intact two-parent family is an
important source of advantage for American children." Id. at 80. Whitehead's 1993 article
"finally penetrated, and to some extent shattered, the widely popular public perception that
divorce is a positive personal experience and that children are resilient and suffer only short-
term harm from their parents' divorce." Katherine Shaw Spaht, Propter Honoris Respectum:
For the Sake ofthe Children: Recapturing the Meaning ofMarriage, 73 NOTREDAME L. REV.
1547, 1555 (1998) (footnote omitted).
14. GALLAGHER, supra note 5. Gallagher's thesis is apocalyptic:
The overthrow of the marriage culture and its replacement by a postmarital
culture is the driving force behind almost all of the gravest problems facing
America--crime, poverty, welfare dependence, homelessness, educational
stagnation, even child abuse. Above all, the decline of marriage is behind the
precarious sense of economic instability haunting so many Americans in this time
of statistical economic abundance.
Id. at 3-4. Along with Whitehead, see supra note 13, Maggie Gallagher has been the most cited
author in the current divorce debate. As an illustration of their influence, note that Katherine
Shaw Spaht, who drafted the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Law, relied on what she termed the
"powerful contributions" of Whitehead and Gallagher, remarking that she used Gallagher's The
Abolition of Marriage as a "prop during testimony before the Louisiana legislative
committees." Spaht, supra note 13, at 1547.
15. See, e.g., Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault: A Developing Legislative
Movement Hopes To Slow the Nation's Divorce Rate by Making It Harderfor Couples To Call
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outraged reaction against Victoria Woodhull's "war upon marriage" 6 a century ago,
one recent indictment charged that "increased abuse and other undesirable behavior
is a natural consequence of the fact that in some states the marriage contract cannot
be enforced."'7 Iowa Governor Terry Branstad criticized no-fault divorce for
"transform[ing] marriage into an arrangement of convenience rather than an act of
commitment.""' The Michigan Family Forum referred to marriage in the age of no-
It Quits, 83 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 50; Rob Gurwitt, The Politics of Divorce: That Broken
Marriages Create a Societal Cost Is Now a Matter of Consensus. How To Reduce It Is a
Subject of Ferocious Dispute, GOVERNING, May 1996, at 34-40; Pia Nordlinger, The Anti-
Divorce Revolution, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 2, 1998, at 25.
16. BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE OF SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND
THE SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL 274 (1998). "'Law cannot compel two to love,"'
Woodhull opined, and as a "free lover" in the Victorian age she claimed the "'inalienable,
constitutional, and natural right to love whom I may, to love for as long or as short a period
as I can, to change that love every day if I please!' Id. at 301, 303 (quoting Victoria
Woodhull).
17. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 869, 869 (1994); see also Gary L. Bauer, Editorial, End No-Fault Divorce, USA
TODAY, Dec. 29, 1995, at 1OA ("Marriage is more than a contract. But, in a peculiar twist of
public policy, the parties to it are accorded less protection than they would enjoy in, say, the
typical lawn care contract."); Melanie Phillips, Whitehall Confettifor the Death ofMarriage,
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 1, 1998, Features ("unlike anything in civil law, people can
tear up the contract of marriage without justification or redress"). But see Ira Mark Ellman &
Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for
Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 719, 772 ("Our examination... of Brinig and
Crafton... finds no evidence to persuade us that fault divorce could confer benefits at all,
much less benefits adequate to outweigh its costs.").
The complaint about the friable nature of contemporary conjugal relationships constitutes
a historical transposition of Victoria Woodhull's assertion that the evils of marriage stemmed
from the enforcement of the marriage contract, which allowed men to subjugate women.
Woodhull claimed to make "'war upon marriage... because it is... the most terrible curse
from which humanity now suffers, entailing more misery, sickness, and premature death than
all other causes combined."' GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 274 (quoting Victoria Woodhull)
(first omission in original, second omission added); see also ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENTINTHE UNITED STATES 64 (1973) (quoting the
wedding vows of Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell: "'the present laws of marriage... refuse
to recognize the wife as an independent, rational being, while they confer upon the husband
an injurious and unnatural superiority'). A modem echo of Woodhull's plaint may be heard
in Martha Fineman's call for the elimination of special rules governing marriage and divorce,
and for regulating relationships between adult sexual partners according to the ordinary rules
of civil and criminal law. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-29 (1995); see also
JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES: STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 269 (1990) (arguing in favor of the demise of the family as
an "ideological concept that imposes mythical homogeneity on the diverse means by which
people organize their intimate relationships").
18. Terry Branstad, 1996 Condition of the State Address, reprinted in Iowa "Vibrant and
Growing", DES MOINES REG., Jan. 10, 1996, at Opinion 1, available in 1996 WL 6221171.
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fault as "notarized dating."' 9 A critical analysis identified characteristics of no-fault
divorce culture which nurture divorce-related violence.2" There are also some
indications that no-fault divorce litigation is becoming more acrimonious, with the
litigative fire transferred from conflicts over divorce grounds to those over children
and property issues.2 Indeed, some harms may be self-inflicted: David Larson, for
many years a research psychiatrist at the National Institutes of Health, cites the
greatly increased risk of psychiatric and physical disease attributable to the process
of marital dissolution:
Being divorced and a non-smoker is only slightly less dangerous than smoking
a pack or more of cigarettes and staying married. Divorced men are twice as likely
to die from heart disease, stroke, hypertension, and cancer as married men in any
given year. Divorced women are two to three times as likely to die from various
forms of cancer.22
The consensus on current domestic relations stresses that the legal structure of
marriage and divorce has fallen into a "state of disarray." 3
19. Dana Milbank, Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce Law Is Assailed in Michigan, and
Debate Heats up, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al. The reference to marriage as "notarized
dating" also appears in MICHIGAN FAMILY FORUM, BREAKING up Is EASY To Do 4 (1995).
20. See Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Violence and the No-Fault Divorce Culture, 1994 UTAH
L. REV. 741, 746. Wardle notes that the ease and alacrity of the divorce process could dash a
spouse's expectations, and the upheaval could lead to violence. See id. at 748-49. The
alienation a spouse or child experiences can fuel demoralization and despair, preludes to
violence. See id. at 764-65. Finally, "[b]y normalizing the expectation and incidents of conflict
within the family, the no-fault divorce culture fosters and unleashes violence." Id. at 770; see
also Brinig & Crafton, supra note 17, at 869 (suggesting that "increased abuse... is a natural
consequence of the fact that in some states the marriage contract cannot be enforced" and thus
"it is time to question whether unilateral no-fault divorce is worth the costs to the institution
of marriage"); Christopher Price, Finding Fault with Irish Divorce Law, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 669, 695 (1997) ("No-fault divorce does not prevent bitterness and violence, but
causes it.").
21. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in the Family Law:
Children's Issues Take Spotlight, 29 FAM. L.Q. 741, 768 (1996) ("As some states discuss a
return to fault divorce, more family members seem to be finding a remedy for fault-based
behavior by bringing tort actions."); William C. Smith, See You in Divorce Tort: Splitting
Spouses Raise RICO, Fraud, and Other Claims, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1999, at 30 (stating that divorce
suits increasingly include tort claims, including allegations of violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Bauer, supra note 17 (stating that no-fault divorce
litigation transfers bitterness to the children, "making them pawns in battles over property and
custody").
22. William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 12, 16;
see also B.M. ROSENETAL., DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS FROMTHE U.S. CENSUS
OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: USES FOR MENTAL HEALTH PLANNING IN SMALL AREAS
(1977) ("The single most powerful predictor of stress-related physical, as well as emotional,
illness is marital disruption.").
23. Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract andthe Limits ofPrivate Ordering,
73 IND. L.J. 503, 505 n.7 (1998); see also MICHIGAN FAMILY FORUM, supra note 19, at
5; Daniel D. Polsby, Ozzie and Harriet Had It Right, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 531, 535
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This Article examines the case against no-fault divorce, as it has been made in
legislative halls, scholarlyjournals, and popular opinion over the past quarter century.
The no-fault "counterrevolution 2 4 takes as its starting point a conviction that the
divorce revolution has resulted in a substantial deterioration in American family life.
But this Article argues that the campaign against no-fault divorce attacks the wrong
target for the wrong reasons, and that it largely-if unwittingly-replicates earlier
misguided reform movements in refashioning the legal framework for family
dissolution. The alternatives to no-fault divorce now proposed will make marital exits
more acrimonious and will fail to either lower the divorce rate or improve domestic
life.
Counterrevolutionary legal proposals on divorce include a range of overlapping
options: restoration of fault as the exclusive dissolution ground; raising the bar of
divorce for couples with children; delaying the process of obtaining divorces; and
mandating or encouraging anti-divorce counseling and education at both the
prenuptial and pre-divorce stages.' These legal experiments constitute the juridical
counterpart to the popular sallies against no-fault divorce, and are best seen within
the larger cultural shift away from irresponsible marital behavior, particularly in
families with children. Both the legal and popular transformations also constitute a
refocusing of the family dilemma from one of achieving an easy divorce to one of
maintaining a good marriage.26
(1995) ("To the extentthatwe legitimate, subsidize, and acceptat-will domestimorphs-which
is what even marriage tends to become under no-fault divorce-we are asking for serious long-
term trouble as a society."). Rather than "assuaging the bitterness" of divorce,
the introduction of no-fault divorce saw a mere transfer of the acrimony to the
secondary issues of the divorce, such as child custody and property disputes, a
loss of negotiating power for the spouse who opposed the divorce, an economic
free-fall for many women and children, and an accelerated divorce rate.
Id.
24. See Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce Revolution" Revisited: A Counter-Revolutionary
Critique, 9 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251 (1989) (presenting an economic argument for post-divorce
joint custody); Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution: A Critique ofRecent Proposals
To Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607,617-20 (1997) (recounting various
attempts by scholars and legislators to return to fault-based schemes); Milbank, supra note 19,
at Al ("A quarter-century after California launched America's divorce revolution, Michigan
could set off a divorce counterrevolution."); Nordlinger, supra note 15, at 25 (discussing
various religious and secular programs aimed at strengthening existing marriages as an
important aspect of the "anti-divorce revolution").
25. See infra text accompanying notes 294, 298-99, 340, 465-70, 485, 487.
26. The Council on Families in America emphasized this counterrevolutionary goal of
shifting focus from the death of marriage to its revival:
The divorce revolution-the steady displacement of a marriage culture by a
culture of divorce and unwed parenthood-has failed. It has created terrible
hardships for children, incurred unsupportable social costs, and failed to deliver
on its promise of greater adult happiness. The time has come to shift the focus of
national attenion from divorce to marriage and to rebuild a family culture based
on enduring marital relationships.
CouNCIL ON FAMILIEs IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION I
(1995). This transition in the focus of the "counterrevolution" may also be traced in the
2000]
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"Covenant marriage" statutes have recently been enacted in two states, and bills
proposing covenant marriage are pending in many statehouses.27 These laws allow a
couple to opt out of the generally applicable no-fault divorce law and agree to terms
which will make it more difficult for them later to divorce. Specifically intended to
turn a"'culture ofdivorce"' ' 2 into a "'culture ofmarriage, "'29 covenant marriage laws
signify a major shift in the tactics of the divorce counterrevolutionaries." For the first
time in American history, the unitary marriage license has been broken into two rival
commitments, and some couples must now contemplate which type of state-
sanctioned marriage they desire. But the covenant marriage laws, enacted to induce
couples to enforce contractually the traditional marriage vows, may have the
unintended and paradoxical effect of encouraging greater ingenuity in couples to
define their own marriages through greater reliance on more wide-ranging prenuptial
contracts.3' These couple-crafted covenants, tagged"supervows,"32 may substantially
expand the scope of both contractually governed behavior during the marriage and
of the permissible exit grounds at its end. These supervows will also pose
extraordinary problems for courts called upon to interpret and enforce this new wave
of domestic agreements. Armed with the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act's
ostensible liberality toward behavioral contracts, and cloning the process of
legislative tinkering with the once-uniform marriage license, couples may
increasingly contour their marriages to suit their needs and aspirations.33 But
customized marriage will not prove the panacea for the ills of modem marriage, as
the law of relational contracts is often inadequate for the emotional and intimate
dimensions of marriage and child-rearing.34
The focus of legal change as seen within the larger cultural matrix accounts for the
large proportion of references in this Article to popularjournals and to sources on the
Internet, consonant with Karl Llewellyn's dictum that "divorce is the major area of
phrasing of the titles of noted social researcher Judith Wallerstein's three volumes reporting
her study of the impact of divorce on children: from JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN
KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDRENAND PARENTS COPEWITH DIVORCE (1980),
to JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989) [hereinafter WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE,
SECOND CHANCES], to JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD
MARRIAGE: How AND WHY LOVE LASTS (1995) [hereinafter WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE,
THE GOOD MARRIAGE].
27. These statutes are discussed at infra text accompanying notes 228, 450-91, 494-507.
28. Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward
a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 929 (1998)
(quoting State Rep. Tony Perkins, sponsor of Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law).
29. See id.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 248, 450-91, 494-507.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 352-84.
32. Amitai Etzioni, How To Make Marriage Matter, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993, at 76.
33. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1983); see also infra text
accompanying notes495-500. One popular book advocating prenuptial contracting relies upon
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and includes the text of the Act in an appendix. See
JACQUELINE RICKARD, SAVE YOUR MARRIAGE AHEAD OF TIME: PREMARITAL
CONTRACTING-LOVING COMMUNICATION FOR TODAY'S COUPLES 215-18 (1991).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 510, 513-22.
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interaction between the social institution and the legal."35 The present Article thus
continues my project on the "interrelationship of popular culture and legal rules in
order to explore the causes and effects of American divorcing patterns."36 One recent
example of this intimate weaving of law and culture has occurred in the area of
prenuptial contracts, whose growth may only be understood within a matrix
incorporating formal legal rules of interpretation with the popular phenomenon of
couple-driven autonomy expanding the range of these evolutionary hybrids of
contract law and domestic relations.37
Part I of this Article explores the unacknowledged strains of fault concerns in
modem no-fault divorce, beginning with this central paradox: no-fault reforms were
intended to increase the difficulty ofprocuring divorces by subjecting marriages in
jeopardy to the resuscitative tools of an ameliorative jurisprudence backed by social
science. The reduced emphasis on-and frequent elimination of-fault grounds
stemmed from a conviction that fault had functioned as a tunnel to divorce rather than
a barrier, and thus a conclusion that the statutory grounds had become easily achieved
entitlements to divorce. This oft-ignored character of the divorce revolution serves
as a vital corrective in the current debate on the reintroduction of fault grounds into
divorce cases. Moreover, the process of creating no-fault divorce provided rehearsals
for many of the proposals debated in our contemporary effort again to remake the
system of regulating marriages and divorces. Current reprises of these discussions
include whether or not fault and no-fault grounds should co-exist, and if so, their
interrelationship; the efficiency and propriety of mandatory divorce counseling; the
best way to safeguard the needs of the children of divorce; and the role of the State
in asserting interests contrary to those desired by divorce-minded wives and
husbands. If no-fault divorce failed, it did not fail for want of trying.
Culpability analysis is attempting a comeback in the divorce ring, and
contemporary divorce reform focuses on damageto children's welfare caused by easy
divorce. In Part II, the operational plans of the divorce "counterrevolution" take
center stage, including scholarly and popular commentary as well as legislation (both
enacted and proposed) aimed at reversing many of the attributes of no-fault divorce.
Perceiving that an excess of personal autonomy has destroyed American family
structure, critics have debated measures to re-endow individual citizens with moral
responsibility in family life. Deep frustration with no-fault divorce has ledto calls for
the return to a fault-based divorce jurisprudence in an attempt both to slow the marital
dissolution rate and to reinject divorce proceedings with moral discourse, particularly
concerning the fate of children. As a major component of this push to safeguard
families with children from the harms of easy divorce, many proposals aim to
35. Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: 1, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1307
(1932).
36. DIFONZO, supra note 5, at 5. On the necessary intertwining of legal and broader
cultural materials in the study of divorce, see id at 5-10.
37. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements andHow We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 146 (1998)
(noting that prenuptial agreements have recently "become more common-a trend reflected
by, and probably also encouraged by, the attention these agreements command in the popular
press"). On prenuptial contracts, see infra text accompanying notes 352-84.
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bifurcate divorce law by raising the bar for legal dissolution of a marriage after the
birth or adoption of children.
Part III discusses the drive to privatize the terms of the marriage contract,
beginning with precommitment restrictions and the incipient Covenant Marriage
movement, and exploring the latter's paradigmatic shift in the campaign to foster
stronger marriages by introducing an alternative state-sanctioned prenuptial contract.
These marital covenants constitute an odd outcropping of the expansion in scope of
prenuptial agreements: unlike the traditional spousal contracts which focus on
financial matters, this new generation of agreements encompass the private
reformulation of divorce grounds and the regulation of behavior during marriage.
Courts have been confronted with these types of marital contracts only infrequently
to date, and have generally ruled them out of bounds. But the judicial recalcitrance
at intervening in marital affairs may now be overcome by a legal and cultural
dynamic driven by the counterrevolutionary thrust of the marital covenant movement
and by the statutory opening provided by the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. In
short, the markers in the field of public policy for marriage and divorce are now
under construction. This Part concludes with an argument that efforts to push couples
into binding marriage contracts constitute a new paternalism which favors the agenda
of those who want to restrict marital options and restore the traditional marriage to
American life.
I. THE PERSISTENT SHADOW OF FAULT
IN NO-FAULT DIVORCE
A generation ago, California led the way in the most radical transformation of
divorce law in American history.38 This divorce law "revolution"39 spectacularly
succeeded in removing marital fault as the primary legal principle for dissolving
marriages. And today the no-fault divorce reforms are also spectacularly
38. See generally Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, § 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, 3324
(current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 1994)).
39. See JACOB, supra note 10. Every concept has its counter: Martha L. Fineman has
criticized Jacob's terminology, suggesting instead that the burgeoning of no-fault statutes was
"in fact antirevolutionary-operating to undermine the fledgling potential for freedom
presented for women by newly won economic opportunities coupled with an ability to freely
leave unsatisfactory marriages." Martha L. Fineman, Neither Silent, Nor Revolutionary, 23 L.
& Soc'Y REV. 945, 947 (1989) (book review) (emphasis in original). Fineman expanded this
point in MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
[T]he move to no-fault divorce hardly represented such a dramatic deviation from
existing practice as to be appropriately labeled revolutionary. What occurred in
the move to no-fault was merely a formal change in rules which were already
being freely manipulated and avoided.... The legal community had universally
tolerated (and perhaps even counseled) fraud and collusion by its clients in order
to secure divorces under the fault system.
Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted). For a contrary reading, suggesting that the legal regime of no-
fault did revolutionalize the legal and social milieu of divorcing couples, see DIFONzO, supra
note 5, at 172-77.
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misunderstood. Indeed, the current widespread conviction that no-fault divorce has
destroyed marriage is a historical irony, as critics often mistakenly assert that the
reforms were intended to expandthe freedom to divorce. 0 But the history of no-fault
divorce illustrates the gulf between founding intentions and achieved effects: the
major family law reforms on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1960s and 1970s were
carefully considered efforts aimed at reinforcing the family and lowering the rate of
divorce. They largely failed. But a fresh review of the course of these reforms in
England and California is essential in contextualizing the current converse debate on
the reintroduction of fault grounds into divorce cases. These transatlantic debates of
the generation past provided a thorough scouring of many of the divorce-related
issues now burnished anew by the counter-revolutionary critique. These freshly
buffed concerns include the viability of a divorce grounds menu including fault and
non-fault elements; whether requiring divorce counseling is appropriate or
worthwhile; the emotional and financial costs of divorce to children; and the limits
on the authority of the State to frustrate the desires of adults intent on divorce.
Understanding our present divorce law conundrum requires a pointed look at the
past. No-fault divorce's debut in 1969 was not entirely unprecedented. It came at the
cusp of a rich history of marked changes in divorce law and practice, a palimpsest
seemingly erased by the conversion-at one stroke--of divorce grounds from an
assortment of multifaceted fault,4' "living apart,"4 and even "temperamental
40. Texts throughout the past generation have made this erroneous assumption. See, e.g.,
PHILLIPS, supra note 10, at 571-72 (describing no-fault divorce as aproduct of"wide-sweeping
liberalization of attitudes toward many institutions and forms of behavior that was
characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s"); MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE,
AND THE LAW 317-405 (1972) (discussing the "extreme liberality" of the new divorce
grounds); Lynne Marie Kohm, SexSelectionAbortion and the Boomerang Effect ofa Woman's
Right To Choose: A Paradox of the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 91, 104 n.53
(1997) (noting that no-fault advocates heralded their reforms as a way to "liberate" women
from "dissatisfying marriages" and to "make uncontested divorce easier"); William L. O'Neill,
Divorce as a Moral Issue: A Hundred Years of Controversy, in "REMEMBER THE LADIES":
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127, 142 (Carol V.R. George ed.,
1975) ("[Mlaking divorce easier might well have led to a burst of divorces."); Twila L. Perry,
No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OIo
ST. L.J. 55, 62 (1991) (observing that no-fault laws were intended to increase an individual's
decisionmaking autonomy in divorce); Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory ofMarriage:
A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689, 695 (1990) ("[L]egislators widely adopted
no-fault laws to reflect the growing notion of marriage as a relationship terminable at will.").
Popular reactions to no-fault divorce have similarly mistaken outcome with motive, as in Rev.
Pat Robertson's declaration to a 1996 Christian Coalition rally:
And I watched little by little an unremitting assault by the left-wing forces, the
.ACLU, and the National Organization of Women, and other radical groups who
began ... then to assault the institution of marriage .... [S]tarting about 1970
... in almost every state this left-wing radical extremist coalition battered down
the walls of intact families and passed what were called no-fault divorce laws.
Speaker ofthe House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) Participates in the Christian Coalition Faith and
Freedom Celebration, in 1996 FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, INC., 1996 Presidential
Campaign Press Materials 30 (Aug. 15, 1996).
41. See JOHN DEWrrT GREGORY ETAL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 7.01(B), at 186
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incompatibility"4 3 statutes, into the touchstone of the no-fault revolution:
"irreconcilable differences."' In fact, however, the transformation of divorce grounds
was far more complex, prolonged, and incomplete than this thumbnail sketch
suggests. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century many states added (and frequently
later modified) a no-fault divorce provision onto the list of statutory marital
dissolution grounds, while retaining a full menu of fault grounds." In 1866, for
(1993) (describing how America "traditionally regarded divorce as a statutory remedy
available exclusively to an innocent spouse whose partner has caused the breakdown of the
marriage by committing some enumerated type of egregious marital fault"). An illustrative
example is Henderson v. Henderson, 35 A.2d 686, 690 (N.J. 1944) (holding that only "an
innocent party who has been injured in the particulars specified in the statute and who for that
cause and in good faith prosecutes his action" is entitled to a divorce). The nearly ubiquitous
grounds for divorce included adultery, extreme cruelty, and desertion, but legislatures often
also provided divorce relief in cases involving insanity, conviction of a serious crime, habitual
drunkenness or drug addiction, and other "perceived evils." GREGORY ETAL., supra, § 7.01,
at 187; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204-07, 498-504
(2d ed. 1985).
42. "Living Apart" statutes recognized marital breakdown as a divorce ground, evidenced
by the parties' separation for a specified time. Initially, many of these statutes demanded
separations of 8 or 10 years, although these time periods were dramatically shortened as the
century wore on. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault: Legislative and
Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 38-53 (1997) (discussing
"living apart" laws).
43. "Temperamental Incompatibility" statutes allowed a divorce to proceed on the
ostensibly unvarnished ground that conjugal harmony was no longer possible. See id. at 26-38.
But appellate courts often applied a gloss requiring the divorce-seeking spouse to establish his
or her blamelessness. See Lester B. Orfield, Divorce for Temperamental Incompatibility, 52
MICH. L. REv. 659 (1954).
44. "Irreconcilable differences" demonstrating completemarital breakdown constitutedthe
sole divorce ground fashioned by the California legislature in the first modera no-fault divorce
statute. See Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, § 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3314, 3324 (current
version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 1994)); see also J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault
Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph ofNakedDivorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519,541-50
(1994).
45. The fault grounds themselves were not born in their contemporary shape. In mid-
nineteenth-century Connecticut, for example, any marital "misconduct" was grounds for
divorce if it "permanently destroy[ed] the happiness of the petitioner, and defeat[ed] the
purposes of the marriage relation." An Act Concerning the Domestic Relations, ch. 21, § 2,
1849 Conn. Pub. Acts 17, 17 (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-40 (West
1995)). Maine allowed for marital dissolution if it was "reasonable and proper, conducive to
domestic harmony, and consistent with the peace and morality of society." An Act Additional
to Chapter 89 of the Revised Statutes, Respecting Divorce, ch. 13, § 1, 1847 Me. Acts 8, 8
(current version at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 902 (West 1998)). In Washington, a
divorce could be premised on any ground "deemed by the court sufficient," so long as the court
"be satisfied that the parties can no longer live together." 1881 CODE OF WASHINGTON, § 2000,
at 340-41. From 1871 to 1877, the Territory of Arizona had a "general mischief' divorce
ground which gave an extraordinarily wide berth to trial court divination of legislative intent:
[W]hereas in the developments of future events, cases may be presented before
the courts falling substantially within the limits of the law, as hereinbefore stated,
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instance, Wisconsin added a provision allowing for divorce if the couple had lived
apart for five years.46 An 1893 Rhode Island law similarly carved out an exception
to the fault matrix for couples whose separation lasted ten years.47 At the beginning
of the decade which gave birth to modem no-fault, Virginia added a provision
allowing for divorce after three years living apart," but soon reduced the waiting
period to two years.49 At present, the living apart period consists of one year. ° But
if the couple have no minor children and have entered into a property settlement
agreement, they need only live apart for six months.5 Similarly, when New Mexico
added an incompatibility divorce ground in 1933, as when Oklahoma did two decades
later, none of the statutory fault grounds were legislatively repealed.52 Through this
incremental and tortuous fashion, more than half of American jurisdictions had
enacted no-fault divorce grounds before 1970."3 Thus, what truly marks California's
divorce reform as revolutionary is not the creation of a no-fault ground, but rather the
elimination of fault-based alternatives for divorce-minded spouses.
The "irreconcilable differences" standard minted in 1969 as the sole divorce
criterion in California was designed to transform divorce litigation from an
adversarial tempest to an amiable teapot. The routinization of divorce was intended
to drain the anger from the process of family dissolution, thus ending the mutual
yet not within its terms, it is enacted, that whenever the judge who hears a cause
for divorce deems the case to be within the reason of the law, within the general
mischief the law is intended to remedy, or within what it may be presumed would
have been provided against, by the legislature establishing the foregoing causes
of divorce had it foreseen the specific case and found language to meet it without
including cases not within the same reason, he shall grant the divorce.
Act Concerning Divorce § 3, ch. 31, Comp. Laws ofthe Ter. of Ariz., 1864-1871, at 303, 304
(Bashford 1871). Such "omnibus" divorce clauses were severely criticized for their potential
to "reduce the marriage relation to a mere state of concubinage, at the mercy of the parties and
the courts." ALvAH L. STINSON, WOMAN UNDERTHE LAW 348 (1914); see also BASCH, supra
note 6, at 39-66 (discussing state divorce legislation from the Revolutionary War period to the
end of the nineteenth century); 3 GEORGE ELLIOTr HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL
INSTITUTONS 3-160 (1904) (same).
46. See 1866 Wis. Laws 37.
47. See An Act of and in Addition to Section 2 of Chapter 167 of the Public Statutes, ch.
1187, § 1, 1893 R.I. Acts & Resolves 237, 237 (codified as amended atR.I. GEN. ACTS. § 15-
5-3 (1996) (indicating, at present, a three-year period)).
48. See Act of Feb. 29, 1960, 1960 Va. Acts ch. 108 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-91(9) (Michie 1995)).
49. See Act of Mar. 31, 1964, 1964 Va. Acts ch. 363 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-91(9) (Michie 1995)).
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Michie 1995).
51. See id For a table listing all living apart statutes enacted prior to the effective date of
California's no-fault provision, see DIFoNzO, supra note 5, at 78-79.
52. See DIFONzO, supra note 5, at 70-75.
53. See id. at 76. The shift away from culpability grounds was accompanied by the gradual
evisceration of fault-based defenses to divorce, such as recrimination, connivance, collusion,
and condonation. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES §§ 13.8-.11 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that such fault-based divorce
defenses are largely of historical, rather than practical, significance today).
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flagellation thought to be endemic to divorce courtroom explosions. This thoroughly
"depressing" character of American fault divorce was well captured by social
philosopher Christopher Lasch, writing on the eve of the no-fault revolution:
If divorce is depressing, American divorce is peculiarly so, because of the
peculiarly irrational character of our divorce laws. If they had been deliberately
designed to corrupt all whom they touched, the laws could not more effectively
bring out the worst in everybody. The definition of divorce as an adversary
proceeding, instead of a mutual agreement, turns husbands and wives into
embattled witnesses against each other, poisons the air with recriminations, locks
the contestants more firmly than ever in postures of outraged self-righteousness,
and makes more difficult than it already was a peaceful parting of ways. Even if
the couple agree to divorce, the law requires them to act out the charade of charge
and counter-charge-prearranged discoveries of illicit assignations in "love-
nests," fabricated injuries and affronts, rituals and conventions which deceive no
one but which have to be performed in the name, of all things, ofjustice. Anyone
who passes through this process must emerge in one way or another humiliated
and degraded. 4
No-fault divorce consisted of a massive effort to prevent divorcing wives and
husbands from becoming "humiliated and degraded." But the movement also aimed
to reinforce the family and lower the divorce rate. The English reform movement
greatly influenced the terms of American no-fault divorce, and also provided
rehearsals for many of the arguments swirling around the divorce counterrevolution.
A. Divorce in England
After the first third of the twentieth century, English divorce was available upon
proof of adultery, cruelty, desertion for three years, or incurable insanity after five
years confinement." With the exception of insanity, matrimonial fault supplied the
54. Lasch, supra note 9, at 3; see also Monrad G. Paulsen, Divorce-Canterbury Style, 1
VAL. U. L. REv. 93, 94 (1996) ("Although the theory of the Anglo-American law rejects the
notion that spouses who wish to terminate their marriage may do so by mutual consent, the law
in practice permits consensual dissolution through the means of properly arranged, undefended
cases."); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interactions, 22 L. & Soc'Y REv. 737, 750 (1988) (observing that
today, when a client accuses her spouse of marital fault, the "[c]lient and lawyer are like
performer and bored, but dutiful, audience-the lawyer will not interrupt the aria, but she will
not applaud much either for fear of an encore").
55. See A.P. HERBERT, THE AYEs HAVE IT: THE STORY OF THE MARRIAGE BILL (1937).
Judicial divorces had only become available to English spouses in 1857. Private parliamentary
bills had dispensed divorce to a privileged few beginning in the mid-seventeenth century. The
1857 legislation allowed divorce to be granted to men on the ground of their wives' adultery,
and to women who could prove that their husband's adultery had been aggravated by some
other offense against morals, such as bigamy, incest, sodomy, desertion, cruelty, rape, or
bestiality. Only in 1923 did English women achieve equality at the bar of the divorce court,
and no longer have to prove the factor aggravating adultery. See Ann Sumner Holmes, The
Double Standard in the English Divorce Laws, 1857-1923, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 602
n.2, 604 & n.9 (1995). In 1937, Parliament extended the grounds of divorce to both spouses
to include cruelty, desertion for three years, and incurable insanity after five years'
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basis of every divorce action, requiring proof of the breaking of the pledge of fidelity
or decent behavior inherent in the conjugal relationship. Since personal depravity was
seen at the heart of all marital breakdown, "fault was the undisputed touchstone of
divorce policy." 6 The prospect of an innocent, faithful spouse shackled to a conjugal
demon only reinforced this view. Accordingly, a divorce decree represented a
punishment inflicted on an unworthy partner by a court acting on behalf of the
aggrieved social order as much as of the victimized spouse.
The massive effort undertaken by the Morton Commission to examine and revise
the entire structure of English marriage and divorce law uncovered deep social
fissures. In 1951, Eirene White, MP, had introduced a private member bill in
Parliament proposing a "marital breakdown" standard for divorce, which could only
be shown by a separation for seven years. Pulling back from the fault
perimeter-even in so circumscribed a fashion-proved so controversial that White
withdrew the bill in exchange for the government's pledge to establish a royal
commission to study the issue. The Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce,
chaired by Lord Morton of Henryton, evaluated a gigantic quantity of evidence,
received testimony from 67 organizations and 48 individuals, conducted 102
hearings, struggled with the issue for 4 years, and produced a report in 1956
containing'more than 400 pages.17 In the end, it settled nothing.
The range of proposals articulated by the nineteen members of the Morton
Commission conveyed a radical divergence of opinion over the fairness of the
divorce'process, and reflected a range of views on the conditions necessary for the
state to allow divorce, most of which have received renewed currency in the present
debate over divorce reform. Eighteen of the nineteen Commission members agreed
to retain the "doctrine of the matrimonial offence" 8 as the basis for divorce, but the
key question of modifying the grounds of divorce provoked fundamental
disagreement. Nine members insisted on retaining the matrimonial offense standard
with no modification. 9 This group's rationale anticipated several features of the
contemporary divorce counterrevolution. It rejected amarital breakdown standard for
divorce since "in whatever form that principle might be introduced it would entail the
recognition of divorce by consent."'6 In turn, consensual divorce was similarly
condemned because the "consequences of providing the 'easy way out' afforded by
confinement. See RHEINSTEIN, supra note 40, at 319-20; DOROTHY M. STETSON, A WOMAN'S
IssUE: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY LAW REFORM IN ENGLAND 97 (1982). On the history of
English divorce generally, see a trilogy of works by Lawrence Stone: LAWRENCE STONE,
ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987 (1990); LAWRENCE STONE, UNCERTAIN UNIONS:
MARRIAGEIN ENGLAND 1660-1753 (1992); LAWRENCE STONE, BROKEN LIVES: SEPARATION
AND DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 1660-1857 (1993). See also PHILLIPS, supra note 10.
56. PHILLIPS, supra note 10, at 566.
57. See REPORT OF THE MORTIMER COMMISSION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, PUrrING
ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY app. a, 19 (1966) [hereinafter
PUTTING ASUNDER]; STETSON, supra note 55, at 161.
58. ROYAL COMMIssiONON MARRIAGEAND DIVORCE, REPORT 1951-1955, 1956, Cmnd.
9678, at 13 [hereinafter MORTON COMMIsSION REPORT].
59. See id. at 14.
60. Id.
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divorce by consent would be disastrous to stability in marriage." 6' In articulating this
critique, these members outlined the precise terms constituting the contemporary
"divorce culture" argument that our legal system facilitates the dissolution of
salvageable marriages:62
The inevitable result [of consensual divorce] would be the granting of divorces
in cases where no real necessity for the remedy had arisen. In other words, the
divorce rate would be swollen by the failure of marriages which would otherwise
have held together with advantage to both parties as well as to children. People
would then come to look upon marriage less and less as a life-long union and
more and more as one to be ended if things begin to go wrong, and there would
be a very real risk that in the end widespread divorce would come to be an
accepted feature of our society.63
Widespread divorce is, of course, featured in our society. And the debate today has
shifted to the wisdom of allowing wives and husbands to divorce themselves with
minimal state regulation of the process, with the recognitiot that a too-easy divorce
path leads ineluctably to a road too often taken. The contours of this precise argument
were anticipated in the Morton Commission Report:
As we have pointed out, to give people a right to divorce themselves would be to
foster a change in the attitude to marriage which would be disastrous for the'
nation. People would tend to enter marriage more lightly, and with the reservation
that, if it were not a success, they could always agree to put an end to it. And
when difficulties arose in marriage life (as happens in most marriages), there
would be much less incentive to overcome them. Husband and wife would be
tempted to say to each other, "Let us have a divorce and start again." Thus,
divorce would increasingly be sought in circumstances where, if a little effort
were made, husband and wife could adjust their differences. Such an attitude
would be fatal to stability and security in marriage, which in the end would come
to be regarded as a temporary relationship, with divorce as a normal incident of
life. For this calamity the State would bear the brunt of the responsibility since,
in giving its blessing to divorce by consent, it would in effect have encouraged
people to abandon their marriages on the flimsiest provocation."
The plight of children injured by their parents' ready divorce has galvanized the
current debate. The same group within the Morton Commission focused on the
adverse consequences to children of divorce, also in prescient terms:
We are deeply concerned about the effect on children of the present divorce rate:
their suffering would be multiplied if divorce were to become more widespread.
The best home for children is of course a happy home,-but in our opinion (and
most of our "expert" witnesses confirmed this) children can put up with a good
deal of friction between their parents so long as the home remains intact. The
relations between the parents must usually be very bad indeed before a divorce is
in the interests of the children.65
61. Id.
62. Cf supra text accompanying notes 26, 28-30.
63. MORTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at 14.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id. at 14-15.
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Finally, this group forecast that a court hearing the issue of marital breakdown would
have an "impossible task," as the case would not be triable whether the breakdown
allegation were controverted or undefended.66 Such a standard would result in many
divorces "on the ground of incompatibility or for such defects of temperament as
should be regarded as coming within the ordinary wear and tear of married life."67
Another nine members supported supplementing the fault grounds with White's
proposal allowing a "marital breakdown" divorce evidenced by seven years
separation.68 This group structured its recommendations for the "many cases where
marriage breaks down irretrievably and where, as the law stands, no remedy is
available." '69 Exclusive reliance on the doctrine of matrimonial offense was also
criticized as serving no effective deterrent function:
[Tihe law of divorce as it at present exists is ... weighted in favour of the least
scrupulous, the least honourable and the least sensitive; and that nobody who is
ready to provide a ground of divorce, who is careful to avoid any suggestion of
connivance or collusion and who has a co-operative spouse, has any difficulty in
securing a dissolution of the marriage."
The nineteenth and final member of the Commission, Lord James Walker, advocated
that all fault grounds be eliminated and replaced by a marital breakdown standard to
be satisfied by three years separation plus evidence demonstrating the improbability
that the couple would ever resume cohabitation."
The hopelessly fractured Morton Commission thus presented at least three radically
contrasting bases for a viable divorce system: matrimonial offenses only; a divorce
grounds menu including both fault grounds and a breakdown standard evidenced by
separation; and a breakdown-plus-separation ground as the exclusive prerequisite for
divorce. No legal changes to the divorce law followed in the wake of the Morton
Commission Report. In the 1960s, the dynamics of English divorce reform altered
significantly. In 1963, Leo Abse, MP, attempted to revive Eirene White's separation
divorce proposal. The House of Lords, led by the Archbishop of Canterbury,
66.Id. at 21.
67. Id. But see PurrINGASUNDER, supra note 57, 62 (suggesting that marital breakdown
isjusticiable).
68. See MORTON COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 58, at 24. Even this group was divided:
five of these nine would have allowed a petitioner to divorce his or her spouse-even after
seven years' separation-only if the spouse did not object. The remaining four would have
contemplated divorce over an objecting spouse ifthe petitioner could "satisfy the courtthat the
[seven years] separation was in part due to the unreasonable conduct of the other." Id. at 25;
see also 0. Kahn-Freund, Divorce Law Reform?, 19 MOD. L. REV. 573, 585-86 (1956).
69. MORTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at 23.
70. Id, For an analysis of American viewpoints on the advisability of divorce on the ground
of separation for a specified period, see DiFonzo, supra note 42, at 38-53.
71. See MORTON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 58, at 340-41. Lord Walker stated that
if his view of complete replacement were not adopted, he would prefer to retain the undiluted
fault standard. See id. at 341. His formulation was sharply criticized in B. MacKenna, Divorce
by Consent and Divorce for Breakdown of Marriage, 30 MOD. L. REv. 121, 126-28 (1967).
See also Kahn-Freund, supra note 68, at 589-90.
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remained an implacable foe of reform, and the bill failed.' The Archbishop of
Canterbury opposed a separation ground as a subterfuge for divorce by consent, and
in the House of Lords he expressed both his dissatisfaction with the lax procedures
in divorce courts and his hope for conservative reform:
[I]f it were possible to find a principle at law of breakdown of marriage which was
free from any trace of the idea of consent, which conserved the point that offences
and not only wishes are the basis of the breakdown, and which was protected by
afarmore thorough insistence on reconciliation procedure first, then I would wish
to consider it."
The Archbishop thus intended any new conjugal breakdown standard as a vehicle for
tightening, not liberalizing, divorce law and procedure.74
Conservative critics of divorce law in England and in America maintained that a
single act (or even repeated incidents) of adultery or cruelty did not necessarily
destroy the marriage. 5 The marital fault regime granted divorces upon proof of
transgression, entirely without regard to the actual state of the marriage. But these
critics saw that fault grounds had transmogrified into entitlements: ifa spouse carried
the normally minimal burden of proof, the court was obliged to award the divorce. 6
On "both sides of the Atlantic," the operating law held that "most people who want
divorces get them and get them without great expense or undue delay."' Inquiry into
72. See PUTrING ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 95; STETSON, supra note 55, at 169-70.
73. 250 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1547 (1963).
74. See PurTING ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 23.
75. The views of an English vicar and an American divorce judge are illustrative. See, e.g.,
REGINALD HAW, THE STATE OF MATRIMONY: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN ECCLESIASTICALAND CIVILMARRIAGEIN ENGLAND AFTERTHEREFORMATION 105
(1952) ("[I]t is nothing short of astounding that there was so little realization... that worse
things can happen to a marriage than adultery."); Paul W. Alexander, The Follies ofDivorce:
A Therapeutic Approach to the Problem, 36 A.B.A. J. 105, 107 (1950) ("[C]omparatively
minor legal guilt can be and often is vastly more devastating to the parties and definitely more
disruptive of family life than that guilt which the law, religion, and society regard as most
offensive, to wit, adultery.") (emphasis in original).
76. On the farcical nature of divorce litigation, see NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD
TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1-8 (1962) (observing that under a
fault-based system of divorce, thousands have had to "resort to some type of make-believe"
in order to have the sour marriage dissolved); Paul Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy: Specific
Grounds for Divorce, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 26, 27 (1953) (stating that divorce
litigation is the one striking exception to the rule that the defendant tries to prevent the plaintiff
from succeeding); Stephen Ewing, The Mockery of American Divorce, 157 HARPER'S
MONTHLY MAG. 153, 159 (1928) (reporting instances of divorces granted to a husband
because the sound of his wife's voice was injurious to his fragile health, and to a wife because
her husband had told her to go to hell once too often).
77. Paulsen, supra note 54, at 94. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with this
assessment of pre-revolutionary divorce in that state: "'Colorado... permits the parties to
obtain divorces by consent, but subjects them to [the] humiliation, hypocrisy, sometimes
perjury, and needless hostility of having to testify to one of the prescribed grounds."' In re
Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845, 849 (Colo. 1975) (omission in original) (quoting Homer
H. Clark, Jr., Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 403, 407 (1971)).
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the actual state of the marriage was irrelevant. As Ohio judge Paul Alexander had
written, the fault system "compel[s] the judge to grind out divorces regardless of the
real facts, the underlying causes and the effect upon the parties, their families and the
state.""8 The Archbishop of Canterbury was now suggesting that the law should go
further and demand not only proof of conjugal transgression, but also resultant marital
disintegration.79 Divorce-seeking complainants would, as in the traditional model,
have to establish their spouse's culpability as well as their own innocence of any
marital fault.80 But the divorce would still not be granted unless the complainant also
convinced the tribunal that the marriage had been irredeemably ruined by the spousal
misconduct. The process would be skewed in the direction of a "far more thorough
insistence on reconciliation."'" In short, the Church of England was placing its moral
authority behind a new legal divorce regime, fault-plus. To mobilize support for a
fault-plus divorce scheme, the Archbishop appointed a committee to explore the
Church's position on marriage breakdown as a divorce standard. In 1966, the
Archbishop's group published Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for Contemporary
Society ("Putting Asunder"). 2 The report insisted on thorough divorce reform: "the
doctrine of the breakdown of marriage should be comprehensively substituted for the
doctrine of the matrimonial offense as the basis of all divorce."'83 Consistent with the
Archbishop's earlier comments in the House of Lords, Putting Asunder declared that
the breakdown standard was neither the equivalent of divorce by consent, nor
"incompatible with a covenant of lifelong intention."8 4 Launching a severe criticism
of the hypocrisy and fraud of the marital fault system, the church group condemned
the established statutory process "not only on moral and legal grounds, but on social
and psychological [grounds] as well."8 5
78. Paul W. Alexander, Introduction to DIVORCE AND FAMILY RELATIONS: A
COMPILATION OF THE ORIGINAL DICTA PUBLISHED BY THE VIRGINIA LAW WEEKLY, 1949-
1950, at iii, vi-vii (Stanley C. Morris, Jr., ed., 1950) [hereinafter DIVORCE AND FAMILY
RELATIONS].
79. See 250 PAR. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1547 (1963). The Archbishop's position was thus
more restrictive than any of the options presented in the Morton Commission Report. See
supra text accompanying notes 58-71; infra text accompanying notes 82-96.
80. The necessity for a divorce complainant to prove not only the defendant spouse's guilt
but also the complainant's own "clean hands" and absence of fault in the dissolution of the
marriage constituted the core of the recrimination doctrine, applicable on both sides of the
Atlantic. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 41, § 7.03, at 215-16.
81. 250 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1547 (1963).
82. PUtrrING ASUNDER, supra note 57.
83. Id. at 18.
84. Id PuttingAsunder served as a template for the later efforts culminating in California
no-fault divorce. See infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
85. PuTriNG ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 28. The group attacked the fault premise of
divorce as psychologically simplistic and inaccurate, noting that
if we concentrate our attention wholly on the actions that are designated
"matrimonial offences," we inevitably fail to do justice to the complex of motives
in the two interacting persons which finally drives the one to act and the other to
treat the actions a ground for a divorce petition.
IaL at 144.
2000]
INDIANA LAWJOURAAL
The Church proposal initially resembled that of Lord Walker, the "lone ranger" of
the Morton Commission. 6 As had Walker, the Archbishop's group rejected a menu
approach to divorce legislation, emphasizing that fault and breakdown were
philosophically incompatible approaches. 7 But Putting Asunder went much further
than previous plans. It articulated a system of legal proof of breakdown by analogy
to a coroner's inquest.8 Much as a coroner examines a corpse for clues to its demise,
so too courts would conduct an inquest on each assertedly dead marriage to determine
whether conjugal resuscitation is possible. 9
The revolutionary nature of this reorientation of divorce procedure cannot be
overemphasized. Because inquests would be conducted to ascertain the vital signs or
moribund status of every proposed divorce, the pro forma procedure adopted by
English courts in undefended petitions would be scrapped. Since approximately
ninety percent of all divorce petitions were then currently unopposed, the increased
demands on the justice system would have been astronomical. The Archbishop's
group defiantly contended that, given the requirements of a matrimonial inquest, "an
uncontested case could on occasion call for greater care and judicial skill than one
that was contested."9 The group called for "considerably expanded"' 1 pleadings in
all divorce cases. These would detail the "history of the marriage in question, the
reasons alleged for its failure, any attempts made to achieve reconciliation, and all
86. See supra text accompanying note 71.
87. PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 16, 57-59. Acknowledging that the fault system
bore no necessary relationship to marital breakdown, the church group asserted:
[I]f the legislature came to the conclusion that it was right and proper to grant
divorce, on the petition of either party and without proof of any specific offence,
when-and only when-a marriage was shown to have broken down irreparably,
how could it justify retaining grounds which depended on the commission of
specific offences, on which only injured parties might petition, and which
required no evidence of breakdown at all?
Id. at 57.
88. See id. at 67.
89. By changing the focus of the inquiry from the proof of fault grounds to the viability of
the marriage, the Archbishop's group intended to alter fundamentally the divorce process itself:
What is essential is to render the procedure of the court appropriate to making
inquiry into the condition of a marriage instead of determining the guilt or
innocence of a person against whom the commission of an offence has been
alleged. Under a law based on breakdown the trial of a divorce case would
become in some respects analogous to a coroner's inquest, in that its object would
be judicial inquiry into the alleged fact and causes of the "death" of a marriage
relationship. It would have to be made possible for the court, therefore, to inquire
effectively into what attempts at reconciliation had been made, into the feasibility
of further attempts, into the acts, events, and circumstances, alleged to have
destroyed the marriage, into the truth of statements made (especially in
uncontested cases), and into all matters bearing upon the determination of public
interest.
Id.
90.Id. at 77.
91.Id. at68.
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arrangements proposed for the care of any children, for the disposal of property, and
for maintenance in general."'
Putting Asunder proposed, in short, a dramatic tightening of the divorce belt. It is
important to recognize that this Report, one of the leading texts of the divorce revolt,
strongly advocated reform legislation which would have made it exceedingly more
difficult for any couple to divorce. Establishing fault under the existing divorce law
would no longer guarantee the issuance of a decree. A divorce petitioner would still
bear the burden of showing marital breakdown. Putting Asunder proposed that, to
avoid the perceived insincerity of unopposed petitions, the court should have
"discretionary power to require the attendance of both parties."'93 The drafters of
Putting Asunder were not sanguine that all relevant facts would surface if the fact-
finding process were left to the parties and their counsel. Indeed, they believed that
the judicial process had effectively yielded a standard allowing for divorce by
consent. Given the traditional reluctance of common law judges to engage in
inquisitorial procedures, the church group recommended that, especially in
uncontested cases, "provision should be made for the intervention, when needed, of
counsel representing the public interest or the interests of children of the family."'
The penalty for failing to satisfy this fault-plus standard would be denial of the
divorce decree. PuttingAsunder called for the refusal of decrees in cases in which the
proposed maintenance of the dependent spouse or children was inadequate, or in
which the "conduct of the petitioner in regard to the marriage was found to be such
that in the court's judgment making a decree would be against the public interest.""5
The comprehensive therapeutic nature of the drafters' program was evident in their
call for a massive infusion of forensic social workers "as part of immediate
procedural reform."96 These new court officers would assist judges in verifying
attempts at reconciliation, testing the reliability of assertions made to the court, and
providing further investigative services as requested.
The Lord Chancellor referred Putting Asunder to the Law Commission upon its
publication in 1966.' 7 The Law Commission promptly produced its own report, which
echoed the Church group's rejection of the regime of matrimonial fault.98 However,
the Law Commissioners strenuously argued that the inquest system proposed by the
Church was unworkable. Not only was marital breakdown not justiciable; the
vagueness of the test would make it difficult forjudges and solicitors to exclude their
personal sentiment in an area of law where strong feelings dominate. Moreover, a
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 70; cf RHEINSTErN, supra note 40, at 326-27 (explaining that the church group
denounced the hypocrisy of using the adversarial method in divorce proceedings).
95. PuTTING ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 75.
96. Id. at 70.
97. The Law Commission was statutorily charged with reviewing all English law "'with
a viev towards its systematic development and reform, including... the elimination of
anomalies.., and, generally, the simplification and modernization of the law."' RHEINsTEiN,
supra note 40, at 332 (quoting Law Commissions Act, 1965, ch. 22, § 3(1) (Eng.)) (omissions
added); see also STETSON, supra note 55, at 181-83.
98. See LAW COMMIssION, REFORM OF THE GROuNDs OF DivORCE: THE FIELD OF CHOICE,
1966, Cmnd. 3123 [hereinafter FIELD OF CHOICE].
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"detailed inquest into the whole married life would prove more distasteful and
embarrassing" '99 than the established proceedings. Reconciliation efforts made
mandatory would degenerate into wasting the "time ofmarriage guidance counselors
... on 'cock and bull' stories to the detriment of sincere applicants."1°°
The Law Commissioners' core objections related to the vast requirement of time,
personnel, and expense which Putting Asunder would entail:
Court hearings would take far longer. Undefended cases at present constitute 93
per cent of the total and take about ten minutes each. Under the suggested
procedure the length of trials could not at best be less than trebled. Present
resources are fully extended to achieve about 35,000 divorces a year. Therefore
great additional expenditure would be required on court-houses, Judges, court
staff, etc. Scarce, highly skilled manpower would have to be diverted to this work.
A great expansion of the Queen's Proctor's Office would be required, since it is
proposed that numerous officials should be employed to investigate the truth of
the evidence contained in the pleadings.
... [A] large number of trained social workers would be needed. There is a great
shortage of them already.'
If breakdown plus inquest was unworkable, and both the Law Commission and the
Archbishop's group had agreed on the objectionable nature of the marriage fault
regime, what option remained? The Law Commissioners took Putting Asunder's
endorsement of a marriage breakdown standard to its logical conclusion, once the
inquisitorial veneer was stripped away. The preferred route for English divorce was
to be breakdown without inquest. 2
The Law Commission dismissed the Church group's belief in the inappropriateness
of a divorce menu system listing both fault and non-fault grounds. But the
Commission supportd this stand by merely quoting the opinion of American law
professor Monrad Paulsen that the "legal system frequently chooses different
principles to dispose of distinguishable situations."'0 3 The Commission's proposal
represented a legislative stew of fault, no-fault, and the emerging breakdown
standard. Divorce could be obtained upon the sole ground of marital breakdown,
which could only be established in one of five ways: adultery, cruelty, desertion for
two years, separation for two years if the respondent did not object, and separation
for five years." 4 Thus, the Commission transmuted the old fault grounds into
"elements" of a new breakdown standard." 5 One component of the proposal was
devised to reverse the virtual automatic granting of divorces, once nominal proof of
99. Id. at31.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted).
102. The Law Commissioners purported to consider two further possibilities: divorce by
consent and a pure separation ground. See id. at 39-49. However, it is clear from the discussion
that these options were straw arguments whose rejection served to emphasize the merits of
breakdown without inquest, which could be shown in a number of ways, including the parties'
separation. See id. at 36.
103. Id. at 49 (quoting Paulsen, supra note 54, at 98).
104. See The Grounds of Divorce, 117 NEW L.J. 827, 827-28 (1967) (reproducing the full
text of the Law Commission's proposal and explanatory notes).
105. See FIELD OF CHOICE, supra note 98, at 49.
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fault had been entered. Proof ofa fault "element" would specifically no longer entitle
the petitioner to a divorce. Rather, the court would be authorized to make an
independent evaluation of the alleged marital breakdown."° With only minor
changes, the Law Commission's proposal became law in the Divorce Reform Act of
1969.107
B. Putting Asunder in California
According to Herma Hill Kay, a leading figure in the no-fault movement, by the
1960s "it was impossible to make divorce easier in California than it already was.""'
In typical ten minute court hearings, ninety-five percent of California divorce
complainants recited accounts of their spouses' "extreme cruelty"'" destroying their
marriage. This statutory requirement could be met by the wife's simple assertion that
her husband was "cold and indifferent,"' " which caused her to become "nervous and
upset.""'
California's Supreme Court, in 1952, had seriously undermined the fault standard
in a widely-noted opinion by Chief Justice Roger Traynor, which sharply limited the
scope of the defense of recrimination and outlined an emerging family law
jurisprudence both hostile to culpability analysis and intent on using the divorce
process to try to reconcile the spouses."' The court described the family in elegiac
terms and pointed the way to a jurisprudential turnabout:
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal affections
that ennoble and enrich human life. It channels biological drives that might
otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures the care and education of
children in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from one generation to
another; it nurtures and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free
people. Since the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster and
preserve marriages. But when a marriage has failed and the family has ceased to
be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer served and divorce will be
permitted. "[P]ublic policy does not discourage divorce where the relations
between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of matrimony have
been utterly destroyed."" 3
106. See id
107. Divorce Reform Act, 1969, ch. 55 (Eng.).
108. JACOB, supra note 10, at 46.
109. Elayne Carol Berg, Irreconcilable Differences: California Courts Respond to No-Fault
Dissolution, 7 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 453,454 (1974); see also Susan Westerberg Reppy, The End
ofInnocence: Elimination ofFault in California Divorce Law, 17 UCLAL. REV. 1306 1307-
08 (1970).
110. Berg, supra note 109, at 454.
11I. Id.; cf Max Rheinstein, Our Dual Law ofDivorce: The Law in Action Versus the Law
of the Books, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE 39, 40 (Ernest W. Burgress et al. eds., 1952)
(explaining that California's cruelty statute encompassed conduct such as "bad cooking,
nagging, or writing insulting letters").
112. See DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 250 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1952).
113. Id at 601 (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. Hill, 142 P.2d 417,422 (Cal. 1943)).
The court favorably noted the parallel English development in which the interest of the
community is "'judged by maintaining a true balance between respect for the binding sanctity
2000]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Belittling the role of "[t]echnical marital fault,""' 4 the court insisted that the
"perpetuation of an unwholesome relationship would be a mockery of marriage."' 5
Instead, divorce courts weighing the equities in divorce cases with recriminatory
allegations were instructed to consider first the "prospect of reconciliation."' 6 The
court elaborated on the task of the divorce judge:
The court should determine whether the legitimate objects of matrimony have
been destroyed or whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the marriage can
be saved. It should consider the ages and temperaments of the parties, the length
of their marriage, the seriousness and frequency of their marital misconduct
proved at the trial and the likelihood of its recurrence, the duration and apparent
finality of the separation, and the sincerity of their efforts to overcome differences
and live together harmoniously." 7
In the 1960s, California's executive and legislative branches combined forces to
try to buttress family life through divorce reform. In 1963, the same year in which
Leo Abse's no-fault bill triggered the divorce reform process in Parliament,
California Assembly member Pearce Young initiated a study aimed at "'developing
a legislative program to strengthen family relations."'.. At hearings conducted the
following year, a variety of witnesses testified before Young's committee to the effect
that California's fault-based divorce law was too lax and thus contributed toward the
social deterioration of California society." 9 Governor Edmund G. Brown told the
of marriage and the social considerations which make it contrary to public policy to insist on
the maintenance of a union which has utterly broken down."' Id. at 604 (quoting Blunt v.
Blunt, 1943 App. Cas. 517, 525 (appeal taken from C.A.)). Nor was the California Supreme
Court alone among American jurisdictions in its view of the futility of trying to resurrect dead
marriages. One year after the DeBurgh decision, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed itself in
similar grandiloquence in upholding that state's first no-fault divorce statute, which allowed
marital dissolution upon proof of five years' separation of the parties:
The family unit, constituting as it does the very base of our religious, cultural and
moral life, is one of the principal supporting pillars of our civilization. The state
created by the people for the protection and promotion of their common welfare,
must protect and foster marriage and the family relationship. However... [w]hen
the marriage relationship has completely and finally broken down and the
relations of the parties have reached an impasse where reconciliation is
impossible and the family unit has ceased to exist, no rule or regulation
promulgated by authority of the state can restore it. The object of the state's
protection has ceased to exist.
Howay v. Howay, 264 P.2d 691, 697 (Idaho 1953); see also Dever v. Dever, 146 A. 478,479
(R.I. 1929) (upholding Rhode Island statute allowing divorce upon ten years' separation).
114. DeBurgh, 250 P.2d at 606.
115. Id. at 603.
116. Id. at 606 (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. Howard A. Krom, California's Divorce Law Reform: An HistoricalAnalysis, 1 PAC.
L.J. 156, 158 (1970) (quoting News Release from Office of Assemblyman Pearce Young, 5th
Assembly Dist., Mar. 15, 1963).
119. See CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON JUDICIARY RELATING TO DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, FiNAL REPORT, 2APPENDIXTO JOURNAL OFTHE ASSEMBLY Vol. 23 No. 6, at 25-
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committee that divorce "erodes the very foundation of our society"' 0 and that the
ease of obtaining divorce in California led to juvenile delinquency and crime. He
pressed the committee to "probe and expose the core of this growing social
problem."'' When the state legislature failed to act, Governor Brown appointed the
Governor's Commission on the Family in 1966 to mount a"'concerted assault on the
high incidence of divorce in our society and its often tragic consequences.""'n
The Governor's Commission proposed no-fault marital dissolution to be processed
by a therapeutic family court." This divorce scheme principally relied on Putting
Asunder, the proposal crafted by the Archbishop of Canterbury's group. Not only did
the Governor's Commission quote extensively from the English study, it also
replicated the heart of the Church of England Report in its bid to link the removal of
fault to a transfer of domestic cases to an administrative and therapeutic-rather than
a purely adjudicative-body. 4 In its radical restructuring of divorce law in order to
strengthen marriages, the California reformers adopted the views of the advocates of
therapeutic divorce, who argued that the primary role of the divorce court was to
foster reconciliation rather than to ascertain culpability."n The Governor's
Commission summarized the case against fault-based divorce in terms which made
clear its commitment to use divorce law to keep marriages alive:
44 (Reg. Sess. 1965) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
120. Id at 176.
121. Id at 177.
122. REPORTOFTHE GOVERNOR's COMMISsIONONTHE FAMILY 1 (1966) (quoting Governor
Edmund G. Brown, Charge to the Commission, May 11, 1966). Some anxious Californians
rushed to the courts to get divorced before the anticipated legal tightening took place. See
MICHAEL WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE 27-28 (1974).
123. See generallyJ. Herbie DiFonzo, Coercive Conciliation: Judge Paul W. Alexander and
the Movement for Therapeutic Divorce, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 535 (1994) (discussing a
therapeutic divorce campaign and family court models).
124. See Philip L. Hammer, Divorce Reform in California: The Governor's Commission on
the Family and Beyond, 9 SALSrA CLARA L. REV. 32, 33 (1968).
125. The reformers acknowledged that, as a barrier to divorce, culpability had proven a
massive failure; they hoped to adapt the tools of social science to apply the brakes on the
divorce rate. See DiFonzo, supra note 123, at 543-46, 552-59. Culpability was, in effect,
perceived as irrelevant. Nester C. Kohut reflected the conviction of therapeutic divorce
reformers: "A substantial number of marriages alleged by the parties and supposed by the
attorneys and divorce court to be broken, lifeless or irreparable, are not in fact completely or
irreversibly broken." NESTER C. KOHUT, A MANUAL ON MARITAL RECONCILIATIONS: A
SocIo-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DIVORCEFORTHE UNBROKEN MARRIAGE 11 (1964); cf Paul W.
Alexander, A Therapeutic Approach, in CONFERENCE ON DIVORCE 51, 51-52 (Ernest W.
Burgress et al. eds., 1952) (explaining that divorce petitioners and their counsel
automatically-and often erroneously-insist that the marriage is dead); EXECUTIVE COMM.
OF THE FED. COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA, AN APPEAL FOR CHANGE IN
DEALING WrrH DIVORCE PROBLEMS, Sept. 19, 1950, reprinted in FOWLER V. HARPER,
PROBLEMS OFTHE FAMILY 771,772 (1952) ("Even though acouple has diagnosed its own case
as hopeless, the judge would be able to draw upon the help of a body of counselors
representing religious, social, psychiatric and legal insights which might point the way to
reconciliation.").
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[I]t is personally tragic and socially disruptive that the court should be absolutely
required, upon proof of a single act of adultery or "extreme cruelty"--perhaps
regretted as soon as committed-to end a marriage which may yet contain a spark
of life." 6
Accordingly, the Governor's Commission tied the elimination of fault grounds in
divorce to the operation of a new and potent socio-legal agency, whose mission was
to provide therapeutic aid to salvage a foundering marriage.
A formal termination of the conjugal union was sanctioned upon proof of marital
breakdown, but only "after penetrating scrutiny and after the parties have been given
by thejudicial process every resource in aid ofconciliation." 27 Mandatory counseling
for divorce petitioners provided the epitome of the therapeutic divorce experiment.
Phillip L. Hammer acknowledged that "requir[ing] a psychiatric type examination
and counseling of persons seeking dissolution of their marriage is a potentially
significant interference by the state with the privacy and personal liberties of the
individual."' 28 But, Hammer insisted, many situations warranted state interference:
when one spouse opposed the dissolution, when minor children needed the state's
protection, when the parties were experiencing difficulty working out a "rational"
distribution of property, when custody and support were unresolved, and, in general,
when psychiatric intercession was needed for the "reduction of anti-social hostility
and tension."' 9 The claims favoring state intervention in these instances "fairly
clearly outweigh the interests of the individual in being free from inquiry by the state
into the events of his private life."'"3 Similar to many proposals of the contemporary
126. REPORTOFTHE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSIONONTHE FAMILY, supra note 122, at27. That
the filing of a divorce suit did not always spell doom for the conjugal bond was suggested in
a study of divorce courts in Washington State: "[A]t least half of the people who start divorce
suits are really hoping that something will stop them before it is too late." Alice O'Leary Rails,
The King County Family Court, 28 WASH. L. REV. 22, 26 (1953).
127. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, supra note 122, at 2.
Proposals to convert divorce from a procedure grounded in matrimonial fault to one exploring
conjugal breakdown were not unknown in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., MORRIS
PLOScOwE, THE TRuTH ABOUT DIVORcE 261 (1955); John S. Bradway, Family
Dissolution-Limits of the Present Litigations Method, 28 IOWA L. REV. 256,266-72 (1943);
Paul Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce, 18 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 26 (1953); Charles W. Tenney, Jr., Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L.
REv. 24, 41-63 (1967).
128. Hammer, supra note 124, at 41.
129. Id. at 41.
130. Id. at 41-42. The therapeutic rationale was fully on display in this proposed reform. The
new legal lexicon banished divorce. Candidates for a dissolution of marriage would file, not
a complaint, but a petition of inquiry. The suit itself would no longer be captioned [Wife] v.
[Husband), but the less-contentious In re the Marriage of[Wife] and [Husband], thus shifting
the rhetorical nub from divorce to marriage. Plaintiff and Defendant would yield to Petitioner
and Respondent. Stress on marital counseling, to be provided by a trained professional staff,
would replace the former focus on adjudication and burdens of proof. The Sturm undDrang
ofthe adversary system would become obsolete, the Governor's Commission believed, because
grounds for divorce would no longer be relevant. REPORTOF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
ON THE FAMILY, supra note 122, at 80-85. See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 4503 (West Supp. 1969)
(repealed 1994); CAL. R. CT. 1261 (repealed 1994), 1281-1282 ("A proceeding for dissolution
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divorce counterrevolution, the process of obtaining a dissolution was restructured in
an effort to frustrate the goal of dissolution. Upon receipt of the initial divorce
pleading, now designated a petition of inquiry, the court clerk was to schedule a
conciliation conference."'3 This initial interview was mandatory, and attendance could
be compelled by court order.' Subsequently, the court's counselor was to inform the
judge whether the parties had decided to (a) become reconciled, (b) continue
counseling, or (c) resume "their application for an inquiry into the marriage, with a
view to its possible dissolution."' 3 This configuration of options discloses the naivete
of the reformers in positing conciliatory resolutions as the first two alternative
outcomes, and in cloaking the third option, the only one resulting in divorce, in the
"psycho-babble" of the day. But even if later events have shown the reformers
simplistic, their faith in the power of the therapeutic alliance of law and psychology
to slow the divorce rate shows clearly. No-fault divorce was intended to fill the gap
suggested by Judge Roger Pfaff's testimony before the Governor's Commission that
nearly ninety percent of California divorces could be averted "if only they [the
couples] knew."134
The belief-which contrary evidence cannot dislodge--that divorce is an impulsive
act persists to this day, and lies at the core of contemporary proposals to extend
waiting periods prior to awarding divorce decrees.'35 Each stage of no-fault divorce
of the marriage ... shall be commenced by filing in the Superior Court a petition entitled 'In
re the Marriage of.... ').
131. See REPORTOFTHE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ONTHE FAMILY, supra note 122, at 82.
132. See id at 82-83.
133. Id. at 83.
134. Krom, supra note 118, at 160. After the initial interview, a minimum waiting period
of 120 days was required before the formal dissolution hearing. During this time, the counselor
was expected to work with the parties and prepare a written report setting forth "the
counselor's recommendations together with supporting facts as to the continuance of the
marriage." Id at 166. If, despite the counseling efforts, the court presiding over the dissolution
hearing decided that the marriage had irreparably broken down, an immediate order dissolving
the union would follow. However, if the court was unable or unwilling to make such a finding,
the parties would face a ninety-day continuance, during which time they were encouraged to
utilize the professional counseling facilities of the court. After this last delay, the court would
order the marriage dissolved upon the request of either party. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY, supra note 122, at 83-84, 90-93.
135. See, e.g., Aidan R. Gough, A Suggested Family Court System for California, 4 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 212, 212-17 (1964) (proposing a new family court system, in part, because it
will be a time consuming process); Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Equality and the Economic
Consequences of Spousal Support: A Canadian Perspective, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1,
7 (1995) ("Divorce on demand... raised concerns abodt hasty and unconsidered divorces.");
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9,
44 (1990) (theorizing that implementation of a legal rule requiring delay before dissolution
"would discourage impulsive divorce and provide sufficient opportunity for reconciliation");
Abraham Stone, Marital Counseling as Aid to Legal Profession, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY
RELATIONS, supra note 78, at 53-58 (reporting that many couples impulsively seek divorce).
For contemporary proposals to expand divorce waiting periods, see infra text accompanying
notes 418-20.
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litigation was designed to convert the divorce action into a conciliation procedure. 13 6
A determined couple could, of course, dodge the persuasive machinations and endure
the delays--eight months or longer in a busy urban court-until they were granted
a "dissolution." But the very process of stalling divorce-minded partners was an
integral component of therapeutic divorce, premised on its belief that slowing the
divorce process would dissuade many couples from seeking to dissolve their
marriages.
Earlier efforts at divorce reform had succeeded only in adding an ostensibly no-
fault option to the statutory list of grounds. The framers of California's reform were
anxious to eliminate grounds altogether in order to achieve total control of the
dissolution process.'37 With this aim, the timing of the publication of PuttingAsunder
could not have been more fortuitous. The Archbishop's group set forth a detailed
rationale for a clean slate, as well as an argument for ending the perfunctory
registration of undefended divorce suits. 3 ' The California reformers joined the attack
on fault grounds as conduits to divorce. As the English proposal had reasoned, the
retention of fault grounds leads to needless divorces and "'invests with spurious
objectivity acts [whose] real significance varies widely."" 39 Marital breakdown, on
the other hand, was theoretically not subject to collusive prior arrangement, and
presented the issue of continuing the marriage in terms far more amenable to
therapeutic intervention than did adultery or extreme cruelty, particularly when those
fault grounds were so often understood to be faked. 140 In any event, divorces would
no longer be "undefended" in any justiciable sense. Since the emphasis was no longer
on contesting charges but on crafting conciliation, the heart of the judge's role had
now been transformed from weighing accusatory ripostes to facilitating
reconciliation. To provide teeth for these jaws of harmony, the court was empowered
to command both parties' participation.' The Report of the California Assembly
stressed that the difference between fault and no-fault divorce lay in the new law's
concern with evaluating and, if possible, preserving, the marriage in conflict:
Under the old law the court granted a decree once the statutory grounds were
established. There was no requirement that it consider all the circumstances of the
marriage at the time of the hearing and evaluate the chances for a successful
reconciliation. But under the new law the emphasis is just the opposite.'42
136. To be sure, the legislature rejected the proposal of Governor's Commission for a
comprehensive family court, to be staffed by counseling personnel. REPORTOFTHE ASSEMBLY
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY ON A.B. 530 AND S.B. 252, reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, 1969 REG. SEss. at 8055-56 (Aug. 8, 1969) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY
REPORT].
137. See REPORTOF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSIONON THE FAMILY, supra note 122, at2.
138. See PUrNG ASUNDER, supra note 57, passim.
139. Richard C. Dinkelspiel & Aidan R. Gough, A Family Court Act for Contemporary
California: A Summary ofthe Report ofthe California Governor's Commission on the Family,
42 CAL. ST. B.J. 363, 372 (1967) (quoting PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 29).
140. See PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 29-30.
141. See id. at 69-70.
142. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 136, at 8058.
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C. "The Final Stage in the Evolution of Divorce?"
Upon signing into law the first modern no-fault divorce statute,'43 California
Governor Ronald Reagan affirmed that "[d]ivorce is a tragic thing."" He hoped that
the new law would "do much to remove the sideshow elements of many divorce cases
... [and] the acrimony and bitterness between a couple that is harmful not only to
their children but also to society as a whole."'45 But the governor's message missed
an important goal of the new statute. The Family Law Act of 1969 heralded the era
of no-fault divorce, but it was intended to render divorce more difficult to obtain.
Scholarly commentary and appellate court interpretation immediately reinforced
the notion that California had closed the door on easy divorce. In no-fault's inaugural
season, Charles W. Johnson suggested in a practice guide to divorce lawyers that a
dissatisfied spouse seeking a marital escape must establish irreconcilable differences
by presenting "substantial reasons" for abandoning the marriage.46 Appellate
affirmation was not long in coming. In 1972, the California Supreme Court decided
In re Marriage ofMcKim, 47 declaring that while the legislature had devised a no-
fault, nonadversarial procedure, "it did not intend that findings of irreconcilable
differences be made perfunctorily."'48 The supreme court pointed out that the
legislature had rejected a proposal whereby the parties would be entitled to a
dissolution upon the processing of certain steps and the passage of a certain period
of time.'49 On the contrary, the Family Law Act placed the trial court in the role of
"'an overseeing participant to do its utmost to effect a healing of the marital
wounds.""" ° To perform this critical task, judges needed to independently review
evidence about the condition of the marriage.' The supreme court specifically
143. See Family LawActof1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312,3314-51 (repealed 1994).
144. Id (Governor's statement).
145. Id.
146. Charles W. Johnson, The Family Law Act: A Guide to the Practitioner, I PAC.L.J. 147,
151 (1970); see also ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 136, at 8058.
147. 493 P.2d 868 (Cal. 1972).
148. Id. at 871.
149. See id
150. Id. (quoting ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 136, at 8058).
151. Appellate courts in other jurisdictions similarly noted the requirement for trial court
evaluation of assertedly broken marriages. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845,
852 (Colo. 1975).
Where the parties do not agree as to the breakdown of the marriage, it is
imperative for the court to weigh all the evidence and make its own independent
determination of that fact. While the dissolution of marriage act did eliminate all
the former defenses to divorce in this state, it did not eliminate the necessity of
proving an irretrievable breakdown where that basic allegation is denied in the
pleadings.
Id; see also Joy v. Joy, 423 A.2d 895, 896 (Conn. 1979) (rejecting contention that trial judge
under no-fault law served merely ministerial function or administered divorce on demand, and
declining "to circumscribe this delicate process of fact-finding by imposing the constraint of
guidelines on an inquiry that is necessarily individualized and particularized"); Desrochers v.
Desrochers, 347 A.2d 150, 153 (N.H. 1975) (no-fault law "contemplates the introduction of
factual testimony sufficientto permit afinding of irreconcilable differences which have caused
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rejected the notion that the parties could consent to dissolve their union and have that
consent constitute the required proof of irreconcilable differences.' 52 In emphasizing
the statutory focus on dissolving only the truly hopeless marriages, the court
continued its long-standing concern with collusion. It worried about the parties'
agreeing "that one of them would present false evidence that their differences were
irreconcilable and their marriage had broken down irremediably."'' The court
insisted that it was the function of the trial judge, not the parties, to decide whether
the evidence sufficed to warrant dissolution.
54
At the dawn of the no-fault divorce era, expectations were high that the process of
marital dissolution had been transformed not only into a more rational process, but
the irremediable breakdown of the marriage").
152. See In re Marriage of McKim, 493 P.2d at 872.
153. Id.
154. See id. Close on the heels of the state supreme court's ratification of the no-fault
procedure, a California Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the new law had
"delegated the function of dissolving marriages... to any litigant who wants to have his or her
marriage dissolved and to the absolute discretion of the courts to either grant or deny the
dissolution of a marriage without any guidelines whatsoever." In re Marriage ofCosgrove, 103
Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 (Ct. App. 1972). The court asserted that the no-fault statute required
adequate proof of allegations and exhaustion of conciliation procedures:
The guidelines for the proof and determination of the existence of "irreconcilable
differences" are no more lacking in the present law than were the guidelines for
the determination of fault under the former law. The rights of the responding party
who elects to oppose the dissolution of the marriage are fully protected. The
procedures prescribed for exhausting all reasonable efforts to save the marriage
by reconciliation demonstrate the continuing concern of the law for the
preservation of the marriage wherever possible. The continuing policy to avoid
collusive dissolutions and to insure that dissolutions will be granted only upon
adequate proof that the causes of the marital failure are in truth irremediable is
emphasized by the recent decision of In re Marriage of McKim.
Id. (citations omitted). Note that the English reformers who authored Putting Asunder had
similarly rejected the nontriability of marital breakdown:
We are assured that, having considered the history of a marriage, the reasons
alleged for its failure (together with, in contested cases, the arguments put forward
on the other side), and the efforts which have been made--or not made-to
achieve reconciliation, a court should find it possible to determine the probability
of the joint life being revived.
PUTTING ASUNDER, supra note 57, at 44-45.
Following McKim and Cosgrove, the California Court of Appeals subsequently determined
that the irreconcilable differences to be proven by the petitioner "must be substantial as
opposed to trivial or minor." In re Marriage of Walton, 104 Cal. Rptr. 472, 480 (Ct. App.
1972). The respondent would always have the opportunity to prove the contrary proposition,
and the trial judge retained discretion to receive evidence of specific acts of misconduct
affecting the marriage. See id. at 480. The court of appeals rejected a standard "based upon the
subjective attitude of the parties," and insisted that the Family Law Act did not constitute a
"license for dissolution of marriage by consent of the parties." Id. at 479. The court concluded
by emphasizing that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing the "existence of marital
problems which have so impaired the marriage relationship that the legitimate objects of
matrimony have been destroyed and as to which there is no reasonable possibility of
elimination, correction or resolution." Id.
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also into one focused on vouchsafing the traditional values of maintaining the
American family. 5 Noted family law scholar Brigitte Bodenheimer predicted a
smooth transition into this responsible divorce framework in her 1968 comment that
"[e]ntirely unilateral divorce at the option of either spouse, without conditions, is
seldom advocated today."'56 To the contrary, another critic observed, "under the no-
fault concept there is even a greater chance that the devoted spouse may save the
marriage through required conciliation."'5 7 The California legislature that framed
modem no-fault relied on its view that the divorce court would now "sit as an
overseeing participant to do its utmost to effect a healing of the marital wounds."'58
The goals of no-fault divorce were not only clear, they seemed easily within grasp:
"By requiring the consideration of the marriage as a whole and making the possibility
of reconciliation the important issue, the intent is to induce a conciliatory and
uncharged atmosphere which will facilitate resolution of the other issues and perhaps
effect a reconciliation."' 59 America was nearing the "final stage in the evolution of
divorce. ' ' The reformers believed that they had clarified and sanitized divorce, and
that through their efforts the flood of divorces had been held in check.' 6'
Unfortunately, the dam soon burst.
II. THE DIVORCE COUNTERREVOLUTION
"On September 5, 1969, with a stroke of his pen, California governor Ronald
Reagan wiped out the moral basis for marriage in America."'162 Thus begins the
revisionist history ofthe divorce counterrevolution. The mid to late 1960s have been
described as the "cultural fault line, the B.C. and A.D. of American divorce."' 63 After
155. One domestic relations writer proclaimed that the passage of the no-fault statute
rendered California the "most civilized state in the nation with respect to the handling of
problems created by the breakdown of marriage." Edwin S. Saul, Proof ofa No-Fault Divorce
Case, 45 L.A. BAR BULL. 99, 100-01 (1970).
156. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM.
L. 179, 193 (1968). To be sure, other voices criticized the California legislature for having
enacted "'divorce for the asking."' Reppy, supra note 109, at 1307 (quoting Rudy Villasenor,
Divorce Law: Guilty/Innocent to Go, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1969, § 1, at 1). Similarly, an
advertising circular sent by a publishing house to California attorneys handling domestic
relations cases predicted the demise of the institution: "Starting January 1, 1970, divorce in
California is not going on a trip. Divorce is dead!" Id. at 1306 n.3 (emphasis in original).
157. Clayton J.M. Adkinson, No-Fault Divorce: A Proposal for Mississippi, 45 MISS. L.J.
179, 200-01 (1974).
158. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 136, at 8058.
159. Id.
160. Michael J. Whaling, The No Fault Concept: Is This the Final Stage in the Evolution
of Divorce?, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 959, 959-60 (1972) (supporting linkage of marital
breakdown standard and mandatory conciliation procedures for couples seeking divorce).
161. See, e.g., Adkinson, supra note 157, at 201 (acknowledging concern that no-fault laws
might increase the divorce rate, but stating that "[a]t this point there seems to be no sound basis
for this argument"); Whaling, supra note 160.
162. Elizabeth Schoenfeld, Drumbeats for Divorce Reform, POL'Y REv., May-June 1996,
at 8.
163. WHITEHEAD, supra note 13, at 44.
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that decade, the legal and social systems no longer considered divorce a concern
involving "multiple stakeholders."'" Divorce abruptly became a solo voyage, often
characterized as an immoral flight from responsibility. The legal system rejected the
culpability-ground-turned-entitlement theory of divorce. But enacting the marital
breakdown standard never resulted in a searching judicial inquiry into the state of each
marriage, as many no-fault divorce reformers had hoped. 6 ' Irreconcilable differences
simply were not justiciable." As Mary Ann Glendon later reported, "the virtually
universal understanding... is that the breakdown of a marriage is irretrievable if one
spouse says it is."' 67 No-fault divorce became naked divorce.
Even had trial judges been inclined, they were ill-equipped and understaffed to
perform the inquests which the therapeutic divorce reformers prescribed. The
California legislature had refused to enact state-wide family courts with the capacity
to conduct social investigations. Concerns about unwarranted judicial probing into
bedrooms merged with the steep price quoted for reconciliation-oriented divorce. As
the former executive director of the Governor's Commission on the Family observed,
the demise of the therapeutic family court was owed to "cost, concern that a family
court structure would disrupt existing systems of court calendaring[,] and perhaps a
fear that 'social work' would dilute 'hard legal process."'"68
But "hard legal process" itself disappeared under the fire sale which divorce now
became. By 1977, only three states (Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota)
remained wedded to exclusively fault concepts in marital dissolutions. 69 That same
164. Id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 143-61.
166. See Hagerty v. Hagerty, 281 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979) (holding irretrievable
breakdown can be shown by "evidence of only one party's belief that it is the existing state,
particularly where the parties have been living apart"); LAW COMMIssION, FACING THE
FUTURE: A DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE GROUND FOR DIVORCE, 1988, Cmnd. 170, at 30.
[A]lthough breakdown is a widely acceptedprinciple, experience elsewhere bears
out the Commission's earlier view that it is not a justiciable issue .... Any
attempt at adjudication is likely to reintroduce an element of fault or at least of
bitter recrimination. A logical application of the breakdown principle requires
divorce on unilateral demand, at least if that demand is persisted in for any length
of time.
Id. (citation omitted); see also WHrIEHEAD, supra note 13, at 68 (no-fault divorce "established
a disaffected spouse's right unilaterally to dissolve a marriage simply by declaring that the
relationship was over"); Bodenheimer, supra note 156, at 200 (expressing concem over the
credibility of evidence adduced to prove a marital breakdown since most will emanate from
the litigants who "will inevitably be slanted in the direction of their ultimate goal, which is
divorce"); Reppy, supra note 109, at 1323 ("[A] major problem presented by the new [no-fault
divorce] law is whether the prima facie case for dissolution can be effectively contested, or,
in other words, whether the issue of marital breakdown is triable."). But see Paulsen, supra
note 54, at 96-97 (suggesting that "the issue of breakdown is triable," but cautioning that the
question is not "whether a judge can arrive at a decision ... but whether it is wise and
expedient that he should do so") (emphasis in original).
167. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 81 (1987).
168. Aidan R. Gough, Divorce Without Squalor, 210 NATION 17, 20 (1970).
169. See Doris J. Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 11
FAM. L.Q. 297, 298 (1977). Pennsylvania adopted no-fault divorce in 1980, as did Illinois in
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year, Riane Tennehaus Eisler reported that in the six years since the effective date of
the irreconcilable differences standard in California, not a single divorce petition had
been denied for failure to meet the standard of proof of irreconcilable differences.' 70
The appellate admonitions setting forth the statutory requirements for adequate proof
turned out to have a nonexistent shelf life. Indeed, none of the forty-four California
domestic relations judges interviewed by sociologist Lenore Weitzman in the "mid-
1970's" could recall ever refusing a request for a divorce under the new
dispensation.' In 1975, the California legislature repealed the provision which had
allowed proof of specific bad acts to show the existence of irreconcilable
differences. " The legislature thus removed one of the few remaining exemplars of
the fault mentality as it recognized that irreconcilable differences were nothing more
than a self-operated escape hatch from any marriage. Even in contested divorce cases,
a "perfunctory judicial acknowledgment of marital breakdown replaced the parade
of witnesses and staged courtroom battles."''
The California story of legal and cultural transformation was quickly replicated.
Reporting a "virtual unanimity as to the urgent need for basic reform," 74 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 proposed the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"). 75 The UMDA specified that the sole ground
for divorce should be an irretrievable breakdown of marriage. 76 Six months after the
effective date of California's divorce reforms, Iowa became the second state to
completely gut its fault system and replace it with an "irretrievable breakdown"
standard.'77 A 1972 survey of twenty Iowa trial judges analyzed the 1810 divorce
1983, and South Dakota-the 50th state to do so-in 1985. See Ira M. Ellman & Sharon L.
Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Between Divorce Laws and Divorce Rates, 18 INT'L REV.
L. &ECON. 341, 347-48 (1998).
170. See RiANE T. EISLER, DIssOLUTION: NO-FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE
FUTURE OF WOMEN 10 (1977).
171. See LENORE J. WEITzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUmON: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIALAND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHLDREN IN AMERICA 19 (1985).
172. See 1975 Cal. Stat. 59.
173. LYNN C. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 251
(1980). The almost total deference to unilateral party behavior is described in Elayne Carol
Berg, Irreconcilable Differences: California Courts RespondtoNo-FaultDissolutions, 7 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 453, 466 (1974); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce
Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 107.
174. UNiF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT prefatory note (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 160
(1998).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 161. The American Bar Association approved the UMDA in 1974, and
recommended its passage by the states. Section 302 of the UMDA currently provides that a
court shall enter a marital dissolution when the court finds the marriage "irretrievably broken";
or if the parties have lived separate and apart for more than 180 days preceding the filing of
the divorce action; or if "serious marital discord" adversely affects the attitude of one or both
of the parties toward the marriage. UNIF. MARRIAGEAND DIVORCE ACT § 302, 9A U.L.A. 159
(1973). Eight states have adopted the UMDA (Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington). See id. at 162-68.
177. 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1266, § 18 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17
(West Supp. 2000)).
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cases they had heard within the previous year. 17 1 Of that total, 1599 had been
uncontested, 211 contested, and in not one case had the prayer for a divorce been
denied. 179 Similarly, a Nebraska survey of nearly 10,000 dissolution cases in the mid-
1970s "failed to reveal a single instance in which it could be said with certainty that
a divorce which was desired by even one of the spouses was ultimately refused. '"'8
The emergence of divorce as an act of self-actualization was only one component
in an emerging Zeitgeist emphasizing "personal autonomy with respect to intimate
life choices."'' The displacement of a formal culpability analysis in divorce cases
was accompanied by cultural rifts in American society "leav[ing] the individual
suspended in glorious, but terrifying, isolation."'8  This cultural primacy of
detachment has produced the "acontextual self,"'83 a being "who stands apart from
any social relationship in which he or she is involved."'" Divorce lost its impact
because marriage no longer appeared to require continual tending. "Love," as the
posters advertising the wildly popular 1970s movie Love Story endlessly repeated,
"means never having to say you're sorry."'8 5
178. See Stephen L. Sass, The Iowa No-Fault Dissolution of Marriage Law in Action, 18
S.D. L. REV. 629, 635, 650 (1973).
179. See id. at 635.
180. Alan H. Frank et al., No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate: The Nebraska
Experience-An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1, 66
(1978). The argument in the text is not intended to imply that all, or even most, states have
followed California down the path of eliminating fault grounds. To the contrary, 32 states still
retain divorce grounds based on culpability, to which they have appended a no-fault ground.
See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Of Welfare
Reform, Child Support, andRelocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765,807 (1997). However, the cultural
changes sparked by California no-fault have resulted in the virtual evisceration of the once-
prevalent fault grounds even in jurisdictions in which those grounds remain an option. Not
only are the overwhelming number of divorces obtained under no-fault grounds, but even
fault-based petitions often resolve into no-fault divorce decrees. See, e.g., Williams v.
Williams, 415 S.E.2d 252, 253 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming trial court's sua sponte grant
of a no-fault divorce in a case in which wife filed for divorce on grounds of cruelty and
constructive desertion and husband countered with allegations of the wife's desertion and
adultery).
181. Perry, supra note 40, at 62; see also RHEINSTEIN, supra note 40, at 10-11 (identifying
a transition from a "Christian-conservative ideology" to a "eudaemonistic-liberal one"); Carl
E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation ofAmerican Family Law, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1803, 1807 (1985) (viewing family law changes as the result of the tradition of
autonomy in family affairs, the ideology of liberal individualism, changing moral beliefs, and
the prevalence of a "psychologic" perspective).
182. ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT
IN AMERICAN LIFE 6 (1985).
183. MILTON C. REGAN, JR:, FAMILY LAWANDTHE PURSUITOF INTIMACY 2 (1993); see also
Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism andAutonomy in Family Law: The Waning ofBelonging, 1991
BYU L. REv. 1, 3 (discussing how family law fosters "autonomous individualism" to the
detriment of familial relationships).
184. REGAN, supra note 183, at 2.
185. ERICH SEGAL, LOVE STORY 131 (1970).
[V/ol. 75:875
CUSTOMIZED MARRIAGE
But in the generation since the creation of no-fault divorce, a strong argument has
emerged that the "happiness principle embedded in the no-fault ground has dealt a
devastating blow to the durability of marriages."'18 6 Contemporary scholarly accounts
are rife with calls for an end to a divorce process seen as facilitating individual
irresponsibility at the expense of mutuality and the welfare of children.'87 Many
accounts in the popular press have also taken a cudgel to no-fault divorce, professing
that "a whole generation... has placed its marital future in a [no-fault] law that
favors the unfaithful, the uncommitted, the selfish and the immature. . . . 'Till death
do us part' was replaced by 'as long as I'm happy.""
88
A. Fault, No-Fault, and Family Life
The nuclear family has, according to some observers, simply disappeared from the
cultural radar screen.'89 Not only has the divorce rate dramatically escalated in the last
186. Annamay T. Sheppard, Women, Families, and Equality: Was Divorce Reform a
Mistake?, 12 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 143, 146 (1990).
187. See, e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 17, at 871 ("The changes in the institutional
structure that make marital promises unenforceable and allow opportunistic behavior are the
enactment in many states of no-fault divorce with the simultaneous removal of fault (breach)
as a consideration in grants of spousal support and property division."); Lynne Marie Kohm,
The Homosexual "Union ": Should Gay andLesbian Partnerships Be Granted the Same Status
as Marriage?, 22 J. CONIEMP. L. 51, 62 n.57 (1996) ("[T]he family instability our society is
experiencing is due to a general breakdown in the value of the family, the ease of obtaining a
divorce since the enactment of no-fault grounds, and a general tolerance for almost anything
between consenting adults."); Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means ofRe-
Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 605, 606 (1996) ("IT]he
advent of no-fault divorce signaled an end to the notion of marriage as a status having at its
core the concept of a contract with God and spouse, the breaking of which necessitated
circumstances which were intolerable and unavoidable-fault."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert
E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2466 n.187 (1995) (advocating
mandatory mediation of custody disputes and other reforms to safeguard children's interests
in divorce).
188. Micah A. Clark, Editorial, The Negative Effects of Easy Divorce, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 12, 1996, at A5; see also William A. Galston, Making Divorce Harder Is Better, WASH.
POST, Aug. 10, 1997, at C3 (suggesting that by providing couples at marriage the option of
rejecting no-fault divorce for themselves, the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Law might help
decrease the divorce rate); Abby Goyette, Letter to the Editor, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 8, 1996, at
B6 ("'No fault' equals 'no responsibility' equals 'no morals' equals 'no justice'!"); Walter
Kim, The Ties That Bind Should Breaking up Be Harder To Do? The Debate over Easy
Divorce Rages on, TIME, Aug. 8, 1997, at48 (reporting the "backlash against divorce" spurred
by disillusionment with the ease ofmarital escape); Michelle J. Moore, Editorial, X'ers to Baby
Boomers: Thanksfor Nothing, ORANGE COULNY REG., June 10, 1998, at B6 (arguing that no-
fault divorce laws, spawned by Baby Boomers "who have always had difficulty accepting
responsibility for their own actions," are responsible for the "destruction of the family unit").
189. See Debra Baker, Beyond Ozzie and Harriet, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at 59, 61 (1998)
(describing the television family of Something So Right, consisting of a"woman with children
from two marriages, a third husband and a stepdaughter"); Frank Bruni, A Small-But-Growing
Sorority is Giving Birth to Children for Gay Men, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at A12
(discussing surrogate mothers of children to be adopted by gay couples); Candace Purdom,
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three decades, but the number of never-married adults more than doubled between
1970 and 1996, from 21.4 million to 44.9 million.'" Within the same time frame, the
number of unmarried households comprised of couples of opposite sexes grew from
523,000 to four million; the number of women living alone doubled, from 7.3 million
to 14.6 million; and the number of men living alone tripled, from 3.5 million to 10.3
million. 9 The proportion of children under eighteen years of age living with both
parents declined from 85% in 1970 to 69% in 1995.192 More than 50% of all children
born in 1992 are expected to live apart from one parent for at least some portion of
their childhood. 93 And almost 40% of children one of whose parents remarry later
experience a second divorce.' 94 One observer has coined the term "American
Split Decisions: To Kids of Divorce, Holidays Can Feel Like a Tug of War, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
15, 1998, at 3 (describing the Hallmark greeting card company's television commercial
featuring a mother dropping her son off at his father's house for Christmas; the boy is glad to
see his father but worried that Santa Claus will not be able to find both his mother's house-in
which he lives-and his father's house which he is visiting); Ron Tank, So Long, 'Ozzie and
Harriet': Nuclear Families No Longer Dominate Cinema, TV (last modified May 5, 1998)
<http://www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/9805/05/90s.familieslindex.html> ("From the silver screen
to the small screen, the traditional family of Mom, Dad, and 2.3 kids has given way to an
updated version: divorced couples, gay significant others, and, of course, their offspring.").
Psychiatrist Carol Lieberman concludes that, in this family revolution, life will chase after art:
"By putting it on the screen, with millions of people seeing it, it becomes the norm and it
influences people to have that kind of lifestyle." Id. On the historical and theoretical arguments
surrounding the nuclear family, see Kris Franklin, "4 Family Like Any Other Family":
Alternative Methods of Defining Family in Law, 18 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027, 1033-50
(1990-91).
190. See CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 11, 1.
191. See id.
192. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS
SERIES 23-193, How WE'RE CHANGING 1 (1997).
193. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROwING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 2-3 (1994).
194. See Frank F. Furstenberg et al., The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital
Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 656, 661 (1983). English society has
experienced similar changes. In 1994, the number of first marriages for both partners had
decreased to 174,000, the lowest since 1889, despite a much larger present-day population.
Cohabitation has escalated dramatically: in the 1960s, fewer than 5% of women cohabited with
their partners before marriage; 70% do so in the 1990s. The proportion of all British births
occurring outside marriage has risen from 8% in 1971 to 13% in 1981 to 34% in 1995.
Between 1970 and the present, the proportion of families headed by a lone parent rose from
one in twelve families to one in four. A far greater percentage of the population now lives
alone. Over one-quarter of households have just a single person living in them today. One in
ten men aged between 25 and 44 now lives alone, three times the proportion a generation ago.
See Jack O'Sullivan, The Family Green Paper: The Dream of the Ideal Family ls Now a Thing
of the Past, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 5, 1998; see also Melanie Phillips, Whitehall
Confetti for the Death of Marriage, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 1, 1998, Features
("[M]arriage is now extremely fragile. It has had the stuffing knocked out of itby divorce laws,
financial disincentives and the myth assiduously peddled by media, academic and political
circles that cohabitation is just as good.").
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Polyintimacy"'" to describe the emerging relationship trend involving a measure of
closeness with a variety of partners. An English critic grimly wrote that "people no
longer want to live in traditional families .... Family life for most people is awful.
It is noisy, intrusive, demanding, boring, unrewarding and sexually frustrating." '96
Other voices suggest, however, that the American family has not entirely lost its
recognizable size and shape."9 While the average family size shrank from 3.71
members in 1965 to 3.17 members in 1990, that latter statistical size has held-and
slightly increased-through the 1990s.'" The marriage rate for the twelve-month
period ending June 1997 was up 2% from the previous year.' Commenting on the
recent demographic trends, Census Bureau population analyst Ken Bryson observed
that the "'perceived decline in the American family is vanishing and the 90's
represents a stabilization period."' 2 Barbara Dafoe Whitehead refers to this period
as the "new familism," characterized by a "shifting away from expressive
individualism and... toward greater attachments to family." ''
Nonetheless, for over a decade some legal scholars have portrayed no-fault divorce
as the sieve through which family law has been drained of moral discourse, ever-
shortening the distance between courting and court by substituting market incentives
195. Green Onions, American Polyintimacy in the 90s and the Internet, ECLECTICA MAG.,
Apr. 1997, available at (visited Apr. 2,2000) <http:/www.eclectica.org/vln7/intimacy.html>.
196. Minette Main, A Sense ofResolution, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 31, 1998, at
30.
197. Indeed, historian John Gillis has observed that "one thing that never seems to change
is the notion that family is not what it used to be." JOHN R. GI-LIS, A WORLD OF THEIR OWN
MAKiNG: MYT, RrruAL, AND THE QUEST FOR FAMILY VALUES 3 (1996). But see STEPHANIE
COoNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 1-2
(1992) (observing a "historical, static notion of what 'the' family was like before... an era of
'family collapse' and hoping "to expose many of our 'memories' of traditional family life as
myths").
198. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl.
40, at 35 (1970); U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRATOF THE UNITED STATES,
tbl. 70, at 60 (1999). As another indication that family change has stabilized, note that the
percentage of households comprised by married couples with minor children stood at 26% in
1990 and at 25% in 1998. See id. tbl. 73, at 62.
199. SeeNATIONAL CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, DVORCES, AND DEATHS
FOR JUNE 1997, MONTHLY VrrAL STAT. REP. (No. 6) 2 (1998).
200. CNN U.S., Decline of TraditionalAmerican Family Slows in 90's (last modified May
28, 1998) <http://cnn.com/US/9805/28/family.figuresindex.html> (quoting Ken Bryson).
201. Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The New Family Values: Striking a Balance Between 50's
Family Values and 80's Individualism, UTNE READER, May-June 1993, at 61, 63; see also
David Popenoe, Fostering the New Familism: A GoalforAmerica, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Fall 1992, at 31-37 (describing the "rise of a new familism"). The covenant marriage
movement is one sign ofthis resurgence offamilism: "'If couples go into the marriage thinking
it's a lifetime commitment, then it will help them stay together .... Most people have this
strange idea of marriage. They think it's about love, but it's really about commitment."' Kristi
Wright, Until Death Do Us Part: Covenants, Other Programs Help Couples Keep Their Vows,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 28, 1997, at IE (omission added) (quoting Rev. James
Lancaster). For a discussion of covenant marriages, see infra text accompanying notes 453-56.
2000]
INDIANA LAWJOUR[.AL
for moral certainties. 2 Carl E. Schneider has called attention to the transfer ofpower
in family law from society to individuals, echoing the claim ofJana Singer that a shift
to private decisionmaking is the sea change transforming modem family law.2" At the
time of its passage, for instance, the California law creating modem no-fault divorce
was praised as a "major contribution... truely [sic] making marital dissolution a more
honest and rational event-one for which the parties and not the State take
responsibility.""° But some say that the notion of responsibility itself has fallen out
of favor, agreeing with Christopher Lasch that the "privatization of morality is one
more indication of the collapse of the community."2 5
Schneider has pointed to a correlate shift, the "language of morals ... being
displaced by other discourses or even by silence."2' William A. Galston highlighted
202. See Schneider, supra note 181, at 1803 ("diminution in the law's discourse" about
morality has metamorphosed family law and has correlated with the "transfer of moral
decisions from the law to the people once regulated."); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse
and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 605, 607 ("[]n both the legal and
popular imagination.., no-fault divorce tends to be associated with a decline in the use of
moral discourse in family law."); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA
IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 109 (1996) (observing that divorce and its financial
consequences have become "detached from moral considerations of guilt and innocence,
punishment and reward"). Market incentives work best within an established market, and
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has pointed to a "huge divorce industry, with a booming
professional service sector of lawyers, therapists, financial experts, and child psychiatrists...
sprung up to harvest the fruits of family discord." Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Moral State
of Marriage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1995, at 114, 116 (reviewing IVANA TRUMP, THE
BEST IS YET To COME: COPING WITH DIVORCE AND ENJOYING LIFE AGAIN (1995), and
WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD MARRIAGE, supra note 26).
203. See Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral
Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 534; Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443. For a contrary view, arguing that the state's increased role in marital
affairs since World War II is a "direct consequence of the state's growing responsibility for the
regulation of family welfare through Social Security and other benefits," see Katherine L.
Caldwell, Not Ozzie and Harriet: Postwar Divorce and the American Liberal Welfare State,
23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 13 (1998). See also JAMES G. SNELL, IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW:
DIVORCE IN CANADA, 1900-1939, at 12 (1991) (arguing that early twentieth-century
Canadians' increased "use of state divorce facilities... represents... a diminution of the
perceived legitimacy of community and family informal divorce processes and a parallel rise
in the perceived authority of the state and its institutions. State control might have been
weakening, but the role of the state in familial matters was growing.").
204. Reppy, supra note 109, at 1332. On the California statute, seesupratext accompanying
notes 145-54.
205. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF
DEMOCRACY 108 (1995).
206. Schneider, supra note 203, at 505; see also Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony:
Marital Decisions andMoral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REV. 197, 198, 233-54 (exploring in
detail the "role ofmoral thinking in the law ofalimony"); GLENDON, supra note 167, at 107-08
("no-fault terminology fit neatly into an increasingly popular mode of discourse in which
values are treated as a matter of taste, feelings of guilt are regarded as unhealthy, and an
individual's primary responsibility is assumed to be to himself'); David Selbourne, OurMoral
Wasteland, TIMES (London), Dec. 30, 1998, at 16 (social institutions, including marriage, have
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another moral vacuum in describing as a "casualty" of no-fault divorce "the idea of
marriage as a presumptively permanent relationship-as a structure of incentives for
individuals to contribute to the well-being of the family, and a framework of
reasonable expectations of reciprocal benefits over the lifetime ofthe partnership."'2 7
In short, critics charge that the application of democracy to divorce has led to the
short-term pursuit of happiness for individuals at the cost of long-lasting damage to
the larger moral community.0 '
But the terms of engagement in the moral discourse of divorce must include
accusations of blame, as the flip side to taking responsibility for one's marital
obligations. Katherine Shaw Spaht has called for the return of "collective social
condemnation... [and] [g]uilt and shame,"2' which are "altogether missing in pure
'no-fault' divorce statutes."210 However, seldom has analysis focused on how a
revival of public accusations of marital infidelity and cruelty-both physical and
emotional-would enhance the larger moral community. Presumably, the moral
discourse whose passing is regretted buttressed the social standards which served as
deterrents to behavior deemed to fall short of those guideposts. An increase in the
accusatory component of moral discourse can, of course, also serve to undermine
marital stability. It is hard to imagine the social utility of such a discourse involving,
for instance, an adulterer, the aggrieved spouse, and the putative co-respondent.
Professor Carriere has effectively outlined the potentially adverse consequences of
reinvesting our legal system with "fault-talk":
Encouraging fault litigation can harden attitudes of self-righteous defensiveness,
contempt for the spouse, and vindictiveness that may contribute to the breakdown
of the marriage, regardless of the specific fault ground on which divorce is
ceased to follow rules of morality). Barbara Dafoe Whitehead praised the most recent research
of clinical psychologist Judith Wallerstein for:
[i]mplicitly present[ing] marriage as a school of virtue, a domain that requires tact
and restraint along with open and honest communication, kindness and gratitude
along with assertiveness and autonomy....
At the same time, marriage requires the exercise of moral imagination. One
thing the couples in these good marriages have in common is a vision of the
marriage as a "superordinate" entity--something that is separate from and larger
than its two parts. The men and women in this study speak of protecting "the
marriage" almost as if it were their child; it is a creation they cherish and share.
Whitehead, supra note 202, at 118-19. For a discussion of the impact of Wallerstein's research,
see infra text accompanying notes 282-84.
207. Galston, supra note 22, at 12, 13; see also Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The
Reliance Interest in Marriage andDivorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855,883 (1988) (representing no-
fault divorce as "rebellion against the propriety of specific performance of the marital
obligations").
208. David Blankenhom argues that divorce has failed even in its more modest
eudaemonistic aims: "'For the past 20 years, the image of divorce was of rebirth and renewal,
a pathway to greater happiness and harmony. The divorce revolution has not delivered the
goods, and now we're beginning to see divorce as the problem."' Milbank, supra note 19, at
Al (quoting David Blankenhom).
209. Spaht, supra note 13, at 1571.
210. Id.
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brought It also discourages reconciliation; partners who are marshaling evidence
against one another of fundamental violations of the marital understanding, and
accusing each other of these in the public records, are more likely to nurse a sense
of grievance and less likely to be in a mood to resume the marital life together
than those who are merely living separate and apart. In fact, in order to avoid
providing the guilty spouse with a defense of reconciliation in a fault-based
divorce, the innocent spouse may refuse to attempt it.
2 1'
But those who bemoan the passing of moral discourse believe that acrimony serves
a function, for blaming can be a cathartic ritual.232 And others argue that the no-fault
regime merely shifted the contest of bitterness from the divorce battleground to the
fields of child custody, child support, property division, and spousal maintenance.
213
The strongest force driving the attack on no-fault divorce is the concern that
children have been seriously hurt in the divorce culture. 214 This new children's
crusade, acknowledged as the "real catalyst 2 5 behind legislative efforts to reform
divorce laws, is driven by the knowledge that over one million children each year
experience their parents' divorce, 21' and a belief that those parents have grievously
sacrificed their children's welfare. In April 1993, The Atlantic Monthly' s entire cover
was devoted to a large-print summary of Barbara Dafoe Whitehead's lead story, Dan
Quayle Was Right:
After decades of public dispute about so-called family diversity, the evidence
from social-science research is coming in: The dissolution of two-parent families,
though it may benefit the adults involved, is harmful to many children, and
dramatically undermines our society." 7
This viewpoint holds that parents who divorced under the fault regime were "forced
211. Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It's Deja Vu All over Again ": The Covenant Marriage Act
in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1723-24 (1998)
(footnote omitted); see also Ellrian & Lohr, supra note 17, at 735 (asserting that reinjecting
fault grounds would"buy[- unpredictable results at a price of heightened transaction costs" and
would prejudice the "financially dependent spouse who feels compelled to settle for a thinner
financial package than she would get under a less discretionary no-fault system, for fear that
the judge will be sympathetic to her husband's (or his wife's) story").
212. See Carriere, supra note 211, at 1722-23 (suggesting that some reformers might
welcome the inevitable increase in acrimony caused by a revival of fault jurisprudence).
213. See MICHIGAN FAMILY FORUM, supra note 19, at 3-4 (citing Bryce J. Christensen,
Taking Stock Assessing Twenty Years of 'No Fault'Divorce, FAM. AM., Sept 1991, at 1, 7).
214. See Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435,
1438 (1998) (describing and rebutting the "Child-Centered Case Against No-Fault Divorce").
See generally AMITAI ETzIoN, THE SPIRIT OF COMMuNrrY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBIL1TIES AND
THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993), excerpted as Children of the Universe: Good
Parenting Benefits the Community As WellAs Kids, UTNE READER, May-June 1993, at 52, 57
(discussing the "revaluation of the importance of children").
215. Jon Jeter, "Covenant Marriages" Tie the Knot Tightly: Louisiana Begins Experiment
in Commitment, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al.
216. See Andrew Schepard et al., Preventing Trauma for the Children of Divorce Through
Education and Professional Responsibility, 16 NOVA L. REV. 767, 768 (1992).
217. Whitehead, supra note 13 (cover text).
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to accept full responsibility" for the divorce."' By contrast, the children whose
families are torn apart under no-fault divorce are "left to imagine that the 'fault' is
somehow theirs." '219 The anti-divorce crusaders contend that divorce "generally scars
children for life,"' and call for us to "Stop Sacrificing America's Children on the
Cold Altar of Convenience for Divorcing Spouses.'""
But where some see an abandonment of moral values in the divorce-friendly
culture, others perceive a "new morality" m in the reshaping of family structure.?
These critics maintain that moral discourse about the family has shifted ground from
a focus on "fault, sexuality, and patriarchal privileges"' 4 within families comprising
of two married parents of opposite sex and their biological offspring to a
218. Bauer, supra note 17, at 10A.
219. Id, Maggie Gallagher quoted the similar viewpoint of a clinical psychologist,
"[Millions of parents have purchased their own relief from marital conflict with a divorce that
forces their children to pay the price in unhappiness, stress, and adjustmentproblems that could
persist for a lifetime. Victimless divorce is either rare or nonexistent when children are
present." MAGGIE GALLAGHER, ENEMIES OF EROS: How THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION Is KILLING
FAMILY, MARRIAGE, AND SEX AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 199-200 (1989).
220. Gordon, supra note 214, at 1439. See generally MICHIGAN FAMILY FORUM, supra note
19, at 6-8 (summarizing the harms to children of divorce).
221. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Q: Would Louisiana's 'Covenant Marriage' Law Be a Good
Ideafor America? Yes: Stop Sacrificing America's Children on the ColdAltar of Convenience
for Divorcing Spouses, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Oct. 6-13, 1997, at 24, 24.
222. Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 228
(1997) (reviewing NANCY E. DOwD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1997), and
BARBRA D. WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997)).
223. See id; DOWD, supra note 222; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, T SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHERTWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDiES (1995); JUDITH
STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN
AGE(1996); Franklin,supra note 189, at 1048-50 (supporting recognition of pluralistic family
definitions); Margaret Talbot, Love, American Style: What the AlarmistsAbout Divorce Don't
Get About Idealism in America, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 14, 1997, at 30. Barbara A. Babb
critiqued the traditional moral determination as elevating theory over practice: "Historically,
judges have attempted to fashion morality in the determination of family legal issues rather
than to devise legal remedies that accommodate how families live." Barbara A. Babb, An
Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and
Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J 775, 775-76 (1997). One critic hostile toward the "new
morality" located the "libertarian" and "responsibility" positions in the culture war over the
family:
In the "libertarian" camp are those who think the family is not disintegrating but
merely changing into a kinder, gentler rainbow of relationships which form and
dissolve and re-form. In the "responsibility" camp are those who think family
breakdown-and in particular mass fatherlessness-threaten not just the
wellbeing of children and women but the social stability that underpins liberal
democracy itself.
Phillips, supra note 194, at 19.
224. Cahn, supra note 222, at 228. Herma Hill Kay suggests that we must "move from
treating divorce as a shameful event to seeing in it a necessary and appropriate corrective for
an unwise or undesired marital choice." Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions
in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORMATTHE CROSSROADS 6,28-29 (Stephen D. Sugarman
& Henna Hill Kay eds., 1990).
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consideration of "fairness, equity, and caregiving '" within "kinships of
responsibility." '226 This position maintains that the yielding of control over divorce
from the government to the divorcing partners is both a proper step in the maturing
of a democracy and consistent with the development of a moral community?2 7 A
recent letter to the editor in a state contemplating the passage of a covenant marriage
statute bluntly advocated this moral democratic imperative:
Is the divorce rate a government issue? No. Divorce is symptomatic of
relationship problems between people. Government was never intended to solve
such problems....
• Recognizing the marriage covenant may encourage greater resolve in a
couple to save the marriage. But that resolve can only come from within; it cannot
be externally forced by government....
.. . Solutions by "we the people" are always better than laws from the
government.""
B. A Comeback for Culpability?
The campaign to reverse the perceived evils of the no-fault revolution has yielded
a wide variety of counter-reform measures in legislatures, the academy, and the
popular press. These proposals to eliminate or raise the threshold of no-fault divorce
range from rewriting the constitution229 to enforcing pre-commitment restrictions on
divorce," and include a variety of counseling and educational requirements, both
mandatory and hortatory." The once-unthinkable return of a culpability hurdle for
225. Cahn, supra note 222, at 229.
226. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean by Home": Toward
a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 587; see
also Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Familyfrom the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809,
816 (1998) (favoring "respect or moral accommodation for a broad range of family forms that
are capable of providing nurturing environments to its members").
227. The characterization of this philosophical position as the "new morality," while apt,
blurs the historiographical record. See WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 89-167 (1967) (discussing the "new morality" of divorce which emerged at the end of the
nineteenth century). Further, the ubiquity of the trope lessens its analytical utility. See, e.g.,
Dear Dawn, THE DOMINION (Wellington), Nov. 16, 1998, at 10 ("In the age of the new
morality, it is in to have bikini lines."); Pravin Gordhan, Pay Your Tax, It's the Patriotic Thing
To Do, FINANCIAL MAIL (South Africa), Jan. 8, 1999, at 14 (discussing "new morality" in
South African governmental concerns); Margaret Scott, IndonesiaReborn?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Aug. 13, 1998, at 43, 46 (discussing need for a "new morality" in Indonesia after fall of
Suharto); David Walsh, Sweet and Sour, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Dec. 27, 1998, at 5G
(terming corruption in British sports the "new morality").
228. Marty Dickerson & Annette Dickerson, A Covenant, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct 2, 1998,
at A19. On Indiana's proposed covenant marriage statute, see infra text accompanying note
448.
229. See infra text accompanying notes 235, 248-52, 257-60.
230. See infra text accompanying notes 386-418.
231. See infra text accompanying notes 294, 298-99, 340, 465-70, 487.
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divorce has not only been thought, 2 it has appeared in state house bills attempting
to undo the no-fault revolution root and branch. 3
In 1991, social critic Christopher Lasch proposed the "most draconian proposal of
the burgeoning divorce-buster movement,"" 4 a constitutional amendment banning
divorce for married couples with minor children:
Marriage should be undertaken only by those who view it as a lifelong
commitment and are prepared to accept the consequences, foreseeable and
unforeseeable, ofsuch acommitment. No state shall pass laws authorizing divorce
for any but the weightiest reasons. In the case of couples with children under the
age of twenty-one, divorce is hereby forbidden."
Although only in South Carolina have constitutional strictures on divorce been
legislatively debated as part of the no-fault counterrevolution, 6 Lasch's proposal
provides a fit template for a discussion of several of these themes. Moreover, the
struggle over constitutional amendments and uniform bills aimed at limiting access
to divorce has been a staple of our richly textured history of regulating marital
dissolution."
South Carolina's history has demonstrated the' potential interplay between
constitutional sanction and statutory provision in the area of divorce. With the
exception often years during the Reconstruction Era, South Carolina courts allowed
no divorces until 1949.1' In 1868, the state constitution was amended to permit the
legislature to sanction divorces." 9 In 1872, South Carolina's first divorce statute
232. See infra text accompanying notes 266, 292, 303, 452, 456.
233. See, e.g., A711, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998) (proposing the elimination of New Jersey's
only no-fault divorce provision, which currently permits a divorce if the spouses have lived
separately for eighteen months); H.R. 1168, 181st Gen. Court (Mass. 1997) (prohibiting
unilateral no-fault divorce for irretrievable breakdown).
234. Paul Taylor, Therapists Rethink Attitudes on Divorce: New Movement To Save
Marriages Focuses on Impact on Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1991, at A6.
235. Symposium, Who Owes What to Whom? Drafting a Constitutional Bill of Duties,
HARPER'S, Feb. 1991, at 48 [hereinafter Who Owes What to Whom?]. The language quoted in
the text constituted Lasch's proposed Article II. His draft Article I read: "Fathers have the
responsibility to marry the mothers of their children and to contribute a fair share to their
children's support unless the mothers release them from these obligations." Id. (emphasis in
original). Judith Younger had earlier proposed a similar marriage for couples with minor
children, which could not be dissolved until the children were emancipated. See Judith T.
Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with
Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 45, 90 (1981) [hereinafter
Younger, Marital Regimes]; Judith T. Younger, Marriage, Divorce, and the Family: A
Cautionary Tale, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1367, 1380 (1993).
236. See infra text accompanying notes 238-48, 257.
237. The plethora of nineteenth-century state constitutional amendments prohibiting
legislative divorce are beyond the scope of this Article.
238. See J. Nelson Frierson, Divorce in South Carolina, 9 N.C. L. REV. 265 (1931); J.D.
Sumner, Jr., The South Carolina Divorce Act of 1949, 3 S.C. L.Q. 253, 254-59 (1951). The
state legislature may have granted several divorces in 1869-70. See 3 HOWARD, supra note 45,
at 38.
239. See S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 15 (granting courts of common pleas exclusive
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provided for marital dissolution upon proof of adultery or desertion for two years.240
The window of divorce was short-lived, however, as the enabling legislation was
repealed in 1878.241" Without legislative authorization, South Carolina divorce lay
dormant until 1895, when the newly-adopted state constitution included a flat
prohibition: "Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed in this
State. ' 242 Over a half-century passed before the state constitution was amended in
1949 to allow divorce on the grounds of adultery, desertion, physical cruelty, and
habitual drunkenness. 243 The legislature passed an enabling statute the same year.'
In 1969, in order to pass a no-fault statute providing for divorce after a three-year
separation of the parties, 245 South Carolina again amended its constitution.2' Ten
years later, the state Constitution was again amended to reduce the waiting period for
no-fault divorce from three years to one.247 In 1997 and 1998, proposals to amend the
constitution once again were introduced in the South Carolina legislature, in order to
change the structure of divorce by creating a "covenant marriage" option.248
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution aiming to turn the business of divorce
legislation over to the federal government in the hope that congressional control24
9
would slow the rise in divorce rates were frequently introduced between 1884 and
jurisdiction in divorce cases); id art. XIV, § 5 ("Divorces... shall not be allowed but by the
judgment of a Court as shall be prescribed by law.").
240. See 15 S.C. Stat. 30 (1872). The legislature limited the desertion ground by requiring
proof that the desertion was "caused by the extreme cruelty of the other party, or that the
desertion by the wife was caused by the gross or wanton and cruel neglect of the husband to
provide suitable maintenance for her, he being of sufficient ability to do so." Id.
241. See 16 S.C. Stat. 719 (1878). Only one reported case was brought under the 1872 Act,
and the opinion affirmed the dismissal of the divorce suit on the ground that the enabling
legislation had been repealed by the time tile suit was decided. See Grant v. Grant, 12 S.C. 29
(1879); see also Frierson, supra note 238, at 266; Sumner, supra note 238, at 257.
242. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. XVII, § 3.
243. See 1949 S.C. Stat. 97; see also Leroy M. Want & W.D. Workman, Jr., Divorce-A
South Carolina Problem, S.C. MAG., Mar. 1949, at 10, 21, 33-34 (describing passage of the
amendment though the state legislature and victory at the polls).
244. See 1949 S.C. Stat. 216. See generally Sumner, supra note 238, at 259-302.
245. See 1969 S.C. Acts 170.
246. See 1969 S.C. Acts 77.
247. See 1979 S.C. Acts 2. The state constitutional provision now reads: "Divorces from the
bonds of matrimony shall be allowed on the grounds of adultery, desertion, physical cruelty,
continuous separation for a period of at least one year or habitual drunkenness." S.C. CONST.
art. XVII, § 3 (amended 1932).
248. S. 961, 112th Leg. (S.C. 1997); S. 305, 113th Leg. (S.C. 1999). On covenant marriage,
see infra text accompanying notes 450-91, 494-507.
249. A federal constitutional amendment was widely seen as a prerequisite for congressional
legislation on the subject of marriage and divorce. The Deputy Attorney General of Indiana
remarked on the "almost unanimous opinion of lawyers who have considered the question that
an amendment to the Constitution is necessary to enable Congress to pass such a law." Mrs.
Edward Franklin White, America's Need of a Federal Marriage and Divorce Law, 18
CURRENT HIST. MAG. 246-50 (1923), reprinted in SELECTED ARTICLES ON MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 117, 126 (Julia E. Johnsen ed., 1925).
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1947. ' Despite substantial support for the notion of federally-enforced divorce
uniformity sl the proposals never succeeded. Constitutional amendments anduniform
divorce bills both fell prey to "the inveterate tenacity of local opinion," 2 one
expression of which may be found in The New York Tribune's expostulation on a
uniform divorce law which would nationalize the Empire State's ban on all divorce
grounds but adultery. 3 Home cooking was similarly praised in a South Carolina
Congressional Representative's boast to his Judiciary Committee colleagues that his
state's total ban on divorce gave it "a higher standard than California or Nevada." 4
250. See BLAKE, supra note 76, at 145-48; HALEM, supra note 173, at 36-40; O'NELL,
supra note 227, at 238-53; RILEY, supra note 10, at 134-35. For example, in 1924 Senator
Arthur Capper introduced a constitutional amendment providing that "Congress shall have the
power to make laws, which shall be uniform throughout the United States, on marriage and
divorce, the legitimation of children, and the care and custody of children affected by
annulment of marriage or by divorce." S.J. Res. 5, 68th Cong. (1924). As the statutory
correlate to his constitutional amendment, Senator Capper introduced a bill limiting divorce
grounds to adultery, physical or mental cruelty, abandonment or failure to provide for one year
or more, incurable insanity, or the commission of a felony. Service of divorce suits by
publication in lieu of personal service was prohibited, and the parties to a divorce were
prohibited from remarrying for a year after the issuance of the decree. Testifying in support of
his proposals in 1924, Senator Capper complained of the "high divorce rate which, if it
continues, will in time disintegrate the family life of the nation." Marriage and
Divorce-Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 2 (1924) (statement of Sen.
Arthur Capper).
251. See, e.g., Robert Grant, Marriage and Divorce, 14 YALE L.J. 223-38 (1925)
(supporting both Sen. Capper's proposed constitutional amendment and uniform divorce bill);
Jennings C. Wise, Shall Congress Be Given Power To Establish Uniform Laws upon the
Subject of Divorce Among States of the Union?, 70 CENT. L.J. 93 (1910), reprinted in
SELECTEDARTICLESONMARRAGEAND DIVORCE, supra note 249, at 253,253-65 (supporting
congressionally imposed divorce law uniformity); For Easier Divorce, LrrERARY DIG., July
29, 1933, at 18-19 (quoting New York World Telegram's attack on collusive divorce actions:
"'[1]t is time to eradicate this deeply harmful hypocrisy by the establishment of a rational and
uniform system of divorce laws based upon the beliefs and practises [sic] of the vast majority
of the American people seeking or contemplating divorce actions').
252. Robert Grant, A Call to aNew Crusade, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 1921, at 42, 143
(1921). Judge Grant elaborated on this species of territorial jealousy:
[E]ach body of people dwelling in the separate states of our country [is reluctant]
to brook proposals to alter their domestic institutions to conform with those of
any other constituency which regards its own as superior. "What! model our
marriage and divorce laws, the safeguards ofthe 'home,' to suit the idiosyncrasies
of 'highbrows' or 'visionaries' in New York, Massachusetts, or elsewhere?"
Jd; see also George B. Young, Uniform State Laws, 8 A.B.A. J. 181, 181-83 (1922)
(supporting uniform divorce legislation adopted by the states in lieu of expanding federal
power).
253. See Marriage and Divorce, PuB. OPInmoN, Nov. 9, 1889, at 103.
254. Uniform Laws as to Marriage and Divorce, Hearings on H.R, Res. 48 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) (statement of Rep. Richard S. Whaley).
Whaley opined that South Carolina maintained the "sanctity of the home ... better than...
any State in the United States." Id at 8.
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The Palmetto State's Representative then voiced the plaint which doomed uniformity
in divorce until the modem era: "Why should we be forced to lower our standard of
morality because you want to raise yours?" 5
Absolute prohibitions of divorce will almost certainly not emerge within federal or
state constitutional texts during the no-fault counterrevolution. South Carolina's
once-vaunted claim that its divorce ban was a "wise policy to shut the door to
domestic discord, and to gross immorality in that community" 6 rings archaic to
modem ears in both its rhetorical timbre and its substantive sway. But the past serves
as prologue here in perhaps three senses. Initially, the failure over two generations to
agree on a federal constitutional approach to divorce, as well as the necessity for
frequent revisions of South Carolina's constitution to accommodate changes in its
divorce rules, suggests that regulation of the domestic relations arena is too subject
to the variable winds of popular demand to be a fit subject for the more lapidary
requirements of the fundamental frame of govemment.2s* More broadly read, this
brief story of unhappy constitutional experimentation intimates the danger of
engraving our current sentiments on proper divorce behavior too deeply in an area in
which we have frequently changed our minds, and have often seen yesterday's
parasite become today's paragon, or at least hail-fellow-well-met.
255. Id, at 19. Rep. Whaley's paean to his state as a moral haven because of its ban on
divorce did not, of course, go unchallenged. A New York attorney criticized South Carolina's
legal system as hypocritical:
The choice lies between divorce and something worse. In South Carolina the
marital tie is indissoluble, but ... [s]tatistics would seem to indicate that South
Carolina with its denial of divorce, makes for loose morals in that concubinage
and left handed marriage with all its attendant evils are very prevalent and there
are more illegitimate children born in that state in proportion to its population
than in any other state... [South Carolina] has never made adultery indictable,
and actually found it necessary to enact a statute regulating how much of his
property a married man might be allowed to give to his concubine!
Milton Ives Livy, Marriage and Divorce, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE, supra note 249, at 165, 166-67. Divorce reformer Samuel Dike understood that
uniform action would most likely expand the grounds for divorce in some states and increase
the divorce rate, and "many would think this too dear a price to pay for uniformity." See
Samuel W. Dike, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Laws, 2 ARENA 401 (1890). Citing another
example of regional bias, Katherine L. Caldwell ascribed the defeat of the constitutional
amendments and uniform divorce bills in part to the fear by Southern Democrats that federal
action on divorce might result in congressional legalization of interracial marriage. See
Caldwell, supra note 203, at 39 n.57; see, e.g., February 1913: Uniform Laws as to Marriage
and Divorce: Hearings on H.RJ. Res. 187 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 65th
Cong. 83 (1918) (First Report of Illinois Comm'n on Marriage and Divorce by Judge Hugo
Pam) (stating that "side by side with the uniform divorce law must be a uniform marriage law.
... based on an amendment to the Federal Constitution, and valid everywhere").
256. Vaigneur v. Kirk, 2 S.C. Eq. (2 Des.) 640, 643 (1808).
257. Of course, concerns of federalism constituted an abiding objection to the
constitutionalization of divorce on the federal level. See O'NEILL, supra note 227, at 252 ("The
constitutional amendment approach was out of the question because it was an invasion of
states' rights, and thus would meet with general hostility.").
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A second lesson also appears from Lasch's proposed constitutional rendering. His
draft begins by proclaiming marriage a "lifelong commitment"' 8 restricted to those
"prepared to accept the consequences, foreseeable and unforeseeable." 9 Consistent
with this understanding of the grave nature of marriage, divorce should be
unavailable except for the "weightiest reasons."2" Although these incantations are
phrased as would-be alterations of our constitutional frame, they serve a more
pragmatic role as shots fired across the bow of the "divorce culture. '2 6' As an effort
to restore the traditional parameters of marriage, Lasch's amendment supplied a
rhetorical thrust in the service of the no-fault counterrevolution. For example, it
anticipated the "lifelong relationship?" 2 language ofthe covenant marriage statutes,263
which require the parties to swear that "marriage is a covenant between a man and a
woman who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both may
live." For Lasch's demand that only the "weightiest reasons"2 65 justify divorce, the
covenant marriage statutes declare that "[o]nly when there has been a complete and
total breach of the marital covenant commitment may the non-breaching party seek
a declaration that the marriage is no longer legally recognized."2'
Third, in articulating a difference between marriages based on the presence of
children, Lasch anticipated another wing of counter-revolutionary thought. Grounded
in the belief that divorce harms children, who are the innocent victims of their
parents' quest for individualized happiness, reformers have called for treating
marriages with children significantly different than those without.267 Many proposals
to change our legal structure assert society's interest in preserving intact nuclear
families and aim at deterring or delaying divorces in families with children.
258. Who Owes What to Whom?, supra note 235, at 48.
259. Id.
260. Id
261. WHrrEHEAD, supra note 13. A similar purpose may be divined in Lasch's demand that
fathers "contribute a fair share toward their children's support," Who Owes What to Whom?,
supra note 235, at 48, and his more controversial call for fathers to "marry the mothers of their
children," id
262. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West 1999).
263. For a full discussion of the covenant marriage statutes, see infra text accompanying
notes 450-91.
264. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273 (West 1999).
265. Who Owes What to Whom?, supra note 235, at 48.
266. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103 (West 1999).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 235. In an earlier review, Lasch had identified the
"emergence of a distinguishable concept of childhood" as likely the "decisive event in the
evolution of the modem family." Lasch, supra note 9, at 4. "[O]nce children came to be seen
not as miniature adults but as a special category of peculiarly impressionable and vulnerable
persons, it was not long before the painstaking nurture and protection of children became the
central purpose of the family." Id.
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C. "Children First"
Divorce was not always seen as the enemy of childhood. In the 1950s and 1960s,
studies routinely asserted that "children adjusted to divorce within a few years. 2 6
William Goode's famous 1956 study, After Divorce, noted that almost all the 425
divorced mothers interviewed believed "that their children had better lives as divorced
children than they would have had as children in marital conflict. 2 69 This
sunny attitude about the consequences of divorce for children continued in the
1970s.27 One text at the beginning of that decade advised that "the child living with
unhappily married parents more often gets into psychiatric difficulties than the one
whose mismatched parents have been healthy and strong enough to sever their
troubled relationship.""27 Another 1970s volume reported that divorce can be
liberating to children, gifting them with "greater insight and freedom as adults in
deciding whether and when to marry" and relief from "excessive dependency on their
biological parents."'272 Finally, a marriage-and-family text at the end of the 1970s
268. RILEY, supra note 10, at 160; see HALEM, supra note 173, at 177-81. These early
studies which stressed the relatively benign impact of divorce on children include J. LOUISE
DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE at viii, 115 (1953) ("[D]ivorce is not automatically
destructive to children .... It may even [be] a maturing and clarifying experience."); Lee G.
Burchinal, Characteristics ofAdolescentsfrom Unbroken, Broken, andReconstitutedFamilies,
26 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 44, 50 (1964) (noting no cause-and-effect relationship between
childhood psychopathology and divorce or separation); F. Ivan Nye, Child Adjustment in
Broken and Unhappy Unbroken Homes, 19 J. MARRIAGE&FAM. 356-61 (1957) (arguing that
in certain circumstances children benefit from divorce's stabilizing effect, and concluding that
children of divorce fared better than their cohorts in unbroken high-conflict homes "in the
areas of psychosomatic illness, delinquent behavior and parent-child adjustment").
269. WILLIAM GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 329-30 (1956).
270. See generally WHITEHEAD, supra note 13, at 81-90.
271. RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE BoYs AND GIRLS BOOK ABOUT DIVORCE at xix (1970).
The contrast between the disparagement of "unhappily married parents" who stay together and
the kudos to "mismatched" parents "healthy and strong enough" to divorce clearly reflects the
rhetorical milieu in which dissolution was seen as a potentially family-enhancing option. In
Canada, divorce in this era was often viewed as an "opportunity to leave behind a flawed
relationship and try again," with a 1975 Law Reform Commission suggesting that the
frequency with which divorcees remarry meant that divorce "sometimes offer[ed] a
constructive solution to marital conflict through the provision of new and more viable homes
for spouses and children." SPECIAL JOINT COMM'NON CHILD CUSTODY AND ACCESS, FORTHE
SAKE OF THE CHILDREN 4 (1998) (citation omitted), available in (visited Feb. 28, 2000)
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoe/36/l/SJCA/Studies/Repors/sjcarpO2-e.htm>. Currently,
60% of remarriages are likely to end in divorce. See Marilyn Gardner, Putting Kids First After
Parents Split, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 6, 1997, at 1, 12.
272. SUSAN GE'rLEMAN & JANET MARKOwrrz, THE COURAGE To DIVORCE 86-87 (1974);
see also MEL KRANTZLER, CREATIVE DIVORCE: A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PERSONAL
GROWTH 211 (1975) (divorce can result in "more opportunity for children to grow into the
unique individuals they are capable of becoming"); GILBERT D. NAss, MARRIAGE AND THE
FAMILY 524 (1978) ("Children whose parents have divorced and perhaps remarried may find
their lives less stressful."). Gettleman and Markowitz wrote of the munificent yield divorce can
provide women and children: "[D]ivorce often impels a nonworking wife into gainful
employment, while child-supportpayments (and often even alimony) continue. This may mean
[V ol. 75:875
CUSTOMIZED MARRIAGE
criticized as "[d]ivorce prejudice7' 2  the implication that divorce was undesirable, and
assessed the social science evidence to conclude that the "chances of psychological
damage to children resulting from the divorce of their parents is no greater than that
for children in unbroken homes marked by continual marital tension." '274
One aspect of these early studies had a telling effect on the course of no-fault
reform. F. Ivan Nye conjectured that the psychopathological symptoms that children
manifested following divorce were a reaction to the divorce process rather than any
long-term maladjustment. In historian Lynne Halem's explanation, Nye's supposition
that "clinical aberrations were only temporary incidences ofdisequilibrium... meant
that divorce might not be so destructive as we customarily assumed."27
Consequently, no-fault reform's emphasis on transforming divorce into a more
amicable, non-adversarial process was presented as substantially lessening the pain
suffered by children of divorce. As the title of an article by Judge Paul W. Alexander
put it, in order to rescue both divorcing parents and their children, "Let's Get the
Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches."'276
Beginning in the 1980s, however, investigators began to acknowledge the traumatic
nature of divorce for children.2m Today, the view on one end of the spectrum sees a
augmented income for the wife and children." GETrLEMAN & MARKowrrz, supra, at 56.
273. ROBERT R. BELL, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY INTERACTION 557 (5th ed. 1979).
274. Id. at 567. Other expressions of the benevolence of the divorce process for children
may be found in MORTON HUNT&BERNICE HUNT, THE DIVORCE EXPERIENCE (1977), and DR.
LEE SALK, WHAT EVERY CHILD WOULD LIKE PARENTS To KNOW ABOUT DIVORCE (1978).
275. HALEM, supra note 173, at 177. John F. McDermott's 1968 study came to a similar
conclusion. See John F. McDermott, Parental Divorce in Early Childhood, 124 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1424, 1431 (1968) (childhood disturbances may be temporary effects of trauma
of the divorce process).
276. Paul W. Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 98,101 (1953); see also John S. Bradway, The Myth ofthe Innocent Spouse,
11 TUL. L. REV. 377, 3 89-90 (1937).
Litigation, a substitute for trial by battle, provides an arena in which contending
parties can settle claims of right and wrong. To employ this crude device, which
in a proper case will lead to family dissolution at the request of one of the parties,
as a means toward the rehabilitation of a domestic unit already shaken by
dissension, is somewhat like taking a watch to be repaired by a blacksmith. A
more sensitive institution is needed to deal with what are now legal
imponderables.
Id. (citation omitted).
277. See, e.g., WILLIAM F.HODGES, INTERVENTIONSFOR CHILDRENOF DIVORCE: CUSTODY,
ACCESS, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 36 (2d ed. 1991) (reporting that in the face of divorce,
"[y]oung children are likely to demonstrate aggression and other acting-out behavior" and
"[t]eenagers may show more withdrawal and depression"); Lawrence A. Kurdek, Siblings'
Reactions to Parental Divorce, 12 J. DIVORCE 203, 204, 207-14 (1988-89) (agreeing that
"divorce ... [is] described as a powerful set of events ... that might affect all siblings
negatively" but conducting a study to determine if all siblings are similarly affected); Jolene
Oppawasky, Family Dysfunctional Patterns During Divorce-From the View ofthe Children,
12 J. DIVORCE 139, 139, 152 (1988-89) (noting the "hefty impact divorce has on a large
number of children" and concluding "that all divorcing families need psychological
counseling"). See generally HALEM, supra note 173, at 161; WHrrEHEAD, supra note 13, at
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direct linkage between all divorce and harm to children: "The evidence is
overwhelming that [divorce] has maimed an entire generation of children."27 8 But the
other, midrange, position distinguishes between divorces "involving physical abuse
or extreme emotional cruelty" and those on the heels of "lower-intensity conflict."'279
New studies suggest that "if parents are experiencing not violence but unhappiness
in their marriages, their children would be better off if they stayed married than if
they divorced."280 Social researchers Frank Furstenberg and Andrew Cherlin
articulate this perspective as follows:
91-106.
278. Gurwitt, supra note 15, at 37 (quoting David Blankenhom, president of the Institute
for American Values); see, e.g., GALLAGHER, supra note 5, at 13-29 (describing adverse
effects on children of a "good" divorce); Scott, supra note 135, at 29-33 (detailing social
science findings demonstrating that divorce is psychologically costly for most children); Dora
Sybella Vivaz, Note, Balancing Children's Rights into the Divorce Decision, 13 VT. L. REV.
531,537-39 (1989) (recounting data demonstrating the severe effect of divorce on children's
psycho-social well-being); Younger, Marital Regimes, supra note 235, at 90 (citing evidence
that "children's post-divorce living arrangements, to the extent that they are in one-parent or
reconstituted families, may be worse than continued life with two parents in a strained
marriage").
279. Galston, supra note 22, at 15. Perhaps the prototypical description ofa"lower-intensity
conflict" marriage with a child which led to dissolution was provided by John Taylor, Divorce
Is Goodfor You, ESQUIRE, May 1997, at 52, 53 (affirming the positive virtue of his intended
divorce from Maureen Sherwood following a marriage that "wasn't hellish; it was simply
dispiriting, a mechanism so encrusted with small disappointments and petty grudges that its
parts no longer fit together"). For a contrary perspective on the same domestic situation, see
Maureen Sherwood, No, It'sNot, EsQuIRE, May 1997, at 60-61. One domestic relations judge
criticized the legal system for aggravating lower-conflict marriage cases and converting them
into bitter divorce battles:
"We encourage people to go out and put together their diaries of every petty
offense they can think of.... I hear trials on diaper counts: Who changes more
diapers, who gets up for midnight feedings. We make them catalogue these
inadequacies and then keep poking and keep poking. We fuel their anger and
animosity."
Gurwitt, supra note 15, at 34 (quoting Judge Barry Schneider, presiding domestic relations
judge, Maricopa County Superior Court, Arizona).
280. Wade E. Horn, Strong Case for Staying Together Despite Discord, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
6, 1998, at E2 (summarizing three new studies). Relying on the work of researchers Sara
McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, William Galston highlighted three principal harms to children
of divorce:
diminished income--roughly a 30 percent drop for children and the custodial
parent;
diminished parenting time from the non-custodial parent (usually the father)
who detaches himself from his children and from the custodial parent (usually
the mother) who has to combine work inside and outside the home; [and]
disruption of [the children's] established ties--to friends, neighborhoods and
communities, and educational institutions.
Galston, supra note 22, at 23.
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It is probably true that most children who live in ahousehold filled with continual
conflict between angry, embittered spouses would be better off if their parents
split up-assuming that the level of conflict is lowered by the separation. And
there is no doubt that the rise in divorce has liberated some children (and their
custodial parents) from families marked by physical abuse, alcoholism, drugs, and
violence. But we doubt that such clearly pathological descriptions apply to most
families that disrupt. Rather, we think there are many more cases in which there
is little open conflict, but one or both partners find the marriage personally
unsatisfying.... Under these circumstances, divorce may well make one or both
spouses happier, but we strongly doubt that it improves the psychological well-
being of the children.2 '
By far the most influential study showing the psychological damage suffered by
children of divorce has been conducted by clinical psychologist Judith Wallerstein
and her associates. Wallerstein began the California Children of Divorce Study in
1971, and has been issuing periodic follow-up reports. In the oft-cited Second
Chances: Men, Women and Children aDecadeAfterDivorce, Wallerstein and Sandra
Blakeslee conclude that "almost half of the children [studied] entered adulthood as
worried, underachieving, self-deprecating, and sometimes angry young men and
women."2"2 Wallerstein's reports are generally viewed as demolishing the notion of
a "good divorce" in families with children, 3 and have helped spur the covenant
281. FRANK F. FuRSTENBERG, JR. &ANDREwJ. CHERLIN, DIIDED FAMILIES 71-72 (1991);
see also PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA
OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 237 (1997) (noting children exposed to "low conflict divorces
experience adverse effects that last far into adulthood"); GLENNT. STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE
MATTERS: REASONS To BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY 123-58 (1997);
WALLERSTEN & BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES, supra note 26, at 11 ("Divorce is a different
experience for children and adults because the children lose something that is fundamental to
their development-the family structure."); Spaht, supra note 13, at 1552-58 (summarizing
social science data on harm caused by divorce); Mary Lynne Vellinga, Opinions Split on
RestoringBlame in Divorce Law, L.A. DAILYNEWS, Nov. 16, 1997, available in WL 4059891
(quoting Barbara Dafoe Whitehead on children's different standard for happiness: "'It's not:
Do Mommy and Daddy love each other? It's: Are Mommy and Daddy in the same house and
available to me?').
282. WALLERSTEN & BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES, supra note 26, at 299; see also
WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 26; Judith S. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce:
Preliminary Report of a Ten-Year Follow-up of Older Children and Adolescents, 24 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 545 (1985).
283. See Claudia Miller, Divorce Doesn't Go Away: The New Wallerstein-Lewis Study
Traces 25 Years of the Effects of Divorce on Children (visited Feb. 12, 2000)
<http://vww.4children.org/news/198divo.htm>; Barbara Vobedja, Children ofDivorce Heal
Slowly, Study Finds: Scholar's Latest Evidence in Influential Series, WASH. POST, June 3,
1997, atEl (describing Wallerstein's 25-year follow-up report). Critics who have relied on the
Wallerstein longitudinal study include DIANE FASSEL, GROWING UP DIVORCED: A ROAD TO
HEALING FOR ADULT CHILDREN OF DIVORCE 5 (1991); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the
Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91, 104 n.59 (1993); Vivaz,
supra note 278, at 579. The popular press has often utilized the Wallerstein study as a cudgel.
Stephanie Coontz reported that, in the wake of Wallerstein's June 1997 follow-up report which
merely confirmed the conclusions of the earlier reports, she located 200 media articles
"trumpeting the 'new' finding that divorce was 'worse than we thought,' a 'catastrophe' for
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marriage movement.2
8 4
But there are deep concerns with the reliability of Wallerstein's work. It has been
severely criticized for its small sample and lack of a control group,285 with one critic
asserting that her work "represents an oversimplified notion of cause and effect
repudiated by most social scientists and contradicted by her own evidence."286 Other
researchers are concerned that she might be "over-generalizing" and that her findings
are "not nationally representative. 287 The central point on which Wallerstein and her
critics disagree is "whether the effects she studied flowed from the divorce itself or
from the conflict that caused the divorce.
288
kids." Stephanie Coontz, DivorcingReality, NATION, Nov. 17, 1997, at 21. For illustrations,
see T. Barry Brazelton, Children's Needs Suffer in Divorce, CIN. ENQJUER, Mar. 1, 1998, at
GIl (noting that the negative symptoms identified by Wallerstein "are present in nearly all
children of divorce"); Divorce 'sEffect on Children, INDIANAPOLIs NEWS, June 9, 1997, atA6
(arguing that Indiana lawmakers who propose reforms to the no-fault divorce scheme "ought
to get more serious attention as a result of [Wallerstein's studies]").
284. See Nichols, supra note 28, at 944-45 (reporting reliance on Wallerstein's work by
Prof. Katherine Shaw Spaht, co-drafter of Louisiana's covenant marriage law); see also Spaht,
supra note 221, at 24 (discussing Wallerstein's studies in connection with Louisiana's
covenant marriage law). On covenant marriage laws, see infra text accompanying notes 448-
507.
285. See, e.g., Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in
FamilyLawAnalysis and Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 631,
652-53 (1994) ("Without a control group, Wallerstein and Kelly were simply unable to
substantiate scientifically that the problems of adjustment that the children in their sample
encountered were the result of marital dissolution, rather than some other process such as
adjustment to adolescence that most children experience, independent of divorce."); Scott,
supra note 135, at 30 n.64 (arguing the absence of a control group in Wallerstein's study is a
"serious limitation").
286. Coontz, supra note 283, at 21.
287. Elizabeth Mehren, But Who Is Looking out for the Children?, L.A. TIMES, June 3,
1997, at El (quoting Kathleen Molley-Morrison and Donald J. Hernandez). Andrew Cherlin
has commented that Wallerstein "'is without peer in giving us clinical insights about children
and their parents from troubled families, but we have to remember these are not representative
of the American family."' Bad Breakups: For Children, Time May Not Heal the Wounds of
Divorce, SALT LAKE TRm., June 3, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 3409163 [hereinafter
Bad Breakups].
288. Lee Borden, Judith Wallerstein: Limitations of Wallerstein 's Research (last modified
May 22, 1999) <http://www.divorceinfo.com/judithwallerstein.htm#Limitations> (emphasis
in original) (arguing that Wallerstein's research is anecdotal, lacking scientific sampling or
double-blind methodologies; that her subjects are not representative of the general population
as they are largely white, upper-middle class and well-educated; and that her research could
not determine the appropriate causative agency, the divorce or the preceding conflict). For an
argument acknowledging the sociological evidence but suggesting that a return to the fault
standard would harm children, see Gordon, supra note 214, at 1446-61. In sharp
contradistinction to her extreme adherents, Wallerstein herself contends that "divorce is often
the only rational solution to a bad marriage," and she opposes a couple's staying together for
the children's sake. She believes that a divorce "undertaken thoughtfully and realistically can
teach children how to confront serious life problems with compassion, wisdom, and
appropriate action." WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES, supra note 26, at 305.
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The 1990s have seen a growing legislative effort to focus on children of divorce.
In the most widely discussed bid, Michigan State Representative Jessie F. Dalman
introduced in 1995 an eleven-bill package heralded as "the state of the art on divorce
policy." 9 Dalman's proposals would have established a two-tier divorce system. 29°
In families without children, or in which the children were all emancipated, the couple
could obtain a divorce upon mutual consent.29' But in families with minor children,
or where one spouse objected to the dissolution, the divorce-seeking spouse would
have to prove the marital fault of the other.292 The reinvigorated fault grounds were
the historically familiar ones of adultery, desertion, and extreme cruelty, which would
have to be established by a "preponderance of the evidence."'293 Additionally, parents
seeking divorce would be required to undergo counseling about the potential effects
of divorce.2
Other states have attempted similar measures. A 1997 Texas bill would have
allowed divorce "without regard to fault" when the marriage becomes "insupportable
because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the
marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. 295
But divorce on this ground would be available only to childless couples who had
passed their first wedding anniversary.2 96 A measure introduced in Virginia in 1998
would have prohibited no-fault divorce if the parties have a minor child and either
party files a written objection to the initial pleading within 21 days of service.297 A
Hawaii bill would have required a one-year waiting period and mandatory counseling
after a divorce filing in cases with minor children.29 Counseling sessions specifically
including all children aged six to sixteen would have been mandated by a
Wallerstein remains a supporter ofno-fault divorce. See Bad Breakups, supra note 287, at Al;
Marilyn Gardner, Putting Kids First After Parents Split, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, June 6,
1997, at 12.
289. Gurwitt, supra note 15, at 37. See also Charmaine Crouse Yoest, State Groups That
Fight for Mom and Dad, POL'Y REV., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 17, 17-18 (describing widespread
publicity for the Michigan divorce reform proposals); Milbank, supra note 19, at Al.
290. See H.R. 4432, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mich. 1995).
291. See id
292. See id.
293. Id. A similar billreinjecting fault requirements into divorces in cases involving children
was introduced in the Kentucky Senate in 1998. See S. 195, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998); see also
WHrEHEAD, supra note 13, at 71 (suggesting both a two-tier divorce system predicated on the
presence or absence of minor children, and the revival of fault notions, at least in dividing the
marital estate and awarding maintenance).
294. See H.R. 4432, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mich. 1995). The couple would also have to
submit asatisfactory post-divorce parenting plan to the court. On parenting plans, see infra text
accompanying notes 319-32.
295. H.R. 323, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
296. See id
297. See H.R. 1163, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1998). Another Virginia proposal would have limited
the availability of divorce on the ground of separation (the only no-fault alternative in
Virginia) to couples who had been separated for one year, filed jointly for the divorce, and had
no minor children. See H.R. 1188, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1996).
298. See H.R. 3751, 18th Leg., 1st Sess. (Haw. 1996).
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Pennsylvania measure.2 An Illinois bill would have limited no-fault divorce actions
to couples who experienced a separation period, and-if the couple had a dependent
child, the marriage were of ten or more years' duration, or the wife was
pregnant-mutual consent."° These laws were broadly aimed at authorizing courts
"'to consider what's best for the entire family, instead of being required to grant the
desire of only one spouse who wants out.""'3 °
Scholarly critics have kept pace with their legislative counterparts, and have often
inspired or helped shape the reform proposals. William Galston has called for the
elimination of unilateral no-fault divorce in marriages with minor children."2 Parents
who seek divorce would, in Galston's scheme, either have to establish a fault ground
against their spouse, or wait to get divorced until they had been separated for five
years. 3 Mary Ann Glendon has championed the "children-first principle" for
division of assets in divorce."' In her view, property settlements would be divided
three ways rather than two. The largest share would be dedicated to ensuring the
economic well-being of the children, and would be managed by the custodial parent
until the children reach the age of majority. Only the remaining assets would be
divided between the father and the mother.0"
While no state has adopted Professor Glendon's "children-firsf' principle for the
division of the parents' assets at divorce, current state laws frequently provide for
greater judicial oversight over the dissolution of families with children than over
divorces among their childless counterparts. For example, a Virginia couple with
minor children cannot take advantage of that state's six-month separation period for
299. See S. 958, 179th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995) (conditioning a divorce upon proof that
all children aged 6 to 16 had attended at least three counseling sessions between the time of
separation and the granting of the decree).
300. See S. 1842, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ii. 1996). Similarly, a Kansas measure would have
limited no-fault divorces to cases of mutual consent and no dependent children. See S. 608,
76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1996).
301. MICHIGAN FAMILY FORUM, supra note 19, at 15 (quoting a press release from former
Oklahoma State Representative Ernest Istook).
302. See William Galston, Braking Divorce for the Sake of Children, AM. ENTERPRIsE,
May-June 1996, at 36; Galston, supra note 22, at 22-23.
303. See Galston, supra note 302, at 36; Galston, supra note 22, at 22. Even in cases where
both parents consent to divorce, Galston has called for "suitable braking mechanisms: a
mandatory pause of at least a year for reflection, counseling, and mediation." Id.
304. See Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1559
(1984).
305. See id. at 1559-60. Writing in support of Glendon's notion, Amitai Etzioni observed
that since "fathers often initiate divorces on the assumption that they will gain control of many
of the assets while the mother will assume custody of the children, the children-first principle
would not only protect the children of divorced couples, but cool quite a few fathers' interest
in divorce." Amitai Etzioni, Give Couples Tools To Make Marriages Last, USATODAY, Nov.
18, 1996, at 25A. The "children-first" proposal is best seen in the context of the
Communitarian critique which argues that children are best raised by a two-parent family in
which one of the parents serves as the home-centered caretaker for the children during their
first years. Communitarians "see the two-parent family as the cornerstone of a moral society."
Marilyn Gardner, Family in the '90s-A New Commitment, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Nov.
24, 1992, at 13.
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no-fault divorce."° Such couples must have lived separately for one year and have
signed a separation agreement in order to file for no-fault divorce."0 Additionally, the
couple's separation agreement will not be ratified by the court until the parties have
complied with detailed rules aimed at facilitating the collection of child support
payments and the provision of health care coverage for dependent children.0 '
Delinquencies in payments of child support for a period of at least ninety days or for
an amount of at least $5,000 may result in the suspension of the professional, trade,
business or occupational licenses of the person responsible for support.3 9
Massachusetts law requires a court to apply the child support guidelines in all cases,
whether the amount of child support obligation is contested or agreed to by the
parties. 31 0 A court departing from those guidelines must make "specific written
f'mdings' '3U demonstrating "that such departure is consistent with the best interests
of the child. '312 Such oversight provisions are common .3 1 States are increasingly
empowering divorce courts to award post-majority support for higher education (or
at least for the completion of high school) in view of the reality that "children from
divided homes face greater obstacles pursuing higher education than children from
intact homes. '314 In England, a divorce decree will not be granted until the court is
satisfied that the arrangements for the minor children are either satisfactory or the
best available under the circumstances."
306. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(A)(9)(a) (Michie 1999), which reads in pertinent part:
A divorce from the bond of matrimony may be decreed... [o]n the application
of either party if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart
without any cohabitation and without interruption for one year. In any case where
the parties have entered into a separation agreement and there are no minor
children either born of the parties, born of either party and adopted by the other
or adopted by both parties, a divorce may be decreed on application if and when
the husband and wife have lived separately and apart without cohabitation and
without interruption for six months.
307. See ide
308. See it § 20-60.3.
309. See id Other examples of license revocation statutes include COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-
13-123 (1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:315.30-.35, 32:432,37:2952,56:647 (West 1995);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 232.001 (West 1995).
3 10. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 208, § 28 (West Supp. 1999).
311. Id
312. Id. The statutory presumption requiring the court to rely on the statutory child support
guidelines even in cases of party agreement was enacted in MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 208, § 28
(1998), apparently reversing Wheeler v. Wheeler, 672 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Mass. App. Ct.
1996) (holding that a court is required to order amount of child support stipulated by the
parties, absent valid reason).
313. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1(1) (1981) ("Departures shall be set forth and
explained in writing."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30(1)(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (requiring
deviations of more than five percent to be justified in writing); IDAHO CODE § 32-706A(c)
(1996 & Supp. 1999) (requiring a "written or specific finding" to justify a departure).
314. Elrod & Spector, supra note 21, at 760.
315. See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, ch. 18, § 41 (Eng.). But see LAW CoMMIssION,
supra note 166, at 39-40 (suggesting serious difficulties with this provision in practice).
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Two state houses recently considered bills which would have enacted some more
specific components of Glendon's children-first principle. A New Hampshire
proposal would have directed the court to retain divorce jurisdiction throughout the
minority of any children involved, and not fully to divide the marital property until
the children are all emancipated?' 6 Montana legislators considered a measure which
would have directed courts to "consider the best interest of the child of the marriage
as the primary consideration in making a determination" of the "irretrievable
breakdown" of the marriage.317 This bill would also have authorized Montana courts
to set aside a portion of the marital estate in a separate fund for the benefit of children
ofthe marriage.3 Both these failed measures would have required continuedjudicial
supervision of marriages for many years after divorce. A 1997 "Parenting Plan Act"
introduced by State Representative Jessie F. Dalman in Michigan would have
required parents to cooperate in proposing a parenting plan, or to submit to an
"alternative dispute resolution process" to devise a joint plan.319 Failure to
successfully devise such a plan would lead to a "mandatory settlement conference"
if one is provided by court rule,32 to be followed by a court hearing if the matter
remains in dispute.32" ' The Parenting Plan Act deliberately turns away from the
concept of awarding one or both parents custody ofthe child, emphasizing instead the
objective ofhaving "the child reared by both the child's father and the child's mother
unless it is not in the best interests of the child."3" Accordingly, in lieu of "child
custody" the bill speaks of"allocation of decision making authority" and "the child's
residential schedule."3n Similarly, "visitation" has been replaced by "parenting
time."324 Whatever parenting plan is adopted "shall contain provisions governing
resolution of future disputes between the parents, allocation of decision making
authority, parenting time, and the child's residential schedule."32 The plan will
specify whether one or both parents has authority over the child's education, health
care, and religious upbringing.326 Residential and parenting time provisions shall be
based on the best interests of the child "that encourage each parent to maintain a
loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child."327
316. See H.R. 1116, 155th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.H. 1997).
317. H.R. 573, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1997).
318. See id.
319. H.R. 4399, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 4-5 (Mich. 1997). The requirement to participate
in an alternative resolution process is waived if "either parent has committed domestic
violence." Id. § 5(2).
320. Id. § 5(3). There is no domestic violence exception to this requirement. See id.
321. See id. § 5(4).
322. Id. § 6(1)(a).
323. Id. § 6(2); see id. § 25 (allowing the court to designate a child's legal or physical
custodian "[s]olely for the purposes of... legal requirements... such as... tax exemptions
or health care benefits"). The bill reiterated the meaninglessness of any custodial designation
by specifying that it "does not affect either parent's rights and responsibilities under the
parenting plan." Id.
324. Id. § 6(2).
325. Id.
326. See id. §8(1).
327. Id. § 12(1).
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Ironically, this proposed parenting plan act declares a goal of encouraging parents
"to meet their responsibilities to their minor children through agreements in the
parenting plan, rather than by relying on judicial intervention,""32 but the act contains
almosttwo dozen sections of detailed regulations that requirejudicial elaboration and
enforcement. 29 Such legislation impossibly seeks to monitor every detail of a
divorced child's upbringing. In their suffocative level of enforceable oversight, the
parenting plans prescribed by these laws resemble the precommitment restrictions
favored by advocates of covenant marriage and expanded prenuptial contracts.330
Both parenting plans and premarital covenants involve richly elaborated rules for
governing the future, and both feature the paradox of inviting continued judicial
intervention as they ostensibly rely on the privatizing principles of contract.
Parenting plan acts are better seen as rhetorical broadsides to remind couples in the
"divorce culture" of their parental responsibilities. Iowa Governor Terry Branstad
illustrated this phenomenon in his recent promise to promote divorce reform
legislation which would replace "visitation" and "custody" with "parenting plans."
Branstad observed that "'[v]isitation is something that happens at funeral homes and
jails,"' while "'[c]ustody is a term that is appropriate for chattel, not children. These
terms demean parents and the children who are the most unfortunate victims of
divorce.""'33 Branstad emphasized the significance of the discursive shift to
"'parenting plans"' in predicting that in place of the "'win-lose atmosphere of who
gets the kids, mediation and the courts will focus on who is parenting them."'332
Creating sharp legal distinctions among marriages based on the presence of
children aims to undermine the perceived present fluidity ofmarital arrangements by
shoring up at least those unions which have produced children.333 What has gone
unrecognized in the present debate, however, is the unorthodox genesis of a
distinction among conjugal unions based on procreation. The present
counterrevolutionary impulse would have childbirth alter the legal status of a
328. Id § 6(g). Even this ostensibly simple directive to foster cooperation is conditioned on
its consonance with eight other sections of the statute, which include minutely scripted
regulations specifying under which circumstances parental cooperation is not to be expected.
See id §§ 6(g), 10-17.
329. See id § 23. The bill specifies the differing threshold standards to be applied in motions
to modify parenting plans. It prescribes a lower standard in adjudicating a request "[b]ased on
a change of residence or an involuntary change in work schedule by a parent that makes the
residential schedule in the parenting plan impractical to follow," or for "[m]inor modification"
in the child's residential schedule, which it further defines as not exceeding "24 full days in
a calendar year or 5 full days in a calendar month." Id.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 352-85.
331. Nancy Hicks, Kids and Divorce: Can the Sting Be Eased?, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Jan. 2, 1998, at I, available in 1998 WL 5490084 (quoting Terry Branstad).
332. Id The ideology of parenting plans thus posits that the divorce process can improve
parenting. Governor Branstad expressed his belief that the mind-set change reflected in
parenting plans should "'move the divorce process away from a fight over the children to a
collaborative effort to parent those kids."' Iad In literary terms, this assumption of enhanced
parental commitment surfacing after marital dissolution is reminiscent of Henry James's
description of Maisie's parents, who "after being perfectly insignificant together. .. would be
decidedly striking apart." HENRY JAMEs, WHAT MAIsm KNEw 1-2 (1897).
333. See Etzioni, supra note 32, at 76; Galston, supra note 22, at 22-23.
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marriage. But this distinction's progenitor was surprisingly rooted in a radical assault
on the conservative mores of American family life early in the twentieth century. This
original view espoused greater divorce freedom for couples prior to the birth of their
first child, as an exception to the prevailing death-do-us-part ideology.33 4 The most
famous advocate of this distinction was Judge Ben B. Lindsey, who proposed
"companionate marriage" in the 1920s in two well-known-indeed,
notorious-books, The Revolt ofModern Youth and The Companionate Marriage."'
Lindsey defined companionate marriage as "legal marriage, with legalized Birth
Control, and with the right to divorce by mutual consent for childless couples, usually
without payment of alimony. 3 6 Lindsey insisted that companionate marriage was not
334. See, e.g., Melvin M. Knight, The Companionate and the Family: The Unobserved
Division ofan HistoricalInstitution, 10 J. SOC. HYGIENE 257-67 (1924) (stating that traditional
family structure has sprouted a companionate branch, due to industrialization and the
proliferation of birth control); Rebecca West, Divorce, FORUM, Aug. 1926, at 161-70 (stating
that in the absence of minor children, divorce is a private matter of no social importance).
335. BEN B. LINDSEY, THE COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE (1927) [hereinafter LINDSEY, THE
COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE]; BEN B. LINDSEY, THE REVOLT OF MODERN YOUTH (1925)
[hereinafter LINDSEY, THE REVOLT OF MODERN YOUTH]. The latter text became the "leading
literary symbol of the American sexual revolution of the twenties." CHARLES LARSEN, THE
GOOD FIGHT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BEN B. LINDSEY 173 (1972). Judge Lindsey's attacks
on the moral ethos provoked a lively public discussion. As his biographer noted, "[p]opular
magazines and Sunday supplements found the temptation to ballyhoo companionate marriage
irresistible." Id. at 174. See, e.g., Are Changing Conventions Menacing the 'Marriage
Institution?, 74 CURRENTOPINION 338-40 (1923) [hereinafter Changing Conventions]; M.G.L.
Black, A Business Woman on Companionate Marriage, 148 OUTLOOK 286-87 (1928); Joseph
Collins, The Doctor Looks at Companionate Marriage, 147 OUTLOOK 492-94, 503 (1927);
Companionate Pair Just Like All Newlyweds, L.A.EXAMiNER, May 13, 1928, at 18; Charlotte
Perkins Gilman, Divorce and Birth Control, 148 OUTLOOK 130-31, 153 (1928); Is Marriage
Breaking down?, LITERARY DIG., Feb. 17, 1923, at 36; Lindsey's Trial Marriage Idea
Bolshevistic, Says Divorce Judge, ST. LOUIS STAR, Mar. 20, 1928, at 3; Edward S. Martin,
Race Wars and Marriage, 155 HARPER'S 653, 656 (1927); Fulton Oursler, A Critic of
Companionate Marriage, 148 OUTLOOK 648 (1928); I.M. Rubinow, Marriage Rate Increasing
Despite Divorces, 29 CURRENT HIST. 289-94 (1928).
336. LINDSEY, THE COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE, supra note 335, at v. Knight had earlier
defined the companionate state as "lawful wedlock, entered into solely for companionship, and
not contributing children to society." Knight, supra note 334, at 258. An echo of Knight's and
Lindsey's concept appears, without acknowledgment, in Whaling, supra note 160, at 970-71
(stating that marriage could be contracted for a trial period, and could be terminated by
consent; the couple would agree not to have children during the trial period, and the birth of
a child would automatically convert the contract into a permanent marriage).
Judge Lindsey also believed it ironic that the law afforded relief in divorce court to an
aggrieved wife or husband, but denied the decree when both spouses desired it. See LINDSEY,
THE COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE, supra note 335, at 376. On this score, Lindsey's opinion was
widely shared. See, e.g., Anne Shannon Monroe, When Shall a Woman Divorce Herfusband,
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Oct. 1921, at 74, 96 (stating that the "very thing that will positively
defeat an attempt to obtain a divorce-the agreement of the two that it is the wisest course-is
the one absolute reason why a decree should be granted"). Katharine Fullerton Gerould
similarly ridiculed the rule that spouses were forbidden to agree on divorce:
[W]hy do your best to prevent people's divorcing when both of them want to?
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trial marriage, but rather a permanent union which was, temporarily, childless. 37
Lindsey's ready dispensation of divorce for such couples ended abruptly, however,
upon the birth of children, "The duty of the state to try to save marriages, especially
when children were involved, was one of Lindsey's most fervent convictions." ' ,
Indeed, Lindsey viewed companionate marriage as a necessity precisely because of
the failure of the marital mores of the time, which he believed harmed children,
who-because of custom and the lack of birth control information-were frequently
born into families who did not want them 39 Lindsey favored mandatory pre-divorce
counseling and questioned the appropriateness of allowing divorce on proof of a
single instance of adultery.34 He once reprimanded a divorce-minded couple that his
court was "concerned with the right of your children to you, rather than your right to
your children."34' The special concern for children in families thus has a long
pedigree.
But some critics today argue that the public policy that uplifts families with
children does a disservice to childless marriages. The protection afforded to couples
who procreate "turns the having of children into the real solemnization of the
marriage." '342 But endowing the marriages of childless couples with a lower status,
according to this view, could lead to marginally higher divorce rates among such
unions.343 Critics have similarly attacked covenant marriage laws for elevating one
vision of the marital state at the cost of denigrating another, which by implication
becomes "marriage lite."3"'
The cry against divorce on the score that in most divorces one person is sacrificed
becomes absurd enough when you realize that only on the basis of one person's
wanting it and the other person's not wanting it is a divorce obtainable at all.
Katherine Fullerton Gerould, Divorce, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1923, at 460, 463.
337. See LINDSEY, THE COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE, supra note 335, at 139-41; LINDSEY,
THEREVOLTOF MODERN YOUTH, supra note 335, at 175-76. Companionate marriage received
a rabid treatment, both pro and con, in the popular periodicals, which also-and sometimes
misleadingly-referred to it as "pal marriage," "contract marriage," "jazz marriage," "free
love," and "trial marriage." Charles E. Larsen, Ben Lindsey: Symbol of Radicalism in the
1920's, in FREEDOMAND REFORM: ESSAYS IN HONOROF HENRY STEELE COMMAGER 255,265
(Harold M. Hyman & Leonard W. Levy eds., 1967). Noted preacher Billy Sunday referred to
companionate marriage as "'barnyard marriage,"' to which Lindsey responded that Sunday
"'would be burning witches and heretics if he had his way."' LARSEN, supra note 335, at 175.
338. LARSEN, supra note 335, at 281 n.14.
339. See Changing Conventions, supra note 335, at 338-39 (paraphrasing Lindsey).
340. See Larsen, supra note 337, at 263.
341. Frank . Taylor, A Court To Prevent Divorce, 103 NEW REPUBLIC 239-40 (1940),
condensed in Frank J. Taylor, The You Don't-Want-A-Divorce Court, READER'S DIG., Sept.
1940, at 85-88.
342. David M. Wagner, Divorce Reform: An Emerging Issue Laps at Legislative Shores,
WORLD & I, Jan. 1998, at 9, available in (visited Apr. 19,2000) <http://www.worldandi.com/
archive/mtjan98.htm.>.
343. See id. at 10-11.
344. Nichols, supra note 28, at 956 (quoting Katha Pollitt). Joel Nichols defends covenant
marriage laws against these criticisms by essentially conceding their central point, that the
divorce counterrevolution aims to demean ordinary marriages. The new statutes are designed
to show couples a better marital alternative, and couples "can remedy any inferiority complex
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Companionate marriage was bitterly criticized for its supposed tendency to destroy
the marital institution. Yet two generations later, all marriages have become
companionate. The present effort to solidify those marriages which are raising
children bears the standard minted by the liberal Judge Lindsey, but waives it now in
defense of conservative family values. At bottom, both these child-centered legal
remedies rely on the power of law to influence culture. Two of the most respected
social researchers on the consequences of divorce, Frank Furstenberg and Andrew
Cherlin, decry the effects of divorce on children but are skeptical of legal reforms to
provide relief: "'Although we would support public efforts to strengthen marriage,
we are inclined to accept the irreversibility of high levels of divorce as our starting
point for thinking about changes in public policy.""'34 But more optimistic critics
point to the effect that lowering the barriers to divorce had on raising the rate of
divorce.346 Since no-fault laws effectively created a right to unilateral divorce, they
argue, surely raising the bar will force some dissolution-minded wives and husbands
(i.e., especially those in lower-conflict relationships) to rethink their goal. For some
reformers, the proposition is self-evident: "When you change the laws to make
divorce quick and easy, you don't need a Ph.D. to know what will happen," 347 states
David Blankenhorn. "You'll erode the American family .... To me, this is like
debating whether the earth is round. 348
One approach devised to stop family erosion and slow the divorce rate consists of
allowing couples to agree on a more restrictive legal framework for their marriage.
Viewing marriage as a "relational contract,"349 this view points to the prime paradox
of modern divorce law: enhanced contractual liberty placed in the service of lessening
individual freedom.
III. OF COVENANTS AND SUPERVOWS:
CONTRACTS AT THE ALTAR
The debate about divorce policy and legislative options to strengthen marriage has
fired across a landscape in which an increasing number of couples have taken marital
law literally into their own hands by drafting prenuptial agreements to fix their legal
rights and obligations vis-A-vis each other and the state. This Part focuses on the
prospects and perils of privatizing the marriage contract. Both the theory of
precommitment restrictions and its odd outcropping, the incipient Covenant Marriage
movement, represent a paradigmatic shift in the divorce counterrevolution. Both seek
... by opting-in to covenant marriages." Id. at 957. On covenant marriage, see infra text
accompanying notes 459-68.
345. Galston, supra note 22, at 19 (quoting Furstenburg & Cherlin).
346. As suggested in supra note 11, the proposition that modem no-fault divorce laws,
independent of the cultural changes of the 1960s and 1970s, yielded the present divorce rate
is problematical. William Galston, a staunch proponent of this proposition, admits that "full
scholarly returns are not yet in" and claims only that "evidence is accumulating that once
instituted, no-fault laws further accelerated the pace of divorce." Galston, supra note 22, at 17.
347. Hanna Rosin, Separation Anxiety, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, at 14.
348. Id.
349. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1225 (1998).
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to foster stronger marriages through alternative state-sanctioned prenuptial contracts.
This variability in the marriage contract is new. Courts have to date only
infrequently considered-and generally declined to enforce-prenuptial agreements
regulating the parties' behavior during marriage or the exit grounds at its end. But this
judicial recalcitrance both at intervening in marital affairs and at allowing private
alteration of the statutory parameters for divorce may now be overcome by an
emerging legal and cultural dynamic evidenced by the rise of variegated prenuptials,
the covenant marriage bills, and the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. In short, the
markers in the field of public policy for marriage and divorce are now again under
construction.
A paradox looms behind the outlines of this new view of prenuptial contracting,
however. Flying the banner of contractual liberty, the advocates of customized
marriage seek to limitmarital choice. Precommitmenttheory is grounded on voluntary
agreements to restrict future freedom, and it is harnessed here in an effort to replicate
the lost world of "traditionar' marriages. This backward-looking campaign seeks to
restore lifelong marriage, dissolvable only on proof ofthe commission ofmarital fault.
But its most disturbing aspect may be the effort to reinvigorate traditional gender roles
within marriage. The new paternalists criticize "selfish career building at the expense
of family"'35 and call for "idiosyncratic specialization within household production"35
in pursuit of an agenda seeking to revive an older gendered division of labor. While
many continue to seek the goal of an egalitarian marriage in which roles and duties
are freely and fairly negotiated, precommitment theory has yet adequately to defend
itself from the charge that it is willing to sacrifice autonomy as the price of supposed
greater marital stability.
Prenuptial contracts sound the drumbeat ofmarriage privatization. In addition to the
scholarly and popular attention which prenuptial agreements have attracted,35
350. Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil ofIgnorance: Personalizing the
Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 467 (1998).
351. Id.
352. See UNIF. PREMARrTAL AGREEMENT ACT commissioners' prefatory note, 9B U.L.A.
369, 369 (1987) ("[lit is becoming more and more common for persons contemplating
marriage to seek to resolve by agreement certain issues presented by the forthcoming
marriage."); Alexander, supra note 23, at 503 ("More and more American couples are
executing premarital contracts that expressly define various legal aspects of their marriage,
including their obligations to each other during marriage and upon divorce."); Baker, supra
note 189, at 161 ("Prenuptial agreements, traditionally a tool for the rich and famous, or for
widowed people remarrying late in life, now are being considered by younger couples
embarking on marriage for the first time."); Bix, supra note 37, at 146 (noting recent
popularity of prenuptial contracts and linking their rise to popular press accounts); Nancy
Blodgett, Put It in Writing: Marital Pacts on the Rise, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 28; Elizabeth
Barker Brandt, The Uniform Premarital Agreements Act and the Reality of Premarital
Agreements in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 539,541 n.16 (1997); Laura P. Graham, The Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of Premarital
Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1037(1993)
("Premarital agreements are gaining in popularity."); Ira H. Lurvey, Love Letters: Premarital
Agreements Help Smooth Divorces-Or Do They?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 85; Allison A.
Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics ofPrenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REv. 887,
891 (1997) (citing indications that"the number of prenuptial agreements tripled between 1978
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and 1988 and has steadily increased ever since" and that the signing of a premarital contract
precedes approximately 5% of all marriages and 20% of all remarriages); Lynne Reaves, IDo
... You Must... : Pienuptial Pacts Gain Favor, 69 A.B.A. J. 1210 (1983); Cecile C. Welch,
Love on the Dotted Line: Craft a Prenuptial Agreement Carefilly To Withstand Any Future
Challenges, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 50; Gary Belsky, Living by the Rules, MONEY, May 1996,
at 100; Andre Brooks, Wedding Bells, DottedLines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at 35; Laura
Castaneda, Inside Story About Prenuptial Agreements: Even If You're Not Rich, or Famous,
It Can Pay To Have One, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 1996, at El; Stephanie H. Dahl, Prenuptial
Agreement: Is It for You?, MOD. BRIDE, Dec. 1990-Jan. 1991, at 326; Claudia H. Deutsch,
More CouplesAre TakingNo Chances on Love, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at CIO; Lisa W.
Foderaro, Prenuptial Contracts FindNew PopularityN.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1997, atB5; Sean
Hargrove, To Have and To Hold on To, TIMES (London), Feb. 21, 2000, Features (describing
Britain's first online prenuptial agreement service); In Praise of Prenuptial Contracts, INV.
DAILY, June 7, 1991, at 8; Liz Kavanagh, Independent Yet Committed, TIMES (London), Feb.
29, 2000, Features ("Prenuptial agreements are gaining in popularity."); Charles Laurence,
Couple Find Fame in Fine Print, CH!. SuN-TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1996, at 32; Andrew Leckey,
Married or Divorced: Watch Finances, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 17, 1996, at 5C
(describing benefits of a prenuptial agreement); Noreen Marcus, For Love and Money
Prenups; Marriage Contracts-No Longer Just for the Rich, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 28, 1997, at IA, available in 1997 WL 11404515; Lisa J. Moore, The Art of
the (Marriage) Deal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 5, 1990, at 68 ("With nearly half of
marriages ending in divorce and second unions on the rise among dual-career couples,
contracts spelling out who gets what in a split are now being exchanged both before and after
the vows."); Caryn Eve Murray, Bridal Planner, NEWSDAY, Mar. 10, 2000, at H39 (listing
prenuptial agreements among routine pre-wedding tasks); Kathleen Murray, Odd Couples and
Their Odder Divorce Settlements, COSMOPOLITAN, May 1996, at 222; Orthodox Rabbis
Working To Prevent 'Chained' Wives, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at 25 (noting that, in the
most recent effort to prevent an increase of"agunah"--women caught in unhappy marriages
whose husbands refuse to grant them religious divorces--eleven influential Orthodox New
York rabbis have advocated greater use of prenuptial agreements in which the wife and
husband pledge-at the risk of having to pay fines--to seek arbitration from a religious court
when the question of divorce arises); Karen S. Peterson, Money Sense from Start Is Important
in Marriage, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Feb. 23, 1995, § 2, at 39 (stating that prenuptials "help you
figure out the way you will go"); Judith Rehak, PrenuptialAccords: Walking Down the Aisle
and Reading Fine Print, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 25, 1995, at 14; Julie Salamon, Popping
the Prenup Question, NEW YORKER, Aug. 25-Sept. 1, 1997, at 70-79; Bonnie Siverd, TilDeath
or Divorce Do Us Part, BUS. WK., Apr. 9, 1990, at 87; Anita Sharpe, Prenuptial Pacts Shield
Businesses from an Heir's Ex, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1996, at BI; Tracy Young, Great
Expectations, VOGUE, June 1990, at 274 ("Today prenuptial agreements, like shotgun
weddings, are regarded without so much as a slightly elevated eyebrow.").
Prenuptial agreements are not only more widespread but also more detailed, as one article
observes:
[P]renuptial agreements are increasingly in vogue among the middle and
upwardly mobile classes. Such contracts are recognized in all 50 states, and
matrimonial lawyers report that they are preparing two to five times as many as
they did just five years ago ....
No matter seems too small-Who takes out the garbage? Who does the
dishes?-or too weird.
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a cottage industry has emerged to assist the interested couple in drafting and
negotiating these contracts. The popularity of premarital accords may be gleaned
from the number of published guides for drafting them."' Nor is the cost prohibitive,
at least for couples of middle and above-average means?54 A prenuptial agreement
form is also available on a popular computer software program aimed at the public. 5
Although in disfavor for many years, prenuptial contracts covering a broad range
of issues have increasingly achieved general broad approval. While antenuptial
bargains were once condemned as facilitative of divorce,3 6 that rationale has been
turned on its head. The premarital contracting process is now often viewed as
promoting marriage and providing a buttress to a stable union: "with the proper legal
safeguards and sufficient trust between spouses, [prenuptial contracts] can be useful,
even relationship enhancing, documents."3 On the other hand, substantial concerns
have surfaced that private bargains often "violate societal norms against gender
discrimination,"3 8 and "overwhelmingly hurt women by virtue of their inferior
bargaining position." 9
Prenuptial agreements have a lengthy history.3" Until relatively recently, however,
Jill Smolowe, What Price Love? Read Carefully, TIME, Oct. 15, 1990, at 94-95.
353. See Brandt, supra note 352, at 564 n.122 (listing such guides)..
354. See Marston, supra note 352, at 893 (citing media reports quoting costs for drafting a
prenuptial contract in the range of $1000 to $5000). Complex agreements will, of course, be
far more expensive. See id.
355. See Desktop Lawyer (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http://vww.desktoplawyer.net/browser
index.cfm> (online prenuptial agreement service available from Desktop Lawyer); Quicken
Family Lawyer '99 (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http://www.parsonstech.com/software/
fanlaw.html> (computer software supplying prenuptial agreement form).
356. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 (198 1); see also Norris v. Norris,
174 N.W.2d 368, 369-70 (Iowa 1970) (noting unenforceability of prenuptial contracts, citing
cases); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 584 (1932); 24 AM. JUR. 2D. Divorce and
Separation §§ 12,942,943 (1998); M.L. Cross,Annotation: Validity, Construction, andEffect
of Provision in Antenuptial Contract Forfeiting Property Rights of Innocent Spouse on
Separation or Filing of Divorce or Other Matrimonial Action, 57 A.L.R. 2D 942 (1958).
357. Marston, supra note 352, at 888; see also Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1050
(Alaska 1987) (upholding a premarital contract and asserting that "people with previous 'bad
luck' with domestic life may not be willing to risk marriage again without the ability to
safeguard their financial interests"); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 112-13 (W. Va. 1985)
(judicial recognition of prenuptial agreements most likely "encourage[s] rather than
discourage[s] marriage"); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, ContractualOrderingofMarriage:A New
Modelfor State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 207,207-11,216-23,285-86,288-91,328-34 (1982)
(writing approvingly of the private ordering of marriage via premarital agreements). But see
John F. Schaefer, Why Michigan ShouldDivorce AntenuptialAgreementsfrom Divorce Cases,
76 MICH. B.J. 1076 (1997) ("[A]ll antenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce promote
and facilitate divorce.. ").
358. Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 229, 279 (1994); see also Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage "For the Sake of
the Children": A Fernist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1435, 1440-42 (critiquing
precommitment restrictions from a feminist perspective).
359. Marston, supra note 352, at 894.
360. See 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 310-12 (3d ed. 1945).
Judith T. Younger notes that by the mid-seventeenth century, prenuptial agreements were of
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their use was limited largely to older widowed or divorced individuals who were
about to remarry but wished to shelter wealth from their first marriages. 6' Prenuptial
contracts regulating transfers of property upon the death of one of the spouses have
long been upheld.362 But agreements attempting to dispose of property or regulate
spousal support upon divorce were "almost universally considered void ab initio as
contrary to public policy. 3 63 The sea change in judicial review of these contracts was
signaled by Posner v. Posner,3" a 1970 Florida decision which held that with divorce
now "such a commonplace fact of life,""36 reasonable fiances might properly wish to
agree on the disposition ofproperty rights, including support obligations, should their
prospective marriage fail.3"
When such agreements determine the financial aspects of a marriage, they have
been praised for their ability to enhance private ordering in an area of law where the
official state regime has failed so many so often. By "empowering couples to commit
themselves reliably,"367 court enforcement of premarital contracts "allows the parties
to structure the economic consequences of future behaviors and, by doing so, to
manipulate the incentives they will face in the future."36 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has gone so far as to withdraw from the "business of policing the
reasonableness of premarital bargains," '369 thus expressing a vibrant-if somewhat
naive-faith in the capacity of prospective spouses to be fair and reasonable with
sufficient concern to be incorporated into the original Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, ch. 3
(1677). See Judith T. Younger, Perspectives onAntenuptialAgreements: An Update, 8 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRim. LAW. 1, 2 (1992).
361. See GREGORY ETAL., supra note 41, at 80.
362. See, e.g., Buettner v. Buettner, 505 P.2d 600, 603 (Nev. 1973); Gross v. Gross, 464
N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ohio 1984); Gant, 329 S.E.2d at 112.
363. Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Alaska 1987). For illustrative cases, see
generally Finchan v. Fincham, 165 P.2d 209 (Kan. 1946), modified on other grounds, 173
P.2d 244 (Kan. 1946); Mengal v. Mengal, 103 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951); Motley v.
Motley, 120 S.E.2d 422 (N.C. 1961); Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. 1945).
364. 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); see
also Bix, supra note 37, at 151 n.20 (citing popular view of Posner as the "turning point for
states' treatment of premarital contracts," but noting the existence of an earlier and little-
noticed case upholding aprenuptial bargain with an alimony waiver in Hudson v. Hudson, 350
P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960)).
365. Posner, 233 So. 2d at 384.
366. While courts clearly uphold prenuptial agreements dividing real and personal property
upon divorce, the status of agreements waiving spousal support is more clouded. See Younger,
supra note 360, at 13.
367. Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 415
(1992).
368. Id. at 415-16; see also Marston, supra note 352, at 889. In the words of Mary Ann
Glendon, the contractual matrix emphasizes "[i]ndividual liberty and the relative independence
and equality of family members." MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY 41 (1981).
369. Recent Developments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (1991); see also Barbara Ann
Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform PremaritalAgreementAct,
19 J. LEGIS. 127, 140-41 (1993). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court deemed the remedies of
fraud, duress, and misrepresentation "perfectly adequate" to assure the integrity of premarital
contracts. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
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each other.37° Providing impetus for further acceptance of these contracts is the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act ("UPAA"), promulgated in 1983 and adopted (as
of 1998) in twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.37' The UPAA supplies a
potential keyhole for unlocking the door to judicial acceptance of a far broader range
of behaviorally oriented and divorce grounds-specifying agreements in its provision
that spouses-to-be may enter into enforceable contracts about "any other matter,
including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a
statute imposing a criminal penalty."3"
Although the vast majority of premarital agreements to date have involved purely
financial considerations, contemporary couples are also including behavioral terms
into their premarital bargains.3" Such contracts have generally failed to win judicial
approval in the past,374 but the rapid changes in contemporary family law may prompt
a reevaluation of this form of contractual liberty.3 75 This new generation ofprenuptial
contracts poses concerns which both extend prior analysis and branch the controlling
legal principles in new directions. The weaving of contractarian discourse into the
traditionalist empire of domestic relations cuts across the two conflicting trends in
contemporary family law which Naomi Cahn has identified.376 One trend, associated
370. Most courts do review prenuptial bargains for procedural and substantive fairness, but
the threshold for judicial ratification has lowered considerably in recent years. See Marston,
supra note 352, at 897-99; see also Brod, supra note 358, at 294 ("Premarital agreements have
a disparate impact on women-and thereby discriminate against them.").
371. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTACr, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987 & Supp. 1999) (listing 25
states plus the District of Columbia in the "Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act has Been
Adopted").
372. Id § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373. On the potential impact of the UPAA on prenuptial contracts
seeking to regulate marital behavior and to specify the grounds for divorce applicable to a
particular marriage, see infra text accompanying notes 373-75.
373. On premarital bargaining of behavioral issues, see generally Theodore F. Haas, The
Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879
(1988); SuzanneReynolds, PremaritalAgreements, 13 CAMPBELL L.REv. 343,357-58 (1991);
Shultz, supra note 357; Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts
and Domestic Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 777; Laura P. Graham, Comment, The
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of
Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037
(1993). Lenore J. Weitzman included many variants on "intimate contracts" in LENORE J.
WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPousEs, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 225-333 (1981).
See also RALPH WARNER & TONY IHARA, CALIFORNIA MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAW 36-39
(7th ed. 1985) (including, as possible topics for premarital contracts, decisions as to surname,
birth control, children, housework, domicile, religion, a blueprint for dispute resolution, and
aprovision for the end ofthe marriage); RICKARD, supra note 33, at 104 (similarly mentioning
"[l]ocation of marital home," "[c]areersfsources of income," and "[tiravel").
374. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 297 (Cal. 1973) (concerning
medical care); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App.) (addressing sexual
intercourse), rev'd on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976).
375. See infra text accompanying notes 503, 508-10.
376. See Cahn, supra, note 222; see also supra text accompanying notes 202-28.
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with communitarians such as Mary Ann Glendon,3" William Galston378 and Carl
Schneider, 79 focuses on the quantum of moral discourse surrounding family issues.
These thinkers concludes that the no-fault divorce revolution overextended itself in
reducing family exchanges into neutral commercial exchanges, with the corrosive
effects ofdevaluing the intact family and risking the degradation ofa large percentage
of the new generation of children."' A second trend, which Cahn labels the "new
morality," '' seeks to support the cornucopia of contemporary family arrangements,
recognizing that the "private negotiation of roles ' appears, ironically, to have
become a permanent feature of the ever-changing family matrix. 83
Prenuptial agreements regulating the behavior of the spouses during the marriage
also constitute a revival of the moral discourse which, communitarians fear is fading
from the American scene. At the same time, the intensely private nature of these
bargains accelerates the privatization of family law which many communitarians
oppose as a continuous ebbing away of culturally shared values. The tension between
these two aspects of prenuptial agreements may serve as a useful dialectic in
evaluating the divorce counterrevolution.
A. Save Us from Our (Later) Selves:
Ulysses and the Sirens
In a landmark 1990 article, Professor Elizabeth S. Scott advanced "precommitment
theory"3 as a "framework for legal transformation of the conception of marriage
from a 'nonbinding' and transitory bond to a more enduring relationship.""38 By
adopting precommitment restrictions, a couple could set out in aprenuptial agreement
the particularized dissolution grounds for their marriage.3"6 These options might range
377. See MARYANN GLENDON, THETRANSFORMATIONOF FAMILYLAw (1989); GLENDON,
supra note 167.
378. See William Galston, A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family,
RESPONSIVE COMMUNrrY, Winter 1990-91, at 14.
379. See Schneider, supra note 203. Schneider has observed that "the people the law seeks
to affect themselves think in moral terms. A law which tries to eliminate those terms from its
language will both misunderstand the people it is regulating and be misunderstood by them."
Schneider, supra note 206, at 243.
380. Ellman and Lohr have aptly summarized this position: "Respectful of the limits of legal
rules, and keenly aware that the law is a reflection of cultural mores as much as a source of
them, this thread of thought seems sometimes to lament more than condemn no-fault, treating
it as a symptom of broader social ills." Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract,
Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv.
719, 733.
381. Cahn, supra note 222, at 228.
382. Id. at 240.
383. For an evocative history of this contractarian trend, see generally Singer, supra note
203.
384. Scott, supra note 135, at 38.
385. Id.
386. See id. at 43-44, 79-91; see also Massarv. Massar, 652 A.2d 219,223 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995) (affirming dismissal of wife's petition for divorce on ground of extreme
cruelty in light of couple's prenuptial agreement which prohibited either party from filing for
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from a legally enforceable commitment "till death do us part"387 to milder obstacles
to divorce, such as conditioning a decree on economic penalties38 8 or mandating a
delay prior to the award of any divorce.8 9 Under Scott's rationale, for example,
prospective spouses could decide that only marital fault-as they defined it-would
render their marriage amenable to divorce proceedings.) ° But the fulcrum of Scott's
analysis is that the couple could only adopt measures to limit future options, never to
expand them. Thus, precommitment strategies are a major theoretical prop of the
divorce counterrevolution, "represent[ing] a conscious attempt to reduce one's future
options because subsequent preferences may be impulsive or contrary to one's long-
term interests."39 ' In Scott's scheme, these long-term interests always encompass the
continuation of the marriage.392
The literary device often used to illustrate precommitment restrictions is Ulysses'
instruction to his crew to lash him to the mast as they navigated past the Sirens,
temptresses whose voices brought doom upon all who heard their song. 93 Ulysses
directed the sailors to plug their own ears, and he abjured them to ignore any pleas
he might make to release him from his self-imposed captivity when their vessel
neared the Sirens. His crew complied, and---despite Ulysses' frantic imprecations for
release upon hearing the powerfully seductive song of the Sirens-refused to loosen
the ropes restraining Ulysses.394 In adapting this episode to adumbrate her
precommitment analysis, Scott casts our contemporary legal and popular culture as
divorce on any basis other than New Jersey's no-fault ground of eighteen months separation).
387. See Haas, supra note 373 (advocating the rationality and enforceability of contracts not
to divorce).
388. See, e.g., Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016 (R.I. 1994) (affirming prenuptial
accord allocating a substantial economic penalty to the spouse who initiated divorce
proceedings).
389. See Scott, supra note 135, at44. Theprenuptial agreement at issue in Massar, 652 A.2d
219, effectively provided for a mandatory delay in divorce in barring either spouse from
initiating divorce proceedings on the more speedily obtained fault grounds and allowed for a
divorce filing only under the eighteen-month separation provision. A prenuptial contract with
exactly the opposite terms has also been proposed. See Haas, supra note 373, at 924, 930
(proposing model agreement by which a couple could pledge not to seek a divorce on the
ground of separation, but only to file for divorce on fault grounds, unless the erttire agreement
were rescinded by mutual consent).
390. See Scott, supra note 135, at 81-82.
391. Id. at 41.
392. See Alexander, supra note 23, at 504 ("IT]he advocates of covenant marriage want to
use freedom of contract to enhance security of contract in the context of marriage... they want
to throw off the traditional limits of private ordering in marriage as a means of returning to
traditional marriage.").
393. See Deborah Heliman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
1107, 1145 (1995) (referring to Ulysses' binding himself to the mast of his ship to avoid the
temptation of the Sirens as the "classic example of self-paternalism"); see also Richard W.
Gamett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36
CATH. LAW. 455,499 (1996) (stating the same). See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE
SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed. 1984).
394. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, bk. XII, 11. 39-54, at 177-79 (Richmond Lattimore trans.,
Perennial Classics, 1999) (n.d.).
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the Sirenic villain, intent on eroding marital stability. Conversely, the spousal bargain
represents Ulysses' self-shackling instructions, to which couples must resort because
of the failure of willpower to resist the destructive allure of our cultural primacy of
the alienated soul. 9 Scott advanced her proposal because of the paucity of "legal
incentives to remain married, or even to consider thoughtfully the decision to end the
marriage." '  The scheme's key component, which constitutes a fundamental
alteration of traditional matrimonial jurisprudence, is the contractual enforceability
of the divorce-restraining promises jointly made by the intended spouses.
Precommitment restrictions "enable the individual to adhere to the initial utility-
maximizing plan," '397 which Scott asserts will "reinforce self-control." '98 But this
injection of contractual fluid into the veins of domestic relations is particularly
problematic, as it insists that the goal requiring self-control is defined forever at the
time of premarital contracting."' Although Scott addresses the "problem of 'later
395. See Scott, supra note 135, at 40. Professor Haas made a similarly reasoned proposal,
in which he postulated a couple's reflections in deciding to bind themselves to a specific
marital contract:
We are contemplating entering into a cooperative venture-marriage. That
venture has various risks. Better opportunities may become available for one or
both of us. The venture may not produce the return we now expect. Perhaps, for
example, children are going to be more costly in time and money and less
satisfying than we now think. We are only willing to enter into such a momentous
venture on the condition that it can be terminated only by mutual consent-in
other words, each of us can veto termination--or by a serious breach of proper
spousal behavior, such as abandonment, adultery or cruelty. We recognize that
either of us may want to end the marriage, and that a rule of mutual consent or
marital fault may frustrate that person's pursuit of utility maximization. However,
we are more concerned about the loss of children, or being left without a career
(or with an etiolated one), about weakness of will, overestimation of competing
opportunities, and the failure to invest adequately in the partnership because of
these other concerns. We do not feel that a nonbinding commitment is sufficient
protection for these risks inherent to the marital partnership under modem law.
Therefore, we wish to bind ourselves to a rule that saysjust as entry into marriage
is only by mutual consent, so, too, exit from it is only by mutual consent,
excepting of course, where there is marital fault.
Haas, supra note 373, at 890.
396. Scott, supra note 135, at 9 (emphasis in original).
397. Id. at 42.
398. Id.
399. Scott accurately observes that "[w]ithdrawal, boredom, pursuit of other relationships,
immersion in career, and conflict over finances, children, and other family may all weaken the
resolve to sustain a lasting relationship." Id. at 42. But what can never be ascertained is
whether the initial commitment to the success of a marriage expressed at the altar and by
contract may wisely be later subordinated to some other goal on an individualfamily basis. All
the psychological studies and statistical measures of divorce's impact on children deal with
broad societal harms, even when case studies such as Wallerstein's detail injuries to specific
families and individuals. Similarly, precommitment strategies have been feted because they
will benefit-if they ultimately do--society as a whole. What is less noticed is that the fate of
a particular hapless family is beyond the saving grace of any precommitment strategy.
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selves,""'4 °° her attempt to reconcile precommitment theory with the unpredictability
of human development reveals a grave flaw in her construct, as well as providing a
showcase for the danger in fully hooking marriage to the wheel of contract.
Scott begins by positing a couple whose decision to enter marriage was a
"thoughtful, reflective choice." '' With the best of intentions, however, in time this
couple "may no longer share the same values, plans, and interests that supported the
earlier commitment."4" Their personal identities may have so altered that their "later
selves""4 3 are fundamentally different than the ones who kissed at the altar."4 An
absolute refusal to permit the later self to undo the promises made by the earlier one
seriously impinges on individual autonomy. Scott acknowledges that, in the cases of
individuals whose identities have substantially changed, "marital breakdown may
reflect a change in long-term preferences, and divorce may be necessary to the pursuit
of [their] life plan."40 5 To bind such a centrally changed couple to their original
contractual promises would not only prove unfair to these later selves, but would also
undermine the purposes of precommitment theory itself, which is designed to supplyguide rails for individual and marital long-term interests. Scott recognizes this major
obstacle to her theory, but suggests that the enforceable commitments themselves will
likely prevent the development of"an intolerable distance or incompatibility between
spouses."4o6
Her rationale is not persuasive. Initially, note that, unlike her discussion of personal
identity development, 40 7 Scott cites to no psychological or philosophical authorities
in asserting that tighter bindings channel growth. She merely avers the sensible
proposition that "[c]ooperative behavior may promote change or growth that results
in compatible rather than alienated later selves. 4 8 But what if it does not? For
couples in whom the best intentions have paved the road to conjugal hell,
precommitment theory allows for no escape hatches not previously designated by the
earlier, unsuspecting, selves. The precommitment rationale amounts to a claim that
living within the locked door of marriage will foster cozy comfort and never
400. Id. at 62.
401. Id. at 58. Scott had earlier discussed the problem of applying precommitment theory
to ill-formed or hasty decisions to marry, concluding that the costs of these permanent but
doomed unions may be mitigated if precommitment mechanisms succeed in discouraging
impulsive unions. See id. at 57-58.
402. Id. at 58.
403. Id.
404. See id at 59.
405. Id. at 61. She thus recognizes that precommitment mechanisms "may not function
correctly in cases in which one or both marital partners experience significant changes in
personal identity over time." Id.
406. Id. at 62.
407. See id. at 59-60 nn.132-36.
408. Id. at 62.
409. Apparently recognizing the weakness of this part of her argument, Scott argues that not
all precommitments would be improper for couples whose individual identities later
fundamentally altered. She suggests that premarital contracts requiring an "extended period of
delay" prior to divorce will aid such couples in assessing whether the desire for a conjugal exit
is consonant with long-term or merely short-term goals. Id. On the problems with such
extended waiting periods, see infra text accompanying notes 445-48.
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claustrophobia. But the history of twentieth-century American divorce patterns
demonstrates that even when the legal system constrained marriages by providing
only fault-based exits, these formal bonds proved totally ineffective in cabining
dissolution-minded spouses. 410 Scott's proposal thus aims at creating a legal scheme
similar to, but more enforceable than, the old divorce fault regime.4 '
Moreover, precommitment restrictions are premised on the overly sunny
assumptions about future identities made by the optimistic selves about to be
wedded.411 Indeed, employing precommitment theory to rebuild the failed fault model
of dissolution harbors an ironic twist: during the hey-day of fault divorce, courts
routinely refused to honor premarital contracts precisely because of the
unforseeability of behavioral consequences. In the emblematic 1940 case of Graham
v. Graham, for example, the court declined to enforce an agreement in which the
husband had promised to accompany his spouse on her travels in exchange for a
monthly stipend:
There is no reason, of course, why the wife cannot voluntarily pay her husband
a monthly sum or the husband by mutual understanding quit his job and travel
with his wife. The objection is to putting such conduct into a binding contract,
tying'the parties' hands in the future and inviting controversy and litigation
between them.
413
While the worldview forbidding marital bargains has dramatically changed, the
hesitation to allow couples to bind themselves to unforseen consequences represents
a modicum of wisdom handed down by our judicious forbears. "At a minimum,"
Brian Bix has argued, "society should be skeptical about the ability of the earlier self
to judge the interests and preferences of the later self."4 4
As we have seen, the Odyssey provided one image for precommitment
410. See DIFONZO, supra note 5, passim.
411. See Lacey, supra note 358, at 1446-48 (criticizing Scott's "later selves" argument as
particularly unfair to women).
412. Brian Bix has elaborated on the problem of applying contractual theories to parties on
the brink of long-term commitments who are in the worst possible position to assess the
likelihood of adverse consequences:
Premarital agreements are good examples of contracts that illustrate problems
with rational judgment, as they involve long-term planning and the consideration
of possible negative outcomes at a time when the parties are most likely to be
optimistic that no such negative outcome will occur. Parties need protection in
this situation because they are unlikely to be able to think clearly for themselves
regarding the consequences of divorce at any time, and certainly not immediately
before marriage.
Bix, supra note 37, at 193; see also id. at 194 n. 198 (quoting W. Somerset Maugham's dictum
that "the essential element of love is a belief in its own eternity," W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM,
Red, in 1 THE COMPLETE SHORT STORIES OF W. SOMERSETMAUGHAM 149, 161 (1952)); Lynn
A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average, 17 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (reporting study results that the "median response of the marriage
license applicants was 0% when assessing the likelihood that they personally would divorce")
(emphasis in original).
413. Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936, 939 (E.D. Mich. 1940).
414. Bix, supra note 37, at 197.
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restrictions.4"5 But let me offer two retellings ofthe episode involving Ulysses and the
Sirens, in a modest effort to render a different perspective on precommitments. The
first version: In order to ensure that he successfully bypass the Sirens' temptation,
Ulysses instructs his crew to plug their ears, fasten him to the mast, and not release
him for any reason until the vessel has made two hours' transport beyond the Sirens.
An hour after the ship has passed the Sirens, however, our hero sees on the horizon
a horrible sea monster bearing down on them. Ulysses frantically attempts to have the
sailors release him so he may navigate around the hazard. But the crew obeys his
earlier instruction and all are swallowed by the sea serpent. A second story: Ulysses
instructs the crew as in Homer's telling, but he has been misinformed as to the nature
of the threat posed by the Sirens. As the ship proceeds, Ulysses sees Penelope and
Telemachus held prisoner by the Sirens, and calling out to him to rescue them.
Ulysses desperately attempts to countermand his earlier orders, telling his crew that
he did not foresee this eventuality, but to no avail.
As these two brief retellings suggest, precommitment restrictions may backfire
catastrophically. Allprecommitments involve ameasure of fortune-telling, which can
never safely be limned in lapidary form. In response to this point, advocates of
contractual bargaining before marriage may point out that all precommitments are not
created equal. For a couple to require that any divorce filing be preceded by a
substantial waiting period is different than the parties' agreement that they may never
divorce. Contracts to limit the grounds of divorce fall somewhere in between. But the
law of unintended consequences holds sway over all precommitments.
B. Hitting the Pause Button on Divorce
Consider the extended waiting period, arguably the mildest restriction, and the one
which Scott considers the "optimal precommitment."'41 6 The myth of impulsive
divorce-seekers has resurfaced in the current counterrevolutionary rhetoric, with
proposals ranging from Galston's five year delay4 " to Scott's two or three-year
waiting period to "discourage impulsive divorce and provide sufficient opportunity
415. See supra text accompanying note 395.
416. Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage asPrecommitment, in IRAMARKELLMANETAL., FAMILY
LAW: CASES, TEXTs, PROBLEMS 225 (3d ed. 1998) (excerpt of paper presented to the
Communitarian Conference on Pro-Family Policies, 1996). Scott continues:
First, a mandatory period of delay... creates a barrier to divorce that makes
leaving the marriage more costly, and at the same time it defines the relationship
as one that is not easily set aside, subtly influencing the spouses' attitudes and
behavior. Beyond this, an extended waiting period promotes better
decisionmaking. The spouse who is unhappy in the marriage can more accurately
assess whether her decision reflects her long term interest or transitory intense
preferences. In general, time is a good tool for making better decisions and
avoiding cognitive errors. Finally, a waiting period undermines the ability of a
spouse quickly to establish a new family, a step that dilutes interest in children
of an earlier marriage.
Id at 225-26.
417. See Galston, supra note 22, at 22.
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for reconciliation." '418 But proponents of placing divorce filings on hold for an
extended period "apparently think that many couples with children divorce casually
... and that they will stop if we just make them think about it first."419 We have, of
course, heard these very arguments before. More than a generation ago, noted family
law professor Monrad Paulsen observed:
[It is] astonishing how a vision of the atypical case has dominated the discussion
of divorce by consent. Debaters conjure up the vision of two insincere pleasure
seekers ready for new adventures rather than the common case of a tragic, weary
couple who have concluded at last that the pain should cease.420
There is a rich history of dealing with extended divorce waiting periods, one to
which the contemporary advocates of this measure never refer. Consideration of this
tapestry should answer many of the questions posed by the proponents of divorce
delays, because the failure of waiting periods in the past may prove instructive to the
present. Before the enactment of California no-fault divorce, twenty-three American
jurisdictions had statutes allowing for divorce upon the passage of a specified time of
separation. 42 1 The majority of these living-apart laws dated from the early years of the
twentieth century. In most cases, they constituted no-fault divorce alternatives
premised on the theory that dead marriages needed decent burial:
When the marriage relationship has completely and finally broken down and the
relations of the parties have reached an impasse where reconciliation is impossible
and the family unit has ceased to exist, no rule or regulation promulgated by
authority of the state can restore it. The object of the state's protection has ceased
to exist.
4 2
Accordingly, many state legislatures concluded that a prolonged period of separation
would indicate the futility of all marriage-reviving measures. The initial wave of
living-apart statutes required quite lengthy waiting periods. For example, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Texas prescribed a ten-year wait in their initial
legislation. 41 Washington's first such law required an eight-year separation,424 while
418. Scott, supra note 135, at 44. Scott has recently argued for a minimum "multi-year"
commitment period for marriages, combined with a "notification requirement--such as a two
year waiting period from the time of notification before divorce." Scott & Scott, supra note
349, at 1263 n.91, 1282.
419. Ellman & Lohr, supra note 380, at 727; cf GWYNN DAvIs & MERvYN MURClH,
GROUNDS FOR DIvORCE 155 (1988) ("[Veryfew decisions to divorce are taken impetuously
... although our research does demonstrate that minds may change.") (emphasis in original).
420. Paulsen, supra note 54, at 96.
421. See DiFonzo, supra note 42, at 40-41 tbl.
422. Howay v. Howay, 264 P.2d 691,697 (Idaho 1953); see also Barrington v. Barrington,
89 So. 512, 513 (Ala. 1921) (describing living-apart laws as focused not on marital fault but
on thefait accompli of a broken marriage); Dever v. Dever, 146 A. 478,479 (R.I. 1929) ("Any
injury to the state from the dissolution of the family cannot now be cured by insisting on a
continuance of a semblance of [a] marriage when the substance has long since disappeared.").
423. See 1907 N.C. Sess. Laws 89; 1893 R.I. Acts & Resolves 1187; 1925 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 4629 (West).
424. See 1917 Wash. Laws 106.
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Louisiana and Puerto Rico were satisfied with a seven-year wait.4" These laws were
not efforts to liberalize divorce grounds and smooth the path to the divorce court. On
the contrary, they were legislative gambits aimed at arresting the widening use of
fault grounds as entitlements to divorce.426 But the measures failed to attract divorce-
seekers, who preferred resort to readily provable fault grounds, especially mental
cruelty, which would yield divorce far more rapidly than would the living-apart
statutes. Legislatures responded to the paucity of living-apart petitioners by reducing
the waiting periods, sometimes dramatically. Texas lowered the living-apart threshold
from ten years in 1925 to seven years in 1953 to three years in 1967427 The pattern
in Maryland commenced with a five-year pause prescribed in 1937, reduced in 1947
to three years and in 1961 to eighteen months.4 As long as fault alternatives existed,
however, the divorcing public largely ignored the living-apart statutes. In 1948, for
example, only three percent of all American divorces were obtained under the living-
apart laws, although such measures were in effect in seventeen states and the District
of Columbia.4
29
Why did the waiting period statutes fail? The answer is suggested in a Maryland
study, which found that the 6430 absolute divorces issued by that state in 1945
included 4733 on the ground of desertion, but only 319 pursuant to the living-apart
law.43 The reason for the disparity was disarmingly simple: the statute requiring a
waiting period delayed divorces for five years, while a divorce on the ground of
desertion was available after only eighteen months.431 Maryland did not allow
divorces for cruelty, so divorce filings gravitated into the desertion column. The
study's conclusion was indisputable: divorce plaintiffs "shift the grounds alleged in
order to use the more liberal... ones. '432 A more recent Ohio study confirmed this
finding. When the state predicated a consensual, no-fault divorce upon proof of a
two-year separation, only 12.6% of Ohio divorces in 1978 were granted on this
ground, with the vast majority of couples choosing the speedier fault grounds.433
The English divorce reform experience similarly counsels against the effectiveness
of waiting periods. The Divorce Reform Act of 1969414 converted the English fault-
only divorce system into one focused on irretrievable marital breakdown, which
425. See 1916 La. Acts 269; 1933 P.R. Laws 46.
426. This history and argument is elaborated in DiFonzo, supra note 42, at 38-53.
427. See 1967 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 288 (West); 1953 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 91 (West); 1925
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4629 (West).
428. See 1961 Md. Laws 104; 1947 Md. Laws 240; 1937 Md. Laws 396.
429. See PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 125 (1959).
430. See CARL N. EVERSTINE, MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DIVORCEIN MARYLAND
17(1946).
431. See id. at 19.
432. Id.
433. See Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath,
20J. FAM. L. 443,464 (1982); see also Alan H. Frank et al., No-FaultDivorce andthe Divorce
Rate: The Nebraska Experience-An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58
NEB. L. REV. 1, 47 n.180 (1979) (citing Wisconsin statistics that when the state reduced its
required separation period from five years to one year, the percentage of couples choosing no-
fault divorce rose from 3% or 4% to only 8% or 9%, with 86% still obtaining divorces on
grounds of "cruel and inhuman treatment").
434. Divorce Reform Act, 1969, ch. 55 (Eng.).
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could be shown in any of five ways: adultery, cruelty, desertion for two years,
separation for two years upon mutual consent, and separation for five years
otherwise.4" Reform advocates believed that divorce rates would stabilize, and that
the bulk of the divorces would fall into the two categories that premised a finding of
irretrievable breakdown on the lapse of a waiting period. Instead, the reform resulted
in a vast increase in the number of divorce suits,4" and specifically a flood of
petitions seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty.437 After the no-fault reforms, the
percentage of divorce petitions alleging cruelty rose from 17.7% in 1971 to 41.4%
in 1986.438 During that same period, the percentage of all fault-based petitions never
fell below 61.4%, despite the presence of the two new no-fault divorce options.43 9 The
proliferation of divorce petitions alleging misbehavior represented the clear victory
of ready divorce over any slower alternative. Waiting periods, even for as short a
period as two years, have never significantly slowed divorce if fault or other
alternatives remain available.
But under the new dispensation proposed by the advocates of premarital
contracting, alternatives to waiting periods may not remain available. Scott argued
that mandatory delay before divorce could be either legislatively imposed"0 or
negotiated as part of a prenuptial agreement.41 Professors Rasmusen and Stake have
called for the enforcement of a wide range of private agreements regarding divorce
grounds and the terms of an ongoing marriage.442 Their proposal would certainly
include the contractual enforceability of lengthy pauses before divorce. But
mandatorywaiting periods would likely result in preventing remarriage, 443 promoting
cohabitation with the possibility of out-of-wedlock births,4" enhancing the likelihood
that the spouse most anxious for the divorce will bargain away financial
considerations,445 and delaying the rebuilding of lives after the break-up ofa marriage
that is now "legally intact but factually dead.2446 These considerations strongly
435. See id.; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN
TRANSITONINTHE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 194-96 (1977); WILLIAM LATEY,
THETIDEOF DiVORCE 152-60 (1970); George G. Brown, Divorce Reform Act 1969, 120 NEW
L.J. 74, 74-75 (1970).
436. See LAW COMMISsION, supra note 166, at 6.
437. See id. at app. b.
438. See id.
439. See id.
440. See Scott, supra note 135, at 87 n.199.
441. See id. at 44.
442. See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 350, at 464-65.
443. ElIman and Lohr observe that remarriage of the parent with primary custody can be
beneficial both to that parent and to the child. See Ellman & Lohr, supra note 380, at 727 &
n.29; see also Lacey, supra note 358, at 1457 ("[D]ivorce almost always leaves the woman as
the custodial parent financially worse off than the man. Mandatory delay would only
exacerbate this situation.").
444. See Ellman & Lohr, supra note 380, at 730.
445. See id. at 731. "Fans of fault often make the mistake of thinking that fault laws protect
the innocent. They do not. They protect the person who does not care about delaying the
divorce, at the expense of the person who does-and who may have very good reasons for
wanting out." Id.
446. Id. at 732.
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counsel against mandatory separation periods. A period of reflection prior to
divorcing would appear a highly prudential choice for a couple, both before and
during a separation." 7 What is objectionable is compulsion, whether the strong-arm
tactics are employed by the State or by the "earlier selves" now fundamentally
changed.
C. Covenant Marriage Laws: Enacting the Freedom
To Make a Binding Commitment
Bills introduced in various state houses in the 1990s proposed a version of Scott's
contract marriage option for couples who desired to enter into connubial relationships
impervious to unilateral no-fault divorce."' These bills aimed, in the words of an
Illinois measure, at differentiating between two types of state-sanctioned unions, a
"marriage of commitment" and a "marriage of compatibility.""' 9 Termed the
"Marriage Contract Act," the Illinois bill would have allowed couples to enter into
binding contracts providing that the "marriage of the parties shall not be dissolved or
otherwise modified except by mutual consent of the parties or upon a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence by one party of the fault of the other party." 5 0 While
these measures did not purport to offer couples the broad contractual freedom
encompassed by the precommitment rationale, they create an. opening for a variable
marriage contract.
Steven Nock, a University of Virginia sociology professor who will spend the next
five years tracking the phenomenon for the National Science Foundation, observed
that "we are on the front end of a covenant marriage boom that could sweep across
the nation." '' The first marriage contract bill to achieve passage was Louisiana's
447. See Gordon, supra note 214, at 1464 (recommending specified "reflection" time in lieu
of separation period). England has now moved to a position in between Gordon's reflection
period and a traditional separation period. The Family Law Act of 1996 provides for divorce
on the sole ground of irretrievable marital breakdown, but the decree may only be entered after
a nine-month period for "reflection and consideration." Family Law Act, 1996, ch. 27,
§§ 3(l)(a), 5(l)(c), 7(l)-(3) (Eng.). Given other built-in statutory delays, the English divorce
process now imposes an overall delay of at least twelve months, which can be extended an
additional six months by either party or if there are children six years of age or younger. See
id. § 7(10), (1 l)(b); MARYLY LA FOLLErE &ROBERTPURDIE, A GUIDETOTHE FAMILY LAW
AcT 1996, at 16 (1996).
448. See H.R. 2095, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (11. 1995); S. 5532, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Wa.
1995); S. 605, 142d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1994); H.R. 247, 162d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 1994); H.R. 1271, 162d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1993); H.R. 1585, 1 th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1990). Indiana state representative Dennis Kruse discusses his bill providing a"covenant
marriage" option in Dennis Kruse, Covenant Vows, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 12,1996, at A5.
The debate over the introduction of new covenant marriage bills continues into the present
decade. See H.J. Cummins, Covenant Vows Would Make Parting Harder, MINNEAPOLIs STAR
TRiB., Jan. 5, 2000, at IA (discussing introduction of new Minnesota covenant marriage bill);
B.G. Gregg, Lawmaker Wants Divorces Harder To Obtain, DET. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2000, at D l
(discussing introduction of similar Michigan bill).
449. H.R. 2095, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ill. 1995).
450.Id
451. Cummins, supra note 448, at IA.
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"covenant marriage" law of 1997.452 This statute created an entirely new class of
marriage, defined as a union between "one male and one female who understand and
agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship." '453 The new law
precludes couples who have chosen "covenant marriages" from access to the state's
liberal living-apart divorce ground, which grants divorce after only a six-month
separation.4 4 The new law mandates counseling for parties seeking to choose this
marital option, and it ostensibly seeks to reestablish the fault basis of divorce
jurisprudence: "Only when there has been a complete and total breach of the marital
covenant commitment may the non-breaching party seek a declaration that the
marriage is no longer legally recognized." '455 In 1998, Arizona became the second state
to adopt a covenant marriage option.456 A bevy of covenant marriage bills have been
proposed in states throughout the country.457
Covenant marriage laws represent the most recent thrust of the movement to undo
the excesses of the no-fault revolution. The proponents of this marital alternative aim
fundamentally to reshape the discourse of domestic relations. The new law not only
defines covenant marriage as a "lifelong relationship,"458 it explicitly requires the
spouses making such a commitment to "solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant
between a man and a woman who agree to live together as husband and wife for so
long as they both may live. 459 The statute is awash with requirements for specific
party acknowledgment of these refitted traditional terms of marital obligation. Not
only must the prospective covenant partners declare their intention to pledge their
everlasting troth on their marriage license application, they must each execute and file
a separate "declaration of intent to contract a covenant marriage.' '4 ° This recitation
"to love, honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the rest of our
452. H.R. 756, 1997 Leg., 1st Sess. (La. 1997) (codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-
275.1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000)).
453. LA. REa. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West 1997). On its face, the statute thus seeks to
prevent same-sex couples from obtaining the benefits of a covenant marriage. On same-sex
marriage, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (remanding to determine if state
could offer a compelling justification, as required by state constitution, why same-sex marriage
should be prohibited); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
(1996); Lynn D. Wardle, A CriticalAnalysis of Constitutional Claimsfor Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REv. 1, 96 (describing the constitutional arguments supporting same-sex
marriage as "strained and diversionary"); Fenton Johnson, Weddedto an Illusion: Do Gays and
Lesbians Really Want the Right to Marry?, HARPER'S, Nov. 1996, at 43-50 (suggesting that
same-sex unions may support relationships both broader and deeper than traditional marriage).
454. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103 (West 1999).
455. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West Supp. 2000).
456. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to -906 (Supp. 1998).
457. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey ofCovenant Marriage Proposals
in the United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31, 41-51 (1999-2000) (discussing covenant
marriage proposals of many states).
458. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West Supp. 2000). The implicit promise that the
statute actually legislates a "lifelong relationship" is, however, misleading. See infra text
accompanying notes 474-75.
459. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
460. 1d. § 9:272(B).
[Vol. 75:875
CUSTOMIZED MARRIAGE
lives"46' contains statutorily-prescribed terms which resemble the full disclosure
requirements of prenuptial contracting: 2
We have chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another everything
which could adversely affect the decision to enter into this marriage. We have
received premarital counseling on the nature, purposes, and responsibilities of
marriage. We have read the Covenant Marriage Act, and we understand that a
Covenant Marriage is for life. If we experience marital difficulties, we commit
ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to preserve our marriage, including marital
counseling.'
The parties must also submit an affidavit affirming their completion of premarital
counseling from a member of religious clergy"6 or from a marriage counselor4 65 The
required counseling must include:
a discussion of the seriousness of covenant marriage, communication of the fact
that a covenant marriage is a commitment for life, a discussion of the obligation
to seek marital counseling in times of marital difficulties, and a discussion of the
exclusive grounds for legally terminating a covenant marriage by divorce or by
divorce after ajudgment of separation from bed and board. 6
The parties must also submit anotarized attestation from the counselor specifying that
the parties were counseled in the manner prescribed by the statute and that they
received from the counselor the state attorney general's informational pamphlet
which reiterates the terms of the Covenant Marriage Act. s
The statute thus imposes two different counseling requirements. Initially, the
couple must have received premarital counseling focused on covenant marriage's
emphasis on lifelong unions and on the provisions of the statute itself. Although the
statute requires a "discussion" of these various aims, it prescribes no particular form
for this pre-entry counseling. Thus, an informational session in which the key points
of the statute are simply summarized would apparently comply with this unspecific
"counseling" requirement." 8 The second mandatory counseling facet ofthe covenant
marriage statute involves the couple's expressed commitment to avail themselves of
counseling in the event of problems during marriage. The couple's declaration of
461. kd § 9:273(A)(1).
462. See Younger, supra note 360, at 18-28.
463. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
464. The sources for religious counseling are designated as "a priest, minister, rabbi, clerk
of the Religious Society of Friends, and clergyman of any religious sect." Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a).
465. See id.
466. Id.
467. See id. § 9:273(A)(2)(b). Couples already married may subject themselves to the new
legislation by renewing their vows in covenant marriage terms, following a procedure virtually
identical to that for unmarried couples. See id. § 9:275; see also Carriere, supra note 211, at
1705-10 (arguing that the counseling requirement mandated by the covenant marriage statute
is superficial and misdirected).
468. See Carriere, supra note 211, at 1707-08 (contrasting effective premarital counseling
programs with the minimal Covenant Marriage requirement, which "may be reduced to an
empty formality").
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intent states: "[W]e commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to preserve our
marriage, including marital counseling."" 9 Both the utility and enforceability of this
"obligation '47 are questionable.47'
Louisiana divorce grounds available to parties not covered by covenant marriage
include separation for six months, adultery, and the defendant spouse having been
sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor following commission of a
felony.4" Ironically, the Covenant Marriage Act substantially expands the available
grounds for divorce for its signatories. A spouse to a covenant marriage may obtain
a divorce on these fault grounds: if the other spouse has committed adultery or a
felony (and in the latter case sentenced to death or imprisonment for hard labor),
abandoned the matrimonial home for one year, or physically or sexually abused the
spouse seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses.4' And either covenant
spouse may obtain a divorce after a separation for two years.474
The appearance of a no-fault provision in the Covenant Marriage Act, after the
quantum of traditional rhetoric employed by the drafters, seems surprising. The
original House Bill (No. 756) did not contain the provision. In a contentious process,
the two-year separation ground was added in the state senate, and ultimately agreed
to after a conference committee report. In fact, not only is the existence of a no-fault,
separation ground surprising in this type of legislation, but the brevity of the required
separation--two years-takes Louisiana merely two steps back in its own history.
Louisiana enacted its first living-apart statute in 1916, allowing for a no-fault divorce
469. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
470. The affidavit attesting that the couple have received pre-entry counseling refers to the
requirement to obtain counseling during marriage as an "obligation." Id. § 9:273(A)(2)(a).
471. See Carriere, supra note 211, at 1710-15. See generally Melissa Lawton, The
Constitutionality ofCovenant Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2471 (1998) (concluding
that covenant marriage statutes are constitutional).
472. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 102-103 (1972) (West 1999).
473. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307(A)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 2000).
474. See id. § 9:307(A)(5). Louisiana law provides another route to divorce for covenant
spouses. They may also obtain a divorce if they have been separated for one year after a
judgment of separation from bed and board. See id. § 9:307(A)(6)(a). Parties with such a
judgment who have a minor child, however, must be separated for eighteen months before
obtaining a divorce, unless the judgment of separation had been premised on the abuse of a
child of one of the parties, in which case the separation need only last one year. See id. §
9:307(A)(6)(b). Ajudgment of separation from bed and board is available to covenant spouses
upon proof of adultery, felony (with a sentence of death or imprisonment at hard labor),
abandonment for one year, physical or sexual abuse of the spouse seeking the divorce or of a
child of one of the spouses, two-year separation, or"habitual intemperance ofthe other spouse,
or excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages of the other spouse, if such habitual intemperance, or
such ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable." Id. §
9:307(B). Note that the statutory scheme is designed to avoid the easy route to a divorce decree
historically provided by the broad expansion of the ground of cruelty to encompass emotional
components. Mental cruelty is thus defined in restrictive terms. More significantly, it may not
serve as a divorce ground, but only as a ground for a judgment of separation from bed and
board in covenant marriage. On the plasticity of the mental cruelty ground for divorce, see
DIFONzO, supra note 5, at 51-54, 60-61, 105-06.
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on the separation of the parties for seven years.475 In 1932, the time period required
before filing for a no-fault divorce was shortened to four years.476 The legislature
halved the waiting period in 1938, allowing a spouse to file a no-fault divorce after
a separation of two years.4" In 1979, the period was lessened to one year,478 and in
1991 to six months. 479 Thus, for over forty years in recent history-from 1938 until
1979--the required living-apart time for Louisiana's only no-fault divorce ground
was identical to the separation period prescribed now under the covenant marriage
option.480
A flurry of covenant marriage bills were introduced in the states in 1997-98.48, In
general, the wording of the bills tracks the language of the Louisiana statute, but
several interesting modifications appear. The Arizona bill, the only one to have
passed to date, parallels its Louisiana predecessor, but adds the divorce ground of
mutual consent.4 12 In Missouri, a covenant marriage bill introduced in 1998 would
have extended the living-apart requirement for covenant spouses seeking a no-fault
divorce to three years.483 A Minnesota senate bill provided that no petition requesting
a dissolution of a covenant marriage could be filed unless both spouses had
completed a "six-month marital counseling course which emphasized the principles
of reconciliation, of no less than 60 hours of actual counseling time, consisting of
three months of individual counseling and three months of counseling as a couple.
' '4 4
The bill also provided that covenant spouses seeking to obtain a no-fault divorce must
wait out a separation period of five years.485
Some covenant marriage bills contain radical departures from the reigning no-fault
jurisprudence. A recent Alabama proposal retains the separation period for covenant
divorce at two years and requires the completion of a twenty-four week marital
counseling program "emphasizing principles of reconciliation. 486 But the statute
restricts the availability ofthis no-fault divorce option to covenant couples who have
no minor children.487 Thus, couples in a covenant marriage who desired to end their
relationship in a no-fault manner would have to wait until their children reached the
475. See 1916 La. Acts 269. On the history of living-apart divorce statutes, see DiFonzo,
supra note 42, at 38-53; Bennett Wolff, Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing
Family-Mediation Not Litigation, 29 Loy. L. REV. 55, 58-62 (1983).
476. See 1932 La. Acts 31.
477. See 1938 La. Acts 430.
478. See 1979 La. Acts 360.
479. See 1991 La. Acts 918.
480. The relatively minor disparity between the two-year living-apart period required for
divorce under a covenant marriage and the six-month provision for a conventional divorce
suggests that the vocal debate over covenant marriage has more to do with unease over this
exercise of the hortatory function of government than with any specific restriction on divorce
itself.
481. See supra note 457.
482. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to -906 (Supp. 1998). The mutual consent ground is
contained in § 25-903(8) ("The husband and wife both agree to a dissolution of marriage.").
483. See H.R. 1864, 89th Leg., 2d Sess. (Mo. 1998).
484. S. 2935, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997).
485. See id.
486. S. 606, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998).
487. See id.
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age of majority. A Mississippi proposal would allow a covenant divorce only upon
proof of adultery.48 Incredibly, the bill would specifically revive the hoary doctrines
of recrimination and collusion in covenant divorce cases.4"9 The application of these
doctrines would thus deny a divorce in cases in which the petitioning spouse had also
committed adultery, or in which both spouses agreed on falsely alleging that one of
them committed adultery. No clearer illustration of the irony of the back-to-fault
movement can be imagined than this bill, which would allow the dissolution of a
covenant marriage when one spouse-despite the statutorily specified pledges of
lifelong fidelity sworn to at the outset of the covenant relationship--violated the
marital vows by committing adultery, but by refusing to divorce such a couple when
both spouses had proven unfaithful.
Given the significant reintrusion of the state into the more intimate details of the
marriage contract which the covenant marriage bills propose, it seems paradoxical to
suggest that covenant marriage may prove a gateway for increased privatization of
the marital institution. Yet covenant marriage crosses a new line in family law, one
whose significance may not be properly appreciated amid the publicity surrounding
the question whether covenant marriage will strengthen marriage and promote a
decline in the divorce rate.4' For the first time in American history, the nature of the
marriage contract has been rendered variable by direct state action. In other words,
before the advent of covenant marriage, the married couple in the basement apartment
always had exactly the same marriage contract as the married couple upstairs. To this
proposition, two exceptions might immediately occur: common law marriage and
couples who have executed a prenuptial agreement.
Common law marriage does represent, in one sense, the apogee of privatization:
no license, no approved minister, no formalities of any kind.49' Yet official
recognition of common law unions has markedly decreased, from a majority of
approving jurisdictions in the nineteenth century, to only a dozen today.492 But the
most compelling reason to reject common law marriage as a model for privatization
is that, even to the limited extent to which it has been recognized, common law
marriage usually seeks to replicate the state-sanctioned marriage contract, not to
replace it with one of the parties' own devising.
488. See H.R. 1201, 1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1998).
489. See id Recrimination is the largely discredited doctrine that a divorce is only available
to an innocent spouse and thus must be denied in any case in which both spouses have been
guilty of violating their marital vows. Collusion, which has similarly fallen into disuse, bars
a divorce in cases in which both spouses have falsely alleged a marital offense. See GREGORY
ET AL., supra note 41, at 214-15.
490. Compare Lynne Marie Kohm, Covenant Marriage Endorses Lifetime Vows,
VIRGrNIAN-PILOT&LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 21, 1998, atB8, available in 1998 WL 5537348, with
Linda Valdez, Legislating Marriage an Insult to Human Relationships, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb.
20, 1998, at B4, available in 1998 WL 7752148.
491. See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 45-62 (2d ed. 1988); Hon. John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for
Common-Law Marriage: A Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law
Marriage Doctrine, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 399 (1998-99).
492. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal To Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REv. 709, 715 (1996).
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Prenuptial agreements have, on the other hand, anticipated covenant marriage's
creation of an alternative marital contract. And the flip side of that proposition is
equally true. Legislative sanction of covenant marriage serves to validate the heart of
prenuptial bargaining, that the couple knows best. What covenant marriage adds to
the already well-established movement favoring prenuptial agreements, however, is
an emphasis on shifting divorce grounds and on regulating the behavior of the parties
during the marriage. The terms of the "declaration of intent to contract a covenant
marriage" specify the detailed commitments of the parties to each other, and provide
the framework for satisfying the contractual prerequisites for enforceability. Indeed,
the construction of a divorce scheme limited to covenant spouses delineates the
state's method of enforcing this form of prenuptial agreement.
Intrepid couples have sporadically been expanding the boundaries of prenuptial
contracts for halfa century, with mixed results.493 The passage of covenant marriage
laws, as well as the broad discussion of marital contracts engendered, may be linked
to another weapon in the quest for expanding marital options. The Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act contains an unheralded but potentially explosive clause
concerning the extension of prenuptial agreements to cover behavioral issues.4"
Section three ofthe UPAA relates to the permissible content ofprenuptial bargains.49
The first six paragraphs of section 3(a) relate to financial issues and the seventh to
choice of law governing the construction of the agreement.4" The eighth paragraph
specifies that parties may contract about "any other matter, including their personal
rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a
criminal penalty."497 The official comment to this section indicates that the
permissible matters listed in the demarcation of the boundaries "are intended to be
illustrative, not exclusive."49 This hint about the UPAA's expansive nature is made
explicit in the specific comment for section 3(a)(8). Subject to the limitations of
public policy and criminal statutes, a prenuptial agreement "may provide for such
matters as the choice of abode, the freedom to pursue career opportunities, the
upbringing of children, and so on.''
493. See the cases cited in Graham, supra note 352, at 1043-49, and Younger, supra note
360, at 15 n.71. Courts have sometimes upheld rather substantial modifications of the
traditional marriage contract. See Stadther v. Stadther, 526 So. 2d 598,598-99 (Ala. Civ. App.
1988) (upholding provision that wife was to receive the marital home, a lump-sum payment,
and periodic alimony if, after marriage, husband drank excessively or caused bodily injury or
mental cruelty to the wife, and such actions led to a divorce); MacFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d
585, 589-90 (N.H. 1989) (validating a provision that if husband left wife for another woman
and a petition for divorce was filed by either party as a result, the prenuptial agreement would
become void and all matters relative to property division and spousal support would be
determined by otherwise applicable state law).
494. See Graham, supra note 352, at 1038.
495. See UNW. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987).
496. See id.
497. Id. § 3(b) provides that the "right of a child to support may not be adversely affected
by a premarital agreement." Id.
498. Id. § 3 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 374.
499. Id
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Professor Younger has expressed skepticism that the UPAA's "personal rights and
obligations' ' 0 language will expand the scope of prenuptial agreements, reasoning
that since the judicially constructed contours of public policy remain unchanged,
courts are unlikely to find that the UPAA "empowers them to enforce previously
unenforceable provisions." '' But the whirlwind of cultural and legal change which
the divorce counterrevolution represents may well encourage courts to seek to re-
examine the outer limits of public policy."02 In short, an expansive reading of the
UPAA more closely dovetails with the evolving social policy favoring private
ordering.
Amitai Etzioni noted that covenant marriage "provides couples with a ready-made
contract that, like all contracts, becomes enforceable by the state once it is entered
into freely.""03 Etzioni perceived that the covenant marriage contract may be viewed
as a "new form ofprenuptial agreements, focused not on whathappens to assets if the
couple divorces, but on how to make divorce less likely."s° The covenant marriage
option thus supports the growth of more behaviorally oriented provisions in
prenuptial agreements, as well as to different conceptions of marriage itself. Once the
atom of marriage has been split, legal fission will be difficult to resist: "A legal
system that recognizes both 'standard marriage' and 'covenant marriage,' with no
basis in principle for preferring one over the other, may likewise have no basis in
principle for refusing to create such categories as 'trial marriage,' 'plural marriage,'
or 'same-sex marriage.' 0s We are in a transition to a new regime of variable
marriage, whether the state designs the new marital tiers itself, or foments (and then
seeks to funnel) the imagination of couples drafting their own covenants. Both the
covenant marriage acts and the UPAA, as well as the rising tide of prenuptial
variations, converge in the direction of wide-ranging marital choice. But customized
marriage comes with a steep price.
500. Id. § 3(a)(8), 9B U.L.A. 373.
501. Younger, supra note 360, at 16.
502. See Graham, supra note 352, at 1038-39.
503. Amitai Etzioni, Marriage Covenant Allows Couples To Reject Too-Easy Divorce, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 20, 1997, 7B, available in 1997 WL 3361116.
504. Id. At least one covenant marriage bill, introduced in California, has recognized the
connection between covenant marriage and other prenuptial accords. See S. 1377, 1997 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1998). The bill provides that the covenant marriage declaration "shall not be
deemed a premarital agreement... and shall not be subject to the provisions of the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act." Id. Denial of such recognition to covenant marriage declarations
would only be necessary if these contracts were otherwise proper prenuptial agreements,
subjectto theUPAA. See also Heidi Graves, Stronger Promises, Families, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRm., Jan. 20, 2000, Letters (describing a covenant marriage as "the best prenuptial agreement
on the planet").
505. Wagner, supra note 342, at 297.
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D. The New Paternalism in
the Guise of Free Bargaining
The case for supervows is strong. Particularly in the face of the damage suffered
by the children of failed marriages,"° it seems quite reasonable to "permit people to
really bind themselves to a permanent and exclusive marriage, by reinforcing the
personal commitment with the force of law.""0 7 Moreover, entirely apart from the
societal interest in preserving and strengthening marriage, the attraction ofpermitting
couples to bind themselves as tightly as they wish lies in the pull of contractual
freedom.0 8 Contract is, after all, a prime tool for channeling expectations to enhance
planning in personal and structural terms. Why should contractual flexibility be
excluded from the ambit of marital affairs, some argue, since "even intimate
interaction can be predicted and explained by concepts such as reciprocity,
cost/benefit analysis, outcome maximization, and interpersonal equity."5 A
supporter of supervows makes explicit the comparison to commercial contracts:
One of the problems with protecting a law that allows people to make and break
all important personal commitments is that it actually eliminates a right that many
people want: the right to make a permanent commitment that the law will respect.
If we imposed "unilateral no-fault breach of contracf' on business law, allowing
people to reject their commercial contracts because they no longer felt like being
bound by them, commerce would collapse.51
Indeed, some proponents of premarital bargaining are so enamored of the freedom
of contract that they would require couples to negotiate a prenuptial agreement:
506. See supra text accompanying notes 277-81.
507. Christopher Wolfe, The Marriage of Your Choice, FIRSTTHINGS, Feb. 1995, at 37-38
(emphasis in original).
508. A full discussion of the many sided relationship between the family and contracts is
beyond the scope of this Article. For an overview, see CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F.
BRINIG, ANINvITATiONTO FAmILY LAW 307-98 (1996); Margaret F. Brinig, Economics, Law,
and Covenant Marriage, GENDER IssuEs, Winter-Spring 1998, at4; June Carbone & Margaret
F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change and Divorce Reform,
65 TuL. L. REV. 953, 977-79 (1991); Schneider, supra note 181, at 1828-33; Scott, supra note
135, at 70-94; Scott & Scott, supra note 349, at 1237-63; Stake, supra note 367, at 415-53;
Weisbrod, supra note 373, at 796-814. The majority of the scholarship in this area bears a law
and economics orientation, focusing on "incentives in individual bargaining." Id. at 778 n.2.
509. Shultz, supra note 357, at 256. Scott and Scott observe that a "contractual framework
... assumes explicitly that autonomous individuals frequently will pursue their own ends by
voluntarily restricting their future freedom through enforceable legal commitments to othe"s;
indeed, often it will not be possible to pursue individual ends in any other way." Scott & Scott,
supra note 349, at 1232.
510. Wagner, supra note 342, at 293. The comparison of commerce to marriage is, of
course, flawed. The consequences of a sour business deal may be devastating financially, but
do not rise to the emotional fire of a hurtful marriage's impact on both emotional and physical
health. In the words of a critic of covenant marriage, "We are not talking about a business
partner but about the person you wake up in bed with every morning, the person who in a
thousand ways large and small shapes what your life and your children's lives can be." Katha
Pollitt, What's Right About Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A29.
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"Mandatory contracts will allow divorce law to move forward, recognizing the
plurality of marriages that exists today and better providing for partners at
dissolution."51'
But supervows accentuate the paradox at the heart of contract. The individualist
impulse collides with the desire to limit future individualism. Contractual
understandings allow for greater individual scope of action, but still "[e]very contract
reduces freedom."5 12 When extended to family governance, the full panoply of
judicially enforceable duties and consequences appropriate in a business setting
distorts the fundamentals of family life, because commercial remedies are simply too
blunt or ill-suited to the task of structuring intimacy.5"' What Carol Weisbrod termed
the "skeptical position"5"4 in this domestic dialogue asserts that "there are radical and
finally insurmountable tensions between the ideas represented by contract and
family." '51
5
The promises made at the altar are better understood as moral obligations rather
than contractual undertakings. 16 To insist on the business nature of marriage vows
not only demeans their importance, but emphasizes enforcement at the cost of the
very trust most beneficial to the fulfillment of those vows. It is in the nature of
511. Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making a Case for
Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223, 1224 (1993); see also Stake, supra note
367, at 400 ("[N]o change in the law could do more to facilitate private ordering of property
and income after divorce than a requirement that couples choose their own futures.")
512. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 350, at 466.
513. This discussion does not suggest that financial considerations are unimportant in family
law, particularly in connection with the dissolution of a marriage. Judicially sanctionable
obligations to divide property and pay child and spousal support will remain a fixture of
domestic relations. But see David L. Chambers, Comment, The Coming Curtailment of
Compulsory ChildSupport, 80 MICH.L.REV. 1614 (1982) (arguing that the private contracting
process provides an unsound jurisprudential basis for these obligations). Other commentators
note:
The law's tools are simply too crude to adjust conflicts in intimate ongoing
relationships that are shaped by subtle and delicate dynamics. Rather than
stabilizing a cooperative equilibrium, legal enforcement of intramarital
performance is as likely to undermine the relational norms that stimulate mutual
efforts and adjustment.
Scott & Scott, supra note 349, at 1294.
514. Weisbrod, supra note 373, at 778.
515. Id. at 779.
516. In their heuristic attempt to blend family and contract law, Scott and Scott acknowledge
that classical contractual analysis does not square with enforcement of the marriage contract.
Nonetheless, they argue for marriage as a relational contract, defining the legal obligations "in
unusually general terms and... rely[ing] upon social and relational norms to specify and
enforce most of the 'terms' of the bargain." Scott & Scott, supra note 349, at 1249. But the
Scotts' stress on social norms, on party-monitoring of the innumerable transactions effected
during a marriage, and their recognition that "individual failures to perform as promised often
cannot be established with sufficient clarity to permit a sanction to be imposed by a court," id
at 1269, suggest that their use of the contractual model for marriage is largely metaphorical.
This approach may be characterized as contract lite, and while it serves to downshift the
unsavory connection between wedding vows and business contracts, it does so by debasing the
currency of contractual enforcement.
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contract to depend on remedies, but wedging this perspective too tightly into the
family unfortunately converts marriage into an increasingly commercial undertaking,
and ironically exacerbates the effacement of moral discourse from conjugal life.
Entering into a contract, particularly one regulating an intimate association, has a
catalyzing effect. The marriage whose terms are intended to be merely enshrined by
the prenuptial bargain is itself altered by the process of reducing the marital
obligations into enforceable provisions. 51 Contracting has a price, and "approaching
marriage as a bargained-for relationship undermines the cooperative goals of
marriage."""8 Prenuptial contracts may sabotage the "trust, hope, and faith the parties
have in each other,"5"9 and weaken the psychological underpinnings of marriage as
reliance is thrust onto external provisions. A prenuptial contract may begin as a
bilateral document,520 but enforcement is always an individualistic enterprise: "A
marriage contract may glorify independence and self-interest. This will undermine
the sense of partnership and equality that is necessary in a successful marriage."52'
Moreover, if the interjection of private contracts into marriage creates an ironic
subtext, the demand that a couple beforced to freely negotiate these agreements is
oxymoronic. Indeed, the argument for policing contractual freedom by depriving
couples of the freedom not to contract suggests that at least some of these reformers
nurse a paternalistic agenda with regard to the life course of American families.
Initially, it should be clear that coercing someone to make a choice is as paternalistic
as making the decision for that person.5" Disrespecting autonomy in order to "help
517. Consider in that light these observations, intended as advice for lawyers drafting
prenuptial agreements:
You are viewed as an impediment by individuals focused on one of life's
strongest emotions: love. Your attempt to interject rational and logical problem
solving to negotiate a complex contract is often unappreciated. Although your
client may declare a need for the agreement and may have sought out your
services, to a greater or lesser degree, neither party appreciates your intrusion into
their idyllic expectations. No one wants to deal with a subject that is the antithesis
of all of the other acts and thoughts at this moment in their lives. You have asked
them to contemplate divorce and death.
Edward L. Winer, Introduction to PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRArs: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO DRAFrING AND NEGOTIATING ENFORCEABLE MARITAL AND COHABITATION
AGREEMENTs at xiii (Edward L. Winer & Lewis Becker eds., 1993) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONThACrS].
518. WEFMAN, supra note 373, at 243.
519. Ralph Underwager & Hollida Wakefield, Psychological Considerations in Negotiating
Premarital Contracts, in PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS, supra note 517, at 217,
217-18.
520. Note, however, that many premarital accords are later contested on grounds of
overreaching and undue influence. The all-too-frequently-recounted scenario ofabride handed
a prenuptial drafted by her husband's attorney on the eve of her wedding should give pause
to the partisans of'private intimate contracts. See, e.g., Simeonev. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162,168
(Pa. 1990) (upholding a prenuptial contract signed the day before the wedding that gave the
unemployed bride only $25,000 in support payments from her brain surgeon husband).
521. Underwager & Wakefield, supra note 519, at 218.
522. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Morality of Choice: Estate Planning and the Client
Who Chooses Not To Choose, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 31 (1998); Anthony T. Kronman,
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people independently value their contributions in an atmosphere of respect'' 523
constitutes an indefensible abrogation of autonomy. Professor Stake, a champion of
limiting freedom in this fashion, advocates "compelling marrying parties to determine
the economic consequences of their own divorce,"524 maintaining that "[p]erhaps it
is time to abandon the impossible task of telling people what to expect out of
marriage and instead make them choose for themselves. 525 Stake does concede that
his mandatory scheme "substitutes public ordering for private on the question of
whether to choose. 5 26 Having encountered the contradiction in his argument,
however, he evades it by concluding that compulsion "is the only way to assure
meaningful choice on the more important question of what to choose.""52 A similar
lack of respect for autonomy is shown by those who would deny couples who
contractually pledge to wait a specific period of time prior to filing for divorce the
right to mutually change their minds.58 In both these circumstances, the passion to
allow couples the freedom to contract carries these true believers into an argument
past rationality, into one justifying a denial of autonomy in the name of autonomy.
In fact, the motivating force appears to be a sense that couples at the outset of
marriage are more susceptible to agreeing to divorce restrictions. Thus, these
reformers would allow greater latitude for these provisions. Couples who later seek
freedom from these self-imposed fetters may not expect the same approach to
contractual liberality.
But the net effect of private contracting may be pressure to restore customary
gender roles in marriage.529 "[Tihe advocates of covenant marriage want to use
freedom of contract to enhance security of contract in the context of marriage....
they want to throw offthe traditional limits of private ordering in marriage as a means
of returning to traditional marriage. '5 3 Some of these new paternalists aim to reform
marriage in ways which will result in the reinvigoration of traditional gender roles.
Professors Rasmussen and Stake emphasize that no-fault divorce destabilized marital
expectations, so that "[d]evoting time and energy to producing assets useful to the
marriage became riskier. A career became a safer bet for either party."53' Professor
Brinig similarly promotes covenant marriage because it will result in "greater
investment in the sorts of things that make marriages better but that are bad
investments in the less permanent world of no-fault.3 s32 But what are those "assets
useful to the marriage" and "sorts of things that make marriages better"? There is no
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
523. Zelig, supra note 511, at 1223.
524. Stake, supra note 367, at 399.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 400 n.lO.
527. Id.
528. See Scott& Scott, supra note 349, at 1283; Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 350, at476.
529. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women's Freedom To Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1170-71 (1999) (arguing that divorce contracts
disfavor wives).
530. Alexander, supra note 23, at 504.
531. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 350, at 459 (footnote omitted).
532. Brinig, supra note 508, at 8; see GARY S. BECKER, ATREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30-53
(enl. ed. 1991); Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978).
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mystery here. When the new paternalists criticize "selfish career building at the
expense of family" 3 and call for "idiosyncratic specialization within household
production,"534 they aim, whether directly or indirectly, at recreating the gendered
division of labor characterized by husbands in the labor force and wives specializing
in domestic production. Although they make obeisance to nonsexist linguistic norms,
they give pride of place to the "traditional roles" in family life. 35
Their argument claims to repudiate sexism as it asserts the primacy of women as
homemakers. For example, Professor Stake acknowledges his "own prejudices" in
assuming that his daughters Laura and Allison
would make better lawyers than whomever they will marry. I also assume that
they would make much better nurturers and homemakers than whomever they will
marry. The principle of comparative advantage teaches that because Laura is so
much better at nurturing, she and her husband (not to mention her children) may
be collectively better off if she stays home even though she could earn more than
he could on the market. It is, therefore, not only from a sexist viewpoint that I
might wish for her to stay home with her children until they are grown, and
maybe beyond.13 6
Professor Brinig acknowledged the strength of the objection that these
counterrevolutionary divorce reforms "will particularly support traditional marriages
in which the man works in the paid labor force while his wife shuns labor force
participation in favor of domesticity."37 But she responded that the "social gains from
movements toward covenant marriage (or any other regimes that increase marriage
stability) will far outweigh the social costs."5 8
In sum, marriage stability is being purchased at a cost which is unacceptable,
unnecessary, and unknowable. The cost is unacceptable because it seeks to burden
both sexes with outdated role assumptions. It is unnecessary because our shift into a
culture of divorce has ebbed; the lessons of harm to children and the punctured
illusion of freedom in serial marriages have had their sizable impact. Ultimately, the
cost of the grand venture into legally customized marriage is unknowable. This
Article has detailed the ways in which counterrevolutionary reforms aimed at
reincarnating the comfortable and nostalgic past may inadvertently sanction an
uncontrollable future: Ozzie and Harriet transmogrified into Who Wants to Marry A
Multimillionaire?539 We need legislatures to withhold the legal imprimatur from
533. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 350, at 467.
534. Id.
535. See iL at 463, 481.
536. Stake, supra note 367, at 408-09. Notice that Professor Stake emphasized-lest the
point be missed-that his daughters would make "better" lawyers than their husbands, but
"much better" nurturers and homemakers. Id.
537. Brinig, supra note 508, at 12.
538. Id. But cf Bryan, supra note 529, at 1273 (arguing for substantially restricting the
freedom of divorcing parents to contract because ofthe"coercive context in which wives must
negotiate and the dysfunctional results produced by a free-market approach to divorce").
539. The capacity of prenuptial contracting to adumbrate the extraordinary range of marital
expectations was recently illustrated in the televised wedding of millionaire Rick Rockwell.
The groom and the fifty women who desired his hand in marriage had not met prior to the
event Nonetheless, as a condition of their participation, all fifty women signed prenuptial
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radical domestic experimentation, and we need courts to continue to monitor these
agreements for reasonableness, particularly in the emerging area of prenuptial
bargains that oh-so-confidently rely on romantic desire to deny future freedom.
Couples always have and ever will customize their own marriages. The formal legal
system should honor both the freedom of domestic partners to make good decisions
and their legal capacity to unmake bad ones.
CONCLUSION:
DO-IT-YOURSELF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE?
It is difficult to make divorce more difficult to obtain. The past generation has
witnessed two movements seeking to make divorce rarer: the no-fault revolution and
now the divorce counterrevolution. Both movements combined legal and social
elements with the aim of improving family life by dissuading dissolution-minded
spouses. No-fault divorce failed. So will the counterrevolution. The attempt to restore
culpability analysis to center stage in divorce proceedings will, if it passes substantial
political hurdles, succeed only in rendering divorces more antagonistic.
Covenant marriage is the newest weapon of the divorce counterrevolution. Some
couples will, indeed, agree to the more restrictive divorce provisions now available.
Others may take counsel in the state's shredding of the unitary conception of
marriage contracts and devise their own marriage schemes. But the cozy assumption
that private marriage contracts will limit access to divorce court is untested and likely
unfounded. 40 On the contrary, a far more likely reading of the evidence agrees with
Katharine Fullerton Gerould's judgment, rendered three-quarters of a century ago,
that "the perfect marriage is perhaps more worth fighting for than the imperfect
marriage is worth protecting. 54'
agreements with Mr. Rockwell which included waiving the right to claim against his estate if
the marriage failed. See Caryn James, Who Wants To be Retro? Multimillions, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2000, § 2, at 1 (describing television special "Who Wants to Marry a
Multimillionaire"); Michelle Singletary, Millionaire Show Reflects Sad Obsession with Money,
FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 2000, Your Business, at 2 (same).
540. The Pandora's box of marriage contracting is suggested by George Bernard Shaw's
reaction upon reading Annie Besant's contract proposal stipulating the terms of their
relationship: "Good God! This is worse than all the vows of all the churches on earth. I had
rather be legally married to you ten times over." ARTHUR H. NETHERCOT, THE FIRST FIVE
LIVES OF ANNIE BESANT 240 (1961).
541. Gerould, supra note 336, at 470.
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